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"Incentives" is a word frequently on the lips and 
in the writings of men and women who discuss the 
difficult economic situation of Great Britain today. 
An economic crisis of the first magnitudé is upon us; 
production must be increased; time, labour and materials 
are in too short supply to permit the installation of 
the new machines which could effect this increase in 
output; what about the human beings who operate the 
machines? Are they playing their part? Could they be 
persuaded to work harder? And so the question of 
incentives arises. 
This is a much wider question thaninerely a matter 
of payment -by- results; non -financial as well as 
financial incentives must be considered, and the 
psychologist as well as the economist and engineer 
demands a hearing. It is, however, the purpose of this 
research to examine the part which methods of industrial 
remuneration might play in the nation's "battle for 
output ". Consideration of non -financial incentives, 
sales commissions, bonuses for administrators and 
executives, and kindred matters, has been omitted not 
because they are unimportant, but in order to reduce the 
problem to manageable proportions. For the sane reason 
Profit-sharing and co- partnership have been dealt with 
somewhat cursorily; there is a field of research here 
which merits detailed exploration. 
There has been very little quantitative research 
done in Great Britain on incentives since the First World 
War apart from the work of H. M. Vernon, P. Sargent 
Florence, and such bodies as the Industrial Health 
Research Board and the National Institute of Industrial 
Ps.lology. As far as methods of wage payment are 
concerned, although there is a vast literature on 
American experience in this field, very little has been 
written on the problem from the British point of view. 
The Government has apparently realised the need of research 
here, for it has recently appointed(1)a Committee on 
Industrial Productivity under the Chairmanship of 
Sir Henry Tizard, Chairman of the Advisory Council on 
Scientific Policy and of the Defence Research Policy 
Committee. The terms of reference, as given by the 
Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison), 
are: "To advise the Lord President of the Council and 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the form and scale of 
research effort in the natural and social sciences which 
will best assist an early increase in industrial 
productivity and further to advise on the manner in which 
the results of such research can best be applied." 
Research in industrial productivity is difficult for 
a number of reasons. In the first place, one is dealing 
(1) December 1947. 
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with human beings as well as machines; with subjective 
as well as objective factors. There are great 
difficulties in the way of measuring out?ut with any, 
degree of accuracy for the purpose of comparing the 
productivity of different workers or groups of workers, 
employed under different conditions and paid by 
different methods. Working conditions, efficiency of 
machinery, f -lows of materials, and so on, vary so very 
widely from plant to plant that comparisons are difficult 
if not dangerous. 
Even if it can be established that productivity has 
in fact increased, the problem of isolating the real 
cause of the increase remains. Managements are 
constantly striving to improve efficiency by various 
means - incentive schemes, joint consultation, improved 
supervision, welfare provisions, and the like - and it 
is virtually impossible to make any quantitative 
assessment of the comparative value of the various 
measures which have been adopted. In these days one 
can hardly ask managements to co- operate in controlled 
experiments which would isolate cause and effect, but 
which would also seriously retard production during the 
experimental period. 
A further difficulty has been experienced in 
securing factual information, namely the natural 
reticence of the business man regarding the divulging of 
 
information on costs, profits, and so on - information 
which, if made public, might damage his competitive 
position in an already difficult market situation. 
For these, and other reasons, the following study 
is factual but not statistical, and, inevitably in a 
subject of this nature, it is to some extent opinionative. 
Thanks are due to the many employers' federations, trade 
unions, public officials, manufacturers, workers and 
private individuals, who have so readily given what 
information they could from their funds of knowledge of 
this most important and fascinating, but albeit difficult, 
problem. 
CHAPTER I. 5 
INTRODUCTIOTT: THI', INDUSTRIliL CONDITION 
OF BRITAIN TODAY. 
Although the mind of this generation seems to a 
large extent to have became inured to living through a 
succession of crises, national and international, 
political and economic, there must surely be few people 
today Who do not realise that the present economic 
condition of Great Britain is parlous in the extreme. 
As the recent Government White Paper (Cmd. 7046) pointed 
out: - 
"The central fact of 1947 is that we have not enough 
resources to do all that we want to do. We have barely 
enough to d.o all that we must do. Whether we reckon in 
man -power, coal, electricity, steel, or national 
production as a whole, the conclusion is unavoidable. 
To get all we want, production would have to be increased 
u(1) by at least 25 per cent 
What is less generally realised is that the situation 
is fundamentally different from that obtaining prior to 
1939, when a considerable part of Britain's standard of 
living was dependent upon income from foreign investments 
made during the previous century. During the Industrial 
Revolution this country went ahead of the rest of the 
world, and by investing large amounts of capital overseas 
ensured. for succeeding generations an income which they 
(1) H. ,i. S. O. "Economic Survey for 1947" Cnd. 7046. 
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were not reáuired to earn by their own efforts. Thus, 
until the recent war this country was able to import more 
than a corresponding value of exports without getting into 
difficulties. That this factor was an important one for 
our standard of living is patent when it is realised that in 
1939 our foreign investments amounted to about 
£4,000,000,000 and brought in over £200,000,000 each year. 
Another £150,000,000 came in as a result of various services 
- shipping, finance, insurance, etc. - which this country 
rendered to other nations, so that in all we had each year 
some £350,000,000 worth of goods in excess of what we 
produced. Our total imports in 1939 were of the order of 
£884,000,000, so that nearly half of our imports came to us 
as a result of the efforts of by -gone generations; we had 
to work to pay for only some 56% of our total imports. 
During the war so many of these foreign investments 
were sold. in order to pay for food and essential war 
supplies that by the end of hostilities our income from 
this source was reduced by approximately 50% In addition, 
much of our merchant shipping was sunk, (18 million of our 
pre -war total of 22 million tons) so that incane fran this 
source decreased. also. This loss of investment income 
needs emphasis, for it demonstrates conclusively that it is 
not sufficient merely to step production up to pre -war 
standards; we must do more than this to regain our former 
standard of living, to say nothing of raising it. 
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The gravity of the situation was demonstrated in 
August 1947, when the Government brought forward measures 
designed to reduce our foreign spending by £228 millions 
a year. Although this is a colossal sum, it is in fact 
less than half of the great gap which will in some way 
or other have to be bridged. Sir Stafford Cripps, 
addressing over 2,000 representatives of both sides of 
industry, has revealed (October 1947) that our current 
adverse balance is running at the rate of approximately 
£600 million a year, so that, if we are to achieve any 
measure of equilibrium, we still have to make up 
(despite the cut of £228 millions) about £372 millions 
increased exports. the level of 
exports at the time of Sir Stafford's speech was £93 
millions a month, the required increase(£31 millions a 
month) is 33 per cent. This increase is merely to 
avoid, to use Sir Stafford's own words, "a collapse of 
our .efforts ", and will contribute nothing towards raising 
our standard of living. 
It is, then, quite patent that the essential need 
of the hour, as far as industry is concerned, is an 
increase in production per man -hour (P. M. H. as it has 
cone to be known). Add. to the loss of invisible 
exports the fact that we have to make up for the capital 
goods which were not produced during the war, and effect 
C) 
long- overdue repairs to run -down capital equipment; make 
up for damage to houses and productive equipment by enemy 
action, and repay to our creditor countries what we 
borrowed during the war, and it must be realised that the 
urgency of the need is beyond dispute. 
Despite this need, it is well- known that in a nunber 
of key industries productivity per nan-hour is considerably 
less than it was before the war, and it _nay be that this 
decline is even more general. The White Paper(1) reports 
that in the building industry output is "far below" pre -war, 
probably 20 -25 per cent, whilst in 1946 "output of deep - 
mined coal was 259 tons per man co_ pared with 308 tons in 
the peak pre -war year, 1937 ", a reduction of 16 per cent. 
A more recent estimate puts total coal output at 19.7% less 
per year than pre -war, with 7.8% or 61, 000 less workers 
(717, 000 as compared. with 778, 000). The estimated drop in 
output per 'man -year is 8. 4% and in output per man -hour 7%. 
the 6'ifference beingdue mainly to shorter working -hours. 
Although general manufacturing industry has 3-% (239,000) 
more workers than the 6,815,000 which it employed before the 
war, and production per man -hour has gone up by 6%, 
production per man -year has fallen by 7%, largely owing to 
the shortened working week.(2) As regards the cotton 
industry, Sir George Schuster, speaking to the Blackburn 
Chamber of Co: rnerce on October 30th. , 1947, said: 
(1) Ibid. (2) "Business" December 1947 Vol. JXXVII No. 12. 
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"....Two years after the issue of the Cotton Working Party's 
report, output per operative had dropped from 81 per cent 
to 74.8 per cent below the pre -war production per man- tiour.." 
This means that whereas in 1946, production per :pan -hour was 
one -fifth below pre -war, by the end of 1947 it was one - 
quarter below. 
One of the largest textile firms in Scotland employs 
over a thousand more operatives than it would have needed for 
the same poundage of yarn in pre -war days, equivalent to a 
fall in output of some 122 per cent for each worker. This 
is not due to material shortages, but to high rates of 
absenteeism and labour turnover. One of the largest 
Scottish engineering firms reported a similar fall in output, 
due not so much to poor production per man -hour of the 
workers on the bench, but rather to heavy overheads-and the 
large labour -force necessary for maintenance work on old 
machines suffering from war-time overwork. In the iron - 
founding industry falls in production per man -hour of 30 
or 40 per cent are by no means unco.mon, due largely to 
material shortages and the fact that during the war the 
industry was robbed of many of its best workers who are now 
reluctant to goback to their former "dirty" trade. 
The words of the Government poster are by no means 
extravagant: "We're up against it.' We WORK or WANT." 
C H A P T E R II. 
INCENTIV,S TO WORK. 
o 
We have seen that the words of the Government poster 
are indeed a true expression of the present economic 
position of this country, and it is probable that few 
people would deny the validity of its claim. But this 
does not necessarily mean that its appeal will be effective; 
it is a debateable point whether such exhortations - logical 
as they may be - can really be expected to induce the worker 
on the bench, the clerk in the office, and the directors in 
the boardroom so to increase their efforts that output is 
substantially increased. The output of the individual 
worker seems to him to be so remote from, and so 
infinitesimal in comparison with, the fortunes of the 
nation as a whole, that the average man, whilst he may 
agree with the sentiments expressed, remains for all 
practical purposes unmoved. 
Undoubtedly education of the general public to a 
sense of responsibility for the welfare of the community 
as a whole can do something towards a solution of the 
problem, but it can do nothing towards changing the 
fundamental nature of men and women, that nature which 
determines what their motives, desires, thoughts, actions 
and reactions will be. In the speech already: referred to, 
Sir Stafford Cripps realised. that the problem was much 
more fundamental than merely one of education; he said:- 
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"I wish that today our country could refresh its heart and 
mind with a deep draught of that Christian faith which has 
come down to us over two thousand years, and has over those 
centuries inspired the peoples of Europe to fresh efforts 
and new hopes. It is that spirit, and not our own 
material hopes and difficulties, that can be the most 
potent source of our inspiration, call it by what nane you 
will - self- sacrifice, honour, love, or coaradeship. It 
is the strongest power in our lives, and at this moment of 
deep difficulty in our history we need its supporting 
strength as never before." 
Satisfaction There is little doubt that the best work is done by 
in work. 
the Ulan who finds a sense of purpose in his job, the man 
who works because he enjoys it, and derives pleasure and 
satisfaction from it, the man who labours for "the love of 
craft, the love of achievement, the feeling that "heist" 
contributing something of hand and brain that remains 
something personal and intimate after it has been created." 
(William Morris) 
As Tolstoy once said "Labour must be acknowledged not as a 
curse, but as the joyful business of life." But this was 
very much easier in the old days of craftsmanship than it is 
today, for whilst the craftsman who creates his own design, 
prepares his own raw materials, and sees his job through 
from start to finish, can without question find satisfaction 
for his creative impulses in his everyday work, it is very 
difficult for the factory hand working on a conveyor belt 
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to do the sane. Ever since the Industrial Revolution, 
the nu.aber of real craftsmen employed in industry has been 
growing smaller, and the vast majority of workers today are 
employed on monotonous repetitive or routine jobs in which 
it is inevitably extremely difficult to find any real sense 
of purpose or fulfilment. A correspondent in the "Times" 
commented upon the broadcast statement of the Lord 
President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison) that "most 
talk about incentives is bunk ", and said "Some sections of 
the community have always worked for non - material reasons, 
i.e. because their work gives there some positive, immediate 
and continuous satisfaction. It is the lack of this 
satisfaction in the work of the coal -miner or crossing - 
sweeper that is the primary problem today "(1) 
Many attempts have been made by various means to 
increase the satisfaction to be derived from the mundane, 
common -place tasks of the majority of workers in our 
Stakhan- highly industrialised society. The Stakhanovite Movement 
ovism. 
of the Soviet Union, which stimulated Russian production 
ten years or so ago, is a case in 7)oint. Alexei 
Grigoryevich Stakhanov was a miner in the Donetz coalfield, 
who became highly efficient with the pneumatic drill, so 
that whereas the average output of a miner was about six 
tons per shift, Stakhanov cut between twenty -five and 
(1) Mr. Nigel Falthin in the "Times" September 1947. 
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thirty tons daily. In 1935 the output of the Central 
Irma pit was lagging, and methods of stimulating an increase 
had to be sought. An enterprising official, Petroff by 
name, thought of using Stakhanov as an example, and on 
August 30th. , with an appropriate audience, the crack 
miner was set to work with a team of labourers to fetch and 
carry for him. That day he cut 102 tons of coal, and 
Petroff sent the news far and wide by press and radio 
throughout the Soviet Union. The Stakhanov Movement was 
launched, and everyone was talking about it. Every mine . 
sought for its own champion worker who might become its 
"Stakhanovite ";. a competitive spirit was fostered; a 
sense of purpose beat Stakhanov's record - 
was found, and consequently production was given a very 
powerful impetus indeed, so that the Central Irma pit 
increased its output by forty per cent. The Movemnerit 
spread and was adapted to other industries - the motor 
industry, the shoe manufacturers, agriculture, all 
produced their own Stakhanovite champion, and before long 
it had the backing of Stalin and the Soviet Government. 
Stakhanov himself was publicly decorated by Stalin with 
the Order of Lenin, he was handsomely rewarded by the 
State and feted by an adoring populace. The movement 
was given great publicity by press, radio and cinema, and 
Stakhanovite meetings were held in thousands of factories 
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and collective farms. Although the fervour eventually 
declined there is no doubt that the productivity of the 
average Soviet worker was permanently and substantially 
increased. In 1942 the Engineering and Allied Trades Shop 
Steward National Council recommended that the system be 
introduced in Britain, and in December of that year 
trophies were presented in London for the biggest increases 
in production during Soviet Anniversary Production Week. 
National- It is often claimed as one of the great advantages of 
isation. 
nationalisation that it causes workers to feel that they are 
working directly for the community rather than for individual 
capitalists, and so makes them readier to work harder to 
increase production. Certainly during the war - and 
especially during the Dunkirk period - the patriotic stimulus 
of service for the common cause was a very powerful element 
in increasing the output of the tools of war. It is, 
however, doubtful whether in peace -time this sense of service 
to the community would be an altogether effective substitute 
for the more mundane incentive of a larger pay- packet. 
Even during the war, large wage increases had to be given, 
and workers had to be directed into essential jobs. Nor 
did employers entirely disregard the financial incentive, 
for the 100 per cent Excess Profits Tax imposed in 1940 had 
to be modified during the following year, so that 20 per cent 
was treated as a post -war credit. The conclusion that non- 
financial incentives cannot entirely take the place of the 
stimulus of money rewards, is endorsed even in the 
experience of that country which has gone farthest along 
the road away from capitalism - the U.S.S.R. In the 
early days of the present regime, the dictum "From each 
according to his ability; to each according to his need" 
held sway, and it was said that even the eminent scientist 
Pavlov received less remuneration than the miner, because 
he required less food to keep him alive and fit for work. 
Nowadays however, payment -by- results is almost universal, 
and wages rise very steeply for the highly- skilled worker, 
who also receives privileges and preferences of a non- 
financial nature. On the other hand inefficiency or 
laziness incur the most severe penalties. 
Hawthorne This is not to say, however, that non- financial 
Experi- 
ments. incentives do not have their part to play. The 
investigations carried out by the Harvard School of 
Business Administration, and popularly known as the 
"Hawthorne Experiments" shewed that many factors other 
than the purely financial had an important bearing upon 
workers' output. These experiments were carried out 
between 1927 and 1932 in the Western Electric Company's 
large factory at Hawthorne, Chicago, and have been fully 
reported in a number of publications(1). 
(1) Vide: "Personnel Journel" Feb. 1930; Mayo: "Human 
Problems of an Industrial Uivilisation" (Chaps.3 -5); 
T.N. Whitehead: "The Industrial Worker" (Harvard Business 
Review July 1934) and "Social Relationships in the Factory" 
(The Human Factor No v 195); Roethlisberger: 
"Management and MoraLe1. & 'Management & the Worker ". 
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A small group of five skilled female operatives was selected, 
and set to work on their usual tasks, but in a separate test 
room. They were asked to co- operate in the experiments, the 
purposes of which were explained to them. They were asked 
to work normally, without trying to increase output, and they 
were kept on the same group piece -rate on which they had 
for.ierly worked, except that now, of course, the group was 
much smaller. 
Surprising increases in output were recorded; in the 
second year output rose by 20%, and subsequently was main- 
tained at a level of 40% above the original figure, for a 
period of three years. Once the girls realised that they 
were taking part in an experiment they took an added interest 
in their work, and did not need to be supervised. They 
were told to work, as they felt, and this sense of freedom 
seemed to destroy the barrier of suspicion between them "and 
the management. They felt that they had added status, no 
longer being merely factory workers, but collaborators in an 
important research project, who were consulted by the manage- 
ment, and allowed to develop their own initiative. Working 
as they did in a small group, the girls developed a strong 
community spirit, and took over their own supervision, 
working together as a team. All these and many other 
factors which the experiments revealed prove that non- 
financial stimuli do exist even in modern industry, and have 
a most important part to )lay. As Professor Dewey has 
said: "There is nothing in industrial production which 
of necessity excludes creative activity." (1) 
Non -financial There is undoubtedly a great field for research in 
Incentives. 
this problem of non -financial incentives, but it is more 
within the province of the industrial psychologist than the 
business administrator, and it is not proposed to do more 
than mention them here. To sum up: apart from the 
incentive of personal gain or loss, probably the most 
important influence upon a worker's output is his attitude 
to his work. In order to afford him intrinsic satisfaction, 
it must seem to him to be wroth while, that is, he must 
find in it fulfilment and sense of purpose. In order that 
this may be so he must be able to see where his own 
contribution to output fits into the general scheme of 
things, and the work of LIr. R. B. Wolf in his American plant 
is relevant here. (2) Having been appointed manager of a 
paper pulp mill in New Hampshire, U.S.A., Wolf sought to 
step up production by replacing the existing time -rate 
system by one of piece -work, but to this the mill -owner 
objected, so other means of increasing and improving output 
had to be found. He developed the use of charts which 
shewed the workers both the quantity and the quality of 
their output, and this engendered a competitive spirit among 
the workers which resulted in both an improvement and an 
(1) J. Dewey: "Human Nature and Conduct" 
(2) Dickinson "American Tre}Js in Industrial Incentives" 
(Occupational PsycT ology, Winter 1938 
 
enlargement of output. Ever: effort was made to enable 
the workers to understand the processes of production, and 
the factors which made for high quality. As a consequence 
the workers felt that they were an important part of the 
scheme of things, their sense of responsibility was 
enhanced, and their creative instincts satisfied. 
Then again, production is improved if there is a spirit 
of co- operation both among the workers themselves, and 
between them and the management. The Hawthorne Experiments 
already mentioned proved this beyond any shadow of doubt, 
and it has been the practical experience of many employers 
consulted during; the course of this survey. One Edinburgh 
firm in the biscuit trade attributes its excellent industri_ 
relations to the fact that it has maintained its traditional 
nature of a "family business "; the workers have free access 
to the management, and. the latter make a -point of mixing 
with the workers not only on business, but also on social 
occasions. The worker is enabled. to see his place in the 
organisation by means of talks given by members of one 
department to those employed in others, end record charts 
prominently displayed in the workshops shew the progress of 
both the shop as a whole and of the individual workers in it. 
Finally there must be absolute justice in the relations 
between management and men; once a man has a sense of 
grievance he never gives of his best. Favouritism, 
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nepotism, an agressive dictatorial attitude, these are the 
worst possible disincentives; it is the employer who can 
inspire the loyalty and confidence óf his men who will 
achieve the best results. 
C H A P T E R III. 20 
THE POWER OF THE FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TODAY. 
Although there is roan for considerable difference of 
opinion regarding the relative importance of the various 
incentives, financial and non- financial, there is a very 
large body of opinion which considers the financial 
incentive to be supreme, at least in our modern, mass - 
production society. In this connection it is interesting 
to note an experiment made in the Rowntree Cocoa Works, 
and reported by the Labour Manager, Dr. C.H. Northcott. (l) 
Certain groups of girl workers, who had formerly been paid 
on a piece -work basis, were changed over to a flat tune -rate; 
based on the previous piece -work earnings, and such that no 
worker received less than she had done under the old system. 
Next the management analysed the process of manufacture 
to discover factors which could be reduced to measurable 
standards for the purpose of stimulating the interest of 
the workers in the attainment of (a) better Quality and 
(b) increase( output. Each day the girls were individually 
"rated" by these standards, and the results posted both in 
figures and as charts. Opportunity was given for the 
workers to discuss relevant matters, air their views and 
grievances, and make suggestions. Every effort was made 
to give the workers a complete understanding of the work 
in which they were engaged, so that their interest would 
be aroused and held. 
(1) C.H. Northcott: "Personnel Management; its Scope 
and Practice ". 
a 
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The success of Mr. Wolf's experiments in the U.S.A. 
was not repeated in the Cbcoa Works. Although there was 
a slight increase and improvement in output, the workers 
did not like the scheme, and p articuIrly objected to the 
substitution of the time -rate system for piece -work, the 
rating of the workers, and the posting of the charts. 
They claimed that piece -work was fairer, in that earnings 
varied directly with effort, and they preferred it also 
on the grounds that, under piece -work, the worker could 
set his own pace within reasonable limits, whereas, under 
time -rate, supervision had to be more strict. Here, it 
will be noticed, the non -financial incentive of a sense 
of freedom, is coupled with the financial incentive 
afforded by the piece -work system. 
It is beyond dispute that "the human donkey requires 
either a carrot in front or a stick behind to goad it 
into activity. "(1) Take that somewhat hackneyed model 
of the professional economist - the 'primitive man' who 
is entirely dependent for his livehihood upon the goods 
and services which he himself produces. He must grow 
his own food - or starve; he must kill animals for their 
skins - or go naked; he must build his own house - or 
go without shelter; he must gather his own firewood - 
or stay cold. The incentive here is simple and direct; 
the harder he works, the more food he has to eat, the 
(1) "The Economist" 29th. June, 1946. 
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wanner is his body, and the more comfortable his home. If 
he is lazy or incompetent, it is he and his family who suffer; 
The disincentive is equally simple and direct. There is a 
positive and effective incentive to greater effort to be 
derived from the knowledge that he himself and his family 
will benefit directly thereby. Equally truly there is a 
positive and effective deterrent to laziness and incompetence 
in the fact that they will be the direct cause of the 
discomfort and possible starvation of himself and his fanny. 
Self- It is fashionable today to claim that human beings are 
interest. 
not motivated by self -interest such as this, but there can 
be no doubt that, despite higher education and wider culture, 
self -interest is, to the ordinary man, his primary concern. 
It is certainly unfortunate that this is so, and selfishness 
is not to be commended, but it does not lessen the truth of 
the statement; the theological concept of "original sin ", 
humiliating though it bein is fundamentally sound. In 
view of this inescapable fact, it is useless for us to try 
to build an economic society based on the Marxist precept 
of "from each according to his ability, to each according 
to his need." "However much we approve of discarding the 
whip of economic pressure, it would be foolish to shut our 
eyes to the fact that, when society discards it, it discards 
the biggest single incentive to effort so far discovered.. "(1) 
This analysis must now be adapted. to the conditions of 
our present -day highly industrialised society, far removed 
(1) Nigel Balchin, in "Occupational Psychology" July 1947 
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from the 'primitive peasant' of our model. Here, 
the simple, direct connection between effort and reward, 
or idleness and loss, does not exist, and as a 
consequence the difficulty of maintaining efficient 
incentives is very greatly increased. 
Special- In our modern exchange economy, each individual is 
isation. 
to some extent a specialist, producing goods or 
performing services not for his own direct needs, but 
to exchange via the medium of money for the goods and 
services which other people supply and which he himself 
needs. Thus, the miner who cuts more coal does not 
directly increase his own domestic stock of coal and, 
if he paid on a time basis, may not receive any 
additional benefit at all. It is, therefore, Quite 
feasible for a man to put forth extra effort and skill, 
and yet receive no extra reward. Indeed, where the 
time -rate system of payment is in operation - and it is 
still the commonest form of wage payment - this is the 
rule rather than the exception. 
On the other hand, the reverse may be true, for 
everyone receives goods and services from the various 
agencies of State and Municipal governme nt, ,rrespective 
of how hard he works, or even of whether he works at all. 
These public services - education, parks, libraries, 
roads, clinics, pensions, family allowances, 





important part of our standard of living, and, being 
paid for as they are out of taxation, come to the 
individual irrespective of the amount of effort and 
skill which he puts into his work. It is a clearly 
defined tendency today for the scope of such social 
services to be increased - "social security" from the 
cradle to the grave is the declared aim of all political 
parties - and this inevitably means that the incentive 
to hard work tends to diminish. 
Every extension of the field of social security 
reduces the effectiveness of both the "carrot" and the 
"stick ". So also does the policy of "full employment ", 
a further principle to which every political party is 
committed. With both full em-mloyemnt, and 
comprehensive social insurance, the worker knows that 
it is highly improbable that he will lose his job, and 
if he does he will not suffer unduly because his needs 
will be met by national insurance. The direct 
incentive which impelled the primitive peasant to work 
because if he did not he would starve, has partly 
disappeared in our modern society. 
All these measures of social security and public 
seriice have to be paid for, of course, and the 
consequent high taxation still further reduces the 
power 6f the financial incentive. Moreover it has 
always been considered, one of the canons of taxation 
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that it should be "progressive ", i.e. the higher one's 
income, the higher the rate of tax one has to pay, and 
from the point of view of social justice there is no 
doubt that this is a sound principle. Unfortunately 
it would be difficult to devise a system more calculated 
to blunt the edge of the financial incentive for, the 
more a worker earns, the larger the proportion of the 
additional earnings which are taken in taxation. Add 
to this the present system of ''pay -as- you -earn" whereby 
tax is deducted immediately wages are earned, and a more. 
direct "disincentive" would be hard to find. Indirect 
taxation acts in precisely the opposite manner, for if 
this forrn of taxation is imposed, and as a consequence 
prices of the taxed goods rise, there is automatically 
an incentive to earn more in order to buy the goods at 
their enhanced prices. 
Then too the reduction in income tax allowances, 
and the general rise in wage- levels, have brought into 
the tax -paying class multitudes of workers who never 
paid income -tax before. Existing income tax payers had 
suffered the gradual rise of the standard rate to the 
present 9/- in the pound, but these new tax payers have 
had to endure this high rate from the very beginning, 
and the shock of this experience has certainly been 
responsible for much resentment, absenteeism, and the 
lack of effort, !'since the workers believed that if 
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they worked after Thursday they had to give up half of 
what they earned to the Government ".(1) It has been 
suggested that "targets" for production should be 
determined, with bonuses payable for output in excess 
of this figure, and that these bonuses should be paid 
free of income- tax.(2) Doubtless this would be 
frowned upon by the Treasury, but at present we have 
the completely illogical position of a low rate of tax 
on lore output, and a high rate of tax on high output, 
which, in view of the clamant need for increased 
production, does not make sense. The decision of the 
Chancellor in the April 1948 Budget to widen the band 
of income payable at reduced rates of tax does something 
to alleviate the position but does not remove the 
disincentive of continuing high direct taxation. 
The Old Testament prophet of 520 B.C. might have been 
writing of today when he said He that earneth wages, 
earneth wages to put into a bag with holes Ye 
looked for much, and lo it cane to little, and when ye 
brought it home, I Lid blow it away. "(3) 
If this tendency to reduce the power of the 
financial incentive by heavy taxation and the extension 
of the social services is to be reversed, it will 
involve a fundamental change in social policy. If 
taxation is reduced in order to restore the power of 
(1) C.A. Lidbury: "A National Wages Policy" p.35 
Ibid, 
(3) Haggai, chapter 1, verses 6 and 9 (M.V.) 
the a!oney incentive and so increase the national 
product, it will have to be at the expense of a less 
egalitarian society. We have come to the point when 
we must make up our minds which is the more important 
- a larger national product, or a more equal division 
of a smaller total. Recently our national policy has 
been to reduce inequality of incomes by direct taxation, 
but the more successful this policy is, the less 
incentive there is to hard work, and the less 
unpleasant are the results of indolence. 
Diminishing A further influence upon the power of the financial 
returns 
incentive merits attention. No -one would deny that a 
rising standard of living is a good thing, but from the 
point of view of incentives it does mean that the 
attraction of additional earnings progressively 
declines; the economist's "law of diminishing marginal 
utility" applies to income just as much as to the 
consumption of goods. "There is a world of difference 
between saying 'He who does not work shall not eat' and 
'He who does not work shall not have a radio or a 
refrigerator'. All experience suggests that beyond 
a certain quite early stage the promise of higher wages 
for higher effort brings diminishing returns ".(1) 
Even if piece -rates are in operation, it is the 
experience of employers that workers set themselves a 
(1) Nigel Balchin in "Occupational Psychology" July 
1947. 
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certain wage, which they consider will give there a 
reasonable standard of living, and when that level of 
earnings has been reached they do not feel it worth their 
while to exert themselves further in order to earn more 
money. "The classical exanple of this attitude is the 
miner who was brought before a recent iflmister of Mines as 
a persistent absentee. The minister said, 'They tell me 
you work four days a week; why is that?' The miner 
replied, 'Because I find I can't earn what I want in 
three.' If we assume that a man works because he must, 
we shall often get this reply and it will be a fair and 
logical one.'i(1) After all, leisure is just as much a 
part of one's standard of living as ordinary goods and 
services such as food and housing; a man inay quite 
rationally prefer a smaller pay -packet with time to enjoy 
it, to a larger one and less leisure. The demand for 
leisure, less responsibility, or less hard work is just 
as real as the demand for a loaf of bread or a packet of 
tea. It does not normally become effective however until 
the normal subsistence demands have been satisfied, and 
this normal standard of living varies with the social 
group to which the individual belongs. Where it is low, 
the point at which the demand for leisure becomes 
insistent is soon reached; where it is high, the 
tendency to slack off will not come so quickly. This 
(1) Nigel Balchin (ibid). 
Shortages. 
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fact has an important effect on the present output 
problem. Recent decades have seen rapid rises in the 
wages of the working classes, whose standard of living 
has always been somewhat low. Consequently, once 
subsistence demands have been satisfied, the demand for 
less hard work and more leisure becomes effective at a 
fairly early stage, and more pay for more work loses some 
of its attraction and incentive power. The so- called 
middle classes are in a different position; their 
standard of living has been comparatively high, but their 
salaries have not kept Dace with rapidly rising prices 
and rates of taxation, and as a consequence they are 
willing to work harder in order to satisfy the conventional; 
needs of their social group. The importance of this 
phenomenon from the point of view of wage -payment is 
obvious and in order to counteract the tendency towards 
diminishing marginal utility of earnings, some employers 
have experimented with systems of payment by results which 
give an increasingly large reward for each unit of 
production drove a certain level.(1) 
A further factor tending to reduce the power of the 
financial incentive is one which - one hopes - is merely 
a temporary phenomenon, viz. the general shortage of 
consumer goods. Workers argue "Why should I work hard 
to earn more money when I can't buy what I want with it ?" 
(1) Vide post: chapter ::I:.. 
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and there is undoubtedly force in the argument. 
Recently it was agreed that more consumer goods should 
go to the mining areas in order to encourage the miners 
to earn more money. 
In Belgium this factor is given such importance 
that the Government has adopted a policy diametrically 
opposed to the British programme of "austerity ". 
"The British slogan is 'Export or die'; the Belgian is 
"Fill the shops and we will fill the ships.' By 
filling the shops a tremendous spur has been given to 
production. Because there are goods to buy, people work 
and strive to make money. The shops, the restaurants, 
provide visible and obvious incentives (the) will 
to work is fortified by well- filled stomachs and by the 
abundance of goods that can be bought without coupons ".(1) 
Which policy is right - the British or the Belgian 
only history can decide. 
Restrict- Finally, consideration must be given to a factor, 
ionism. 
which, unfortunately, cannot be regarded as temporary, 
viz. the restrctionist attitude of mind which in recent 
decades seems to have developed in both organised labour 
and organised capital. The trade unions grew up 
against a background of surplus labour and unscrupulous 
exploitation, and consequently their whole policy was 
directed towards the protection of their members. 
Restrictive practices which effectively prevented any 
(1) Paul Bareau, in the "News Chronicle" 11th. Sept. 1947. 
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great increase in output were introduced, and in many 
cases still remain to this day - the fixation of maximum 
rates of working for individual jobs; opposition to 
Payment-by-results, and preference for the simple time - 
rate system; hostility to mechanisation; go -slow tactics; 
guaranteed weeks; protection of lazy or incompetent 
workers against dismissal - such practices as these are 
inconsistent with conditions of full employment, shortage 
of labour, and clamant need for increased production in 
order to secure the economic survival of the nations. 
Nor is organised capital exempt from this criticism. 
Recent decades have seen the rapid development of the trade 
association movement, designed to eliminate "destructive 
competition " - the only effective spur to efficiency 
known to a free society. "Self- government for industry" 
means the protection of the inefficient, high -cost 
producer, and the discouragement of the enterprising 
manufacturer anxious to reduce costs and prices and expand 
his market. 
"The whole process of removing both the carrot and 
the stick has culminated in the extraordinary circumstance 
of today.... Nobody gains anything from activity or suffers 
anything from inactivity. There is hardly a flavour of 
carrot or a shadow of the stick. And yet we wonder why 
the donkey does not break into a trot. "(1) 
(1) The "Economist" 29th. June 1946. 
CHAPTER IV. 
AGî S: Sa-iE PRIiLI:,iINARY COIdSIL2,RATIOIdS. 
If, as has been argued above, the financial 
incentive, with all its limitations, is still the 
d.onilnant motivating force in industry today, the 
desirability of discovering the most satisfactory 
system of wage payment for each individual set of 
circumstances can hardly be over- emphasised. In 
the search for the ideal, it is necessary to bear 
in ;Hind the attitude of both employer and employee, 
for if the wage - system is not acceptable to both it 
will fail in its purpose, however good its theoretical 
basis may be. The worker will judge any system of 
wage payment by at least two criteria, viz. (a) 
whether it is a fair return for the efforts that he 
makes on behalf of his employer, and (b) how it 
compares with the remuneration gained by workers 
-oerforaing similar functions in other undertakings. 
The essentials of a good incentive plan will be 
discussed in a subsequent section dealing with payment - 
by- results; here it may be said that the wage system 
must serve to promote confidence, understanding and 
goodwill between management and men. The design and 
working of the system should be fade clear to the workers 
before its introduction, in order to avoid misunder- 
standing and ill- feelings later on. 
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Wage The employer will judge the system as to whether 
Criteria. 
or not it induces the worker to produce the largest 
possible output, consistent with the desired standards of 
quality, and the most economical use of materials. 
If the wage system results in increased efficiency, and 
consequently increased productivity, overhead charges 
per unit of output will be reduced. A very large 
proportion of the total costs of every industrial 
undertaking consists of fixed charges, costs which do 
not vary directly with output, e.g. lighting and heating 
charges, repairs, depreciation, expenses of administration 
and maintenance, and so on.. If oncost per unit of 
product declines as output expands, and direct costs 
(e.g. materials, direct labour, etc.) per unit remain 
constant, then clearly total costs per unit of product 
will fall. Herein lies the great advantage of a system 
of wage payment which encourages workers to increase 
their output. 
Again, a good wage system will result in less 
wastage of time and materials, and decreased costs of 
supervision. If it is directly in the interests of the 
worker to work steadily and efficiently, he will to some 
dxtent be his own supervisor. Not only will this 
reduce the costs of supervision, but it may also improve 
employee relations by removing the sense of grievance 
which is so frequently induced by the constant pressure 
upon the worker of his supervisors. If this is so, 
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and improved industrial relations result, not only does 
the employer gain from enáhnced efficiency, but also 
from the reduction in labour turnover. A constantly 
fluctuating staff is a recurrent source of trouble and 
expense for training and equipment, and has a bad effect 
upon the firm's reputation in the labour 
Thus,the importance of a good system of wage payment 
is beyond dispute, and in the following pages an attempt 
will be made to deal with those systems which are 
commonly found in, or which might profitably be adapted 
to, British industrial practice. The ground to be 
covered may be mapped out thus : - 
1. The time -rate system. 
2. Payment -by- results, i.e. remuneration based 
on output: 
(1) Individual output: (a) Piecework. 
(b) Bonus systems. 
(c) "Points" systems. 
(2) Collective output: Group incentives. 
3. ierit- rating schemes. 
4. Profit- sharing and Co- partnership schemes. 
Overtime. 
CHAPTER V. 
TI-íL TIIGZIE-RATE SYS'I'1;ïdl. 
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This is the simplest and commonest form of wage 
payment in Great Britain, although nowadays the number 
of workers paid on time -rate is decreasing relative to 
those paid in other ways. According to a recent 
Government estimate(1) 70% of British manual workers in 
manufacturing industries were paid on a time basis, that 
is to say, they gave their services to their employers for 
an agreed sum of money per hour, per day, per shift, per 
week, or per annum. If the time unit is a day or a week, 
the number of hours to be worked during that period will 
be fixed, and any time worked in excess of that number of 
hours will count as overtime, and be paid for at an 
enhanced rate, as will also night duty and Sunday duty. 
The extra payment for overtime is usually expressed as a 
fraction of the noraal rate, e.g. time and a quarter, time 
and a half, double time, and so on. The ratemay be 
progressive according to the duration of the over -time, 
say time and a quarter for the first two hours, time and a 
half for the next two, and so on. 
It is very easy for employers to think that production 
is directly proportional to time worked, but experience 
during both the World Wars showed that as a general rule, 
overtime is an uneconomic proposition, one to be avoided 
as far as possible. In the first place, workers may be 
(1) The Minister of Lemur, 25th. November, 1947. 
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tempted to "go slow" during the normal working hours, in 
order to necessitate the working of overtime, which will be 
paid for` at the enhanced rates. This difficulty becomes 
increasingly acute as the working day is shortened both by 
legislation and by trade union agreement. The employer 
must take steps to keep up output by increasing the 
efficiency of his supervision, or else he must change over 
to payment by results in some form or other. 
Maintaining For example, one large firm in the light metal trade 
Output with 
Time-wage makes it a matter of policy not to have piecework in any 
form, and is, therefore, restricted to using the time-rate 
system. During the war this rule was relamed and a 
production bonus instituted, but the original policy was 
reverted to when the war was over. To maintain and 
increase productive efficiency under these circumstances 
was a difficult problem, and the factory manager, who was 
a man of considerable experience and initiative, comménced 
a training scheme for members of the supervisory staff, 
with the object of increasing their efficiency. He coached 
them, prtly in the firm's time, in management subjects, so 
that the floor management and supervision were better 
equipped for their tasks, and the training was taken down 
to chargehand level by means of a T. W. I. ( "training within 
industry ") scheme. In addition the supervisors come on 
duty in their departments at least a quarter of an hour 
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before the shift, and they personally hand out the cards 
to employees with a "Go,..)d morning" as they c .ock in. 
The time clocks are locked two minutes after the starting 
bell, and any latecomers have to see their supervisors 
before starting work. These measures have been quite 
successful, and the firm claims that its post -war 
production is at least equal to anything that was achieved 
before the war, and in many cases it is better. 
Quite apart from any question of deliberate idling, 
however, overtime output is usually uneconomic owing to 
the fact that a worker's reserve of strength is strictly 
limited. After Dunkirk, the supply position was so acute 
that extremely long working hours were instituted,, but 
it was soon found that a greater output could be achieved 
by cutting down this excessive working time, which only 
resulted in undue fatigue. 
Lack of The great defect of the time -rate system is that the 
Incentive. 
sane rate :nay be paid to workers who show wide variations 
in ability, energy, initiative, and output. A worker's 
earnings bear no direct relation to his individual output, 
although probably the time -rate has been calculated with 
reference to the average output of large ntu hers of workers, 
and the employer no doubt expects a certain amount of work 
to be forthcoming; if it is not, the worker may be 
dismissed. When this minimum expectation of work is 
rigidly fixed, and the worker is set a definite output 
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per working period, time -work becomes "task- work ". If 
the man fails to reach the task he may be dismissed, or 
have a proportionate deduction made from his wages. This 
systan is st rongly opposed by the trade unions, and does 
not exist in any of the organised trades. F.W. Taylor's 
"differential piece -work system" shews some likeness to 
this idea of "task- work" in that the slow worker, who 
receives the lower rate, is very heavily penalised. It 
is more generous than the "task -work" system, however, 
in that the good worker does at least get a bonus. 
The fact that all workers in the sane grade receive 
the sane wage me ans that there is no financial incentive 
to increase output, and the good worker feels that it 
is not worth his while to put forth extra effort when 
his less conscientious colleagues receive the same pay 
for doing less work. If the time -rate system is an 
incentive at all, it "is an incentive to mediocrity - 
an incentive to attain mediocrity, but because of the 
deep -seated human yearning for a 'fair deal', also an 
incentive not to exceed. it. " (1) Consequently the 
amount of output depends either upon the goodwill and 
conscientious attitude of the workers, or upon the 
effectiveness of the supervision and the fear 
of 
dismissal. In conditions of full employment, 
such as 
exist in the present immediate post -war 
period, the 
latter stimulus loses a good deal of its 
power, and 
(1) E.D. Smith, in "Handbook of Business Administration" 
p. 1159. 
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there are widespread complaints among employers of a 
lack of discipline and will to work. Since full 
employment is the declared policy of all shades of 
political opinion, this problem is not merely one for 
the transition from war to peace. 
The time -rate system is that which appears most 
commonly in collective agreements between employers and 
the trade unions, since it lends itself to application 
to large classes of workers as a minimum agreed rate. 
Traditionally, the trade unions have favoured uniformity 
for the same occupation and locality, and have frowned 
upon wide individual differences, due to their desire 
to maintain union solidarity and a collective spirit. 
It is much more difficult to negotiate standard piece - 
rates than standard time- rates, owing to the wide 
diversity of conditions, methods, materials and equipment 
to be found in the various factories concerned. For 
these reasons the time rate has become the basis of 
collective bargaining in the majority of the highly 
unionised trades. A less logical reason for trade union 
support for the time rate system is the fear that if 
piece -work is introduced and output is thereby increase4 
this will result in increased unemployment. However 
sound the economists' "long -run" arguments to the 
contrary may be, they fail to convince the average 
working man or his union leader. 
40 
Advantages Despite the fundamental defect of lack of incentive, 
of Time -work. 
the time -rate system offers the considerable advantage of 
simplicity. Wages calculations are a simple matter of 
multiplication, on the basis of the workers' time - cards. 
No complicated and difficult piece -work pricing is 
required, and the worker has a known and easily calculable 
wage, which is more stable than he would obtain under any 
aystein of payment -by- results. 
In certain circumstances the tune -rate is the only 
satisfactory method of wage payment, as where the amount 
of a worker's output is to a large extent outside his own 
control. The engine- driver, the box -office or lift 
attendant, the school- teacher - these obviously cannot be 
paid by results. Then again, the worker employed on a 
conveyon -belt or assembly line has only indirect control 
over the amount of his output; his rate of working is 
determined by the speed of the conveyor or automatic 
machine. It matters little in such cases whether the time 
rate or the piece -work system is in operation, for it 
virtually amounts to the same thing. 
In the Ford plant at Dagenham the plain time -rate 
system is employed. Workers are divided into five groups - 
tradesmen, production workers, general workers (groups A 
and B) and women. There are probationary hirinz_, rates, 
and automatic increases after three months' service, but 
no payment- by- reults. The element of incentive is 
quality. 
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introduced by offering to the good worker facilities for 
training for a higher -rated group, and by a system of 
"merit pennies" by which pennies are added to the hourly 
rate by departmental heads for efficient work and long 
service. So many of the Ford employees have their speed 
of working determined by conveyors or machines that the 
time -rate system is adequate for these mass- production 
conditions. It has been suggested. in connection with 
the Ford plants in America that "he (Henry Ford) may also 
be influenced by the desire to devise and install labour- 
saving equipment' without having to worry about the 
adjustment of piece- rates, or the question as to how the 
resultant labour savings should be shared. "(1) 
Where quality is far more important than quantity, the 
time -rate system may result in less spoilt work. Payment- 
by-results may be so efficient an incentive to increased out 
put that, in their haste and anxiety to earn bonus, workers 
may produce shoddy work which causes loss rather than gain 
to the employer. This danger can be averted by more 
efficient methods of quality control, however, and a 
number of firms engaged in precision work report no 
difficulty in connection with the maintenance of their 
standards of quality when systems of payment -b y- results 
are employed.. 
One of the most successful methods of maintaining 
(1) Balderston, Karabasz & Brecht: "Management of an 
Enterprise" p.205. 
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output both quantitatively and qualitatively when hourly 
rates operate is the development of individual records of 
efficiency, which are used as the basis for promotion and 
wage increases. In this way efficiency is indirectly 
connected with earnings, and an approximation to payment - 
by- results is achieved. A Scottish firm in the bakery 
trade computes the efficiency of each operative on the 
basis of the number of units produced, and posts these 
efficiency coefficients periodically on the works notice - 
board. It is, however, found that the workers respond 
less satisfactorily now to this non -financial incentive 
than they did before the war, when jobs in other under- 
takings were less easy to find. 
This adjustment of the time -rate in accordance with 
a worker's efficiency would seem to be a way out of the 
impasse connected with the lack of a financial incentive 
to increase output. Since the more efficient or 
energetic worker is worth more to his employer, there is, 
prima facie, no reason why he should not be paid more, 
although in some cases trade union opposition would 
prevent this. In the engineering industry, for example, 
there are "ability" or "lieu" rates, and workers on 
difficult jobs or working complicated machines may 
receive "differentials" of varying amounts. Many fins 
have found, however, that once a worker has been given 
such an enhanced rate, he tends to claim it as 
of right 
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for all time, and resents any reduction even if his 
efficiency subsequently declines. This resentment may 
be avoided only by the development of a systematic scheme 
of merit- rating, with the adoption of clearly defined 
standards, and this will be discussed fully in a later 
chapter. 
Clerical and It is usual for clerical, technical, executive and 
Other staffs. 
administrative staff to be remunerated on a time basis, 
almost invariably an annual rate or salary. It is very 
difficult to evolve any systematic method whereby payment 
to such staff is in accordance with output; consequently 
a flat rate is paid, the amount being dependent on the 
nature of the business and the work óerforned, the 
responsibility of the post, the qualifications and 
training required, and the salaries paid for similar 
posts in other businesses. As far as possible the 
employer will try to pay his salaried employees 
according to their value to the company. 
Where a fairly large number of clerical workers is 
employed, it may be possible to standardise and grade 
the posts for salary and promotion purposes. For 
example, the clerical posts on the main line railways 
are all placed into one of six classes: "special ", 
first, second, third, fourth and fifth, depending on 
the responsibilities of the post, the amount of 
experience and training required, the position in the 
Summary. 
4 4 
organisation chart, the number of men supervised, and so 
on. The junior clerk starts in the lowest class - the 
fifth - in which he receives regular annual salary 
increments until he reaches the maximum. No further 
salary increases are given unless he is promoted, usually 
to a class 4 post, in which there will again be a minimum, 
maximum, and intermediate increments. 
Promotion continues through the grades, each 
promotion involving transfer to a higher -graded post, 
until the more fortunate member of the staff reaches the 
"special" class. These posts are those where the work 
done is valued not by the time the employee puts in at 
his job, but by what he actually contributes towares the 
progress of the firm; posts in which the occupant is 
required to exercise independent and critical judgment, 
make major decisions, control large numbers of staff, and 
so on. In these ranges, salary is determined more by the 
worth of the individual to the company than by the 
requirements of the post. 
There is no doubt that the time -rate system offers 
the very substantial advantage of simplicity, and places 
a salutary emphasis upon quality of workmanship, which 
payment -by- results tends to ignore. It suffers from the 
fundamental defect, however, of the complete lack of 
financial incentive to increase output, a lack which 
would seem to be fatal in these days of stringent need 
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for production, and on the other hand steady decline in 
that moral calibre which prompted the craftsman of a by- 
gone.day to work conscientiously irrespective of the 
stimulus of increased remuneration. Two ways out of 
the impasse seem to exist, viz. (a) payment -by- results 
in its various forms, and (b) daywork with some system of 
merit -rating, and both of these cneth.ods are discussed 
at some length below. 
Sliding -Scales: Before leaving the time -rate system, however, 
(a) Cost of Living, 
mention must be made of a refinement which has sometimes 
been introduced, namely the adjustment of wages by 
sliding -scale arrangements. In a large number of 
industries there exist collective agreements whereby 
wage -rates are periodically adjusted on an agreed basis 
in accordance with changes in the official Cost -of- Living 
Index. The purpose of such arrangements is to relate 
wages to changes in the cost of living so as to maintain 
the level of real wages in tines of rising prices. The 
method grew up out of the period of rising prices during 
and after the 193.4 -18 War, and became popular during 
the immediate post -war years. After 1922, however, 
its popularity declined and the =her of workers 
covered by such arrangements fell from three millions 
to a million and a half in 1939. During the Second 
World. War some schemes were abandoned, notably those 




the method (coal -mining, iron and steel, cotton, tobacco, 
etc.) and it was estimated that in 1914 two and half 
million workers(1) were covered. by arrangements of this 
kind. The range of industries includes mining and 
quarrying, pottery, iron and steel, textiles, clothing, 
tobacco, woodworking, building, and so on, and in some 
cases cost -of- living sliding scale arrangements are 
included. in orders issued under the Wages Councils Act, 
1945. 
The details of the schemes vary widely both in method 
and in complexity. A fairly simple arrangement operates 
in the tobacco trade;(2) no addition to base -rates is 
made if the cost of living figure is 65 or less, but if 
it is more than 65 but not more than 114, the following 
additions to baserates are made for each unit by which the 
cost -of- living figure exceeds 65; male workers 21 years 
of age and over 42d. per week; male workers under 21, 
3d. per week; female workers, 3d. per week. For example, 
if the cost -of- living index stood at 99, the additional 
amount for an adult male would be 42d. x 34 = 12/9d. per 
week. If the index rises above 114, the following 
additions are payable: adult males, 18/9d. per week; 
males under 21, 12/6d. per week; females, 12 /65.per week. 
In 1940 the cost -of- living sliding scale arrangement 
was introduced into the coal -mining industry.(3) 
(1) "Ministry of Labour Gazette" June 1944. 
(2) Notice N.(26) issued. by the Tobacco Trade Board 




A uniform flat -rate addition per shift is paid, subject to 
quarterly review on the basis of changes in the cost -of- 
living index. The amount of the addition is ascertained 
each quarter by multiplying by 0.7d. the number of points 
by which the index number for the previous month exceeds 
55 (the index for 1st. September, 1939). No alteration 
is made, however, unless and until the index shews a 
variation of five points or more from the number on which 
the last alteration was based. Thus, if the index stood 
at 100, the addition would be 0.7d.. x 45 = 2/8d. per shift. 
No alteration would be trade to this figure unless the index 
number dropped to 95 or rose to 105. 
In both spinning and manufacturing sections of the 
cotton industry, sliding scale arrangements operate. 
In the latter section of the industry, there is an agree - 
ment(1) which provides that the rates of wages operative 
in September 1939 shall be regarded as the base- rates, 
cotresponding to a costof- living figure of 65 points, 
and that for each four points variation in the cost -of- 
living index these base -rates shall be raised or lowered 
by 22 per cent. the review to take place quarterly. 
/(3) By agreement of 20th. March, 1940 between the Mining 
Association of Great Britain and the Mineworkers' 
Federation of Great Britain. 
(1) Between the Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' 
Association, and. the Northern Counties Textile Trades 
Federation, 16th. January, 1940. 
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Criticisms The official Cost -of- Living Index upon which these 
of the Index. 
and other sliding -scale wage schemes have been based has 
New Index. 
been the subject of much justifiable criticism. It was 
first introduced during the First World War and was designed 
to measure the monthly increase in the cost of maintaining 
unchanged the standard of living of the average working - 
class household in July 1914. The index was based upon an 
enquiry into some 2,000 working -class budgets made by the 
Board of Trade in 1904, and it took account of changes in 
the retail prices of a wide selection of the (then) 
principal items of working -class expenditure, including 
food, rent, clothing, fuel and light, soap and soda, 
domestic ironmongery, brushes and pottery, kitchen hardware, 
tobacco and cigarettes, fares and newspapers. The items 
were weighted according to their relative importance in the 
working -class budget of that day. 
An index which reflected the living habits of nearly 
half -a- century ago is obviously an unsatisfavtory basis for 
a.wd 
wage -payment; the working -class standard of living, £ter 
the way in which people spend their income hart changed 
enormously in the intervening years. In 1937 -8, therefore, 
the Ministry of Labour investigated for a full year the 
household expenditure of some 9,000 working -class fanilies, 
and it was found that a much smaller proportion of income 
was being spent on food, leaving more for "other items ". 
The intervention of the War precluded any steps being taken 
As a result of this investigation, but in 1946 a 
Coimnittee(1) was set up and it issued its interim report 
in March 1947. This recommended the adoption of an Interim 
Index of Retail Prices to replace the old Cost -of- Living 
Index. The recommendation was followed and the 1914 
index officially passed out of existence on 17th. June, 
1947, the base -date chosen for the new Interim Index. 
How obsolete the old index had become is demonstrated by 
the changes in the new one; instead of only fourteen 
food items, 47 are now included; instead of a very few 
"other items ", the new index includes expenditure on the 
cinema, football matches, radio sets, vacuum cleaners, and 
so on. These'bther items" which were only weighted at 
4 per cent in the old index, are now weighted at 16 per 
cent with an additional 24 per cent for items not 
included at all in the 1914 index. Another outstanding 
change is that the weighting for food has been reduded 
from 60 per cent to 35 per cent. 
Thus, the new index will reflect much inore accurately 
than did the old one, how people spend their income today, 
and, if it is incorporated in revised sliding - scale 
agreements, these will therefore be so much the more 
satisfactory. It is doubtful, however, whether this 
method of deliberately and directly linking wages to 
prices is desirable, especially in the present economic 
context. 
(1) Committee set up by the Minister of Labour, under the 
chairmanship of Mr. R. M. Gould:, Chief Industrial 
Commissioner of the Ministry or La our. 
o 
It should be the basis of wage policy to make wage 
increases dependent upon increased production, and to 
make relative wage levels in different industries indic- 
ative of their relative importance in the national economy, 
At a time like this, when price -levels are to a considerable 
extent "artificial ", this policy is not consistent with 
cost -of- living sliding -scale arrangements. These latter 
only serve to make even more automatic the operation of 
the "vicious spiral" of inflation. 
Other Sliding The linking of wage -rates with sliding- scales other 
Scales. 
than the cost -of- living scale has been adopted in certain 
industries, but the m ajorLty of these schemes were 
abandoned during the recent War or replaced by cost -of- 
living scale arrangements. Outstanding among these w as 
the agreement operating in the iron and steel and 
associated industries, where wages were periodically 
adjusted according to changes in the selling -prices of the 
output of the industries, e.g. pig -iron, which determined 
the wages of blastfurnacanen in some areas. 
The usual procedure was for a base -rate of wages to 
be taken as corresponding to a certain selling price, 
and for each variation of an agreed amount in this price 
a percentage was added to or subtracted from the base- race. 
The ascertainment of selling -price was usually undertaken 
monthly or Quarterly by joint accountants representing both 
employers and employees. 
The plan is said to have worked smoothly for many 
Coal. 
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years, and to have earned for itself a high reputation as 
a factor in industrial peace, but it was not generally 
applicable to the fluctuating conditions of war, and in 
1940 it was replaced in most cases by a cost -of- living 
scale. In the manufacture of coke and by- products in 
the Durham area, however, the price -scale system is retained.;' 
when the aver-ge realised price of coke at the ovens is at 
or under 18/- per ton, 30 per cent is added to the basic 
shift rates; for every increase of 4d. per ton up to 24/ -, 
the percentage addition is increased by per cent, and for 
every increase of 6d. )er ton thereafter by 1 per cent. 
Until 1944 there was an arrangement in the coal- mining 
industry whereby wages were periodically adjusted in 
accordance with variations in the proceeds of the industry 
in each district. The aggregate proceeds of the industry 
were ascertained from returns made by the owners and 
checked by auditors representing employers and men. 
Certain specified. costs were deducted from this total, and 
the balance was divided in agreed proportions between wages 
and profits. This method of regulating wages was suspended 
for a period of at least four fears under an agreement 
reached on 20th. April,1944, and the percentage additions 
operative at that date were merged in the day -.and piece- 
rates payable. 
Whilst all these sliding -scale arrangements have their 
merit, they do not get to the root of the problem of the 
time-rate system. None of them gives to the worker that 
which daywork so sadly lacks, namely a direct incentive 
to increase efficiency, and without this incentive no wage - 
system can be said to be entirely satisfactory. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
PAYMENT-BY- ú E SUL'l'S. 
It has already been suggested that the fundamental 
defect in the time -rate system of wage payment is the 
lack of direct financial incentive to improve production. 
The authors of a standard work on management problems 
contend: "By emotional appeals or driving, management 
may secure eighty or ninety per cent efficiency without 
the use of direct incentives; but some extra output can 
be secured only by an appeal through the pocket -book. 
What is equally important to management is that a 
financial incentive tends to act as a ratchet, and to 
keep efficiency from retrogression, when the management's 
attention is diverted to other problems. "(1") 
Reasons for There is no doubt that the present century has seen 
extension of 
P.B.R. an increasing proportion of workers in the industrialised 
countries paid by one or other of the payment --by- results 
systems. This has been due to a number of reasons; in 
the first place, the increasing mechanisation and 
apecialisation of industry has largely removed the old 
incentives of pride of craft and satisfaction in the job 
itself, and a financial incentive has had to be put in its 
place. Then again, two major wars in a generation have 
demanded the maximum productivity from a labour force 
reduced by the prior claims of the armed forces, and 
(1) Balderston, Karabasz & Brecht: "Management of an 
Enterprise" pp.200 -201. 
every avenue for securing an increase in output has had to 
be explored. Thirdly, there has developed an increasing 
consciousness among the working classes of their rights in 
society, which has led to the feeling that it is only just 
for a man to be rewarded according to the mount of work he 
performs. The traditional attitude of the trade unions 
has been in favour of the flat time -rate, but most good 
workers like to be rewarded for their superior skill and 
extra effort, and in the majority of cases the unions now 
accept payment -by- results but with certain reservations. 
Quite apart from the incentive value of increased pay 
for increased work, payment -by- results seems to stimulate 
the desire to excelt and introduces an element of interest 
and competition into the job, which to some extent 
compensates for its monotony. The mere fixation of 
standards for piece -work purposes sets the worker a target, 
gives him something to aim at, provides an opportunity for 
him to assert his importance and superiority, and thereby 
diminishes boredom and increases satisfaction in work. 
The managing director of one firm which has managed to 
increase production per man -hour by 216 per cent since 1938 
claims that the secret is simply a combination of payinent- 
by- results and democratic scientific management. He said 
"Without payment -by- results you haven't even started on 
output -boosting. Even when you get that-it can yield no 
more than a 40 per cent boost. The next 20 per cent 
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increase can only come from the workpeople's willingness to 
co- operate fully in managerial suggestions." This 
particular undertaking aupnents its piecework system with an 
output competition. On the factory wall is a production 
chart in the form of a greyhound track, which, with three 
dogs moving round the rim, shows the progress of the various 
departments in the current month's production race. If the 
target is beaten, every worker gets a free packet of twenty 
cigarettes each month; if not, the lagging dog shews the 
section holding the team back - apparently an effective 
stimulus to greater effort next month. 
Effect of The fixing of standards for payment -by- results is also 
P.B.R. upon 
management. an incentive to improved management. Rate- 
especially if time and motion study methods are employed - 
involves careful analysis of methods and organisation of 
production, which almost invariably shews up directions in 
which improvements may be effected. In this way efficiency 
is increased quite apart from the increase derived from the 
financial stimulus given to the workers to produce a greater 
output. Indeed, the workers who are paid by results can 
generally be relied upon to make sure that management does 
its part. If they are held up through bad organisation of 
factory routine, bottlenecks in the productive processes, 
badly maintained machinery, and the like, their bonus is 
affected, and there will be im. iediate demands for redress, 
Only if management is efficient can labour earn the maximum 
Aft 
bonus, and only if labour earns the maximum bonus 
(compatible with the maintenance of standards and the 
avoidance of undue fatigue) can management earn the 
maximum profits. Thus the interests of the two sides 
are made to coincide, and there is therefore a much 
better chance of success being achieved. Due to this 
coincidence of interest between management and men, 
supervision under payment -by- results does not need to 
be so strict as under the time -rate system, and this 
greater sense of freedom is appreciated by many workers. 
Government Both the Labour Government and the Conservative 
attitude to 
P.B.R. Opposition have recently endorsed payment -by- results. 
In the Government White Paper "Economic Survey for 1947 "(1) 
it was stated "....Increased output per man -year is the 
only way to expand production and the standard of living. 
The way to effect this is by the organised combined effort 
of men, management, and machines.... It is necessary to 
build up the factories into productive units of the 
highest efficiency....For this purpose also, the 
Government attaches great importance to the introduction 
of systems of payment and other arrangements which 
provide the maximum incentive to increase output...." 
Opposition The recent statement of Conservative industrial 
attitude. 
policy(2) included the following paragraph: "We have 
already stated that it is our policy so to adjust direct 




taxation that extra effort is encouraged and not retarded. 
We wish to see such encouragement of effort adopted 
throughout the whole system of wage payments, as it is 
already in many industries. Basic wages there must be. 
But extra reward should always be linked with extra effort 
and initiative. There are many different ways of giving 
piece -rates and bonuses. The circumstances of each 
industry differ so greatly that we would not be dogmatic 
about the methods; but the adoption of the principle we 
regard as essential." 
Even in Soviet Russia where one might expect to find 
an economic system based on the maxim "from each according 
to his ability; to each according to his need ", the once - 
despised payment -by- results systems are becoming more and 
more widely used. The collective agreementssigned in 
April 1947 between the industrial trusts and the trade 
unions embody these principles.(1) There are fixed 
standard novas of output; production in addition to these 
is even better rewarded than hitherto, whilst output below 
the norm is penalised through decreasing scales of payment. 
These standard norms were raised by the 1947 agreements, 
so that in order to maintain his income, the worker has 
to produce more goods. Output over the standard norm 
earns no extra reward, moreover,if costs of production 
rise together with output, and in some industries lowering 
(1) "Economist" 22nd. March, 1947. 
Disadvantages 
of P. B. h. 
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of costs is made the condition for payment of bonus. 
Coitunent__r g on this situation, a writer in the "Economist" 
states; "The strong bias in favour of incentive wages in 
the past undoubtedly stimulated the growth of an elite of 
skilled workers in Russia; and to this extent it has been 
justified by the results. But an over -emphasis on 
incentive wages may also lead to undesirable consequences. 
The lower -paid worker becomes disgruntled and unwilling to 
produce. The enterprising individuals grow even more 
enterprising, while the unenterprising mass grows rather 
apathetic. "(1) It would seem, however, that if the 
"unenterprising mass grows rather apathetic" despite the 
strong financial stimulus of an out -and -out payment -by- 
results system, it would_ be even more apathetic without it, 
It :.gust, however, be conceded that payment -by- results 
is by no means a universal panacea; it is suited only to 
certain sets of circumstances, and even here it has certain 
disadvantages. Both employers and workers agree that wage 
incentives .nay lead to a deterioration in the Quality of 
work produced; in his anxiety to earn bonus there nay be 
a tendency for the worker to hurry unduly and so oroduce 
a shoddy job. Speaking at the 1947 Annual Conference of 
the British Association in Dundee, iviiss Iïorah M. Davis 
referred to a pilot investigation(2) she had recently 
(1) Ibid. (2) "Report of a Pilot Investigation by 
Miss Norah M. Davis, M.A. on the Attitudes of Building 
operatives towards their Work and Working Conditions" 
(Industrial Health Research Board) 1947. 
conducted into incentives to work in the building industry. 
Some of the actual comments of the men regarding P.B.R. 
were: It scamps work an sets employees against each 
other." "It is bad for the workmen, the job and the 
community. It beings in bad feeling and shoddy work." 
"You can knock a screw in with a hammer quicker than put 
it in with a screw driver," Of the total number of 
operatives questioned (400 men) 14.25 per cent objected 
to payment -by- results for this reason. A joiner said 
"I badly want more money, but not by payment -by- results. 
Money's got too strong a pull. I'm afraid it would make 
me do bad work and then I should lose my self-respect. 
So daren't risk it." is, no 
in the majority of cases why adequate syste_as of 
inspection and quality control should not eliminate the 
danger of bad workmanship resulting from the introduction 
of payment -by- results. 
Sometimes workers feel that piece -work, by 
increasing production per man-hour, will reduce the 
number of men required, and cause unemployment. That 
this fear had some considerable justification in times 
of depression there is little doubt, and the average man 
has little faith that the present post -war ph.nomenon 
of shortage of labour can be perpetuated by the 
politicians' and economists' plans for "full employment ". 
G 0 
As Whiting Williams said: "Let a man live for years 
underthe daily pressure af that narrow margin between 
job and no job, let him observe, day after day, that 
when some men work it appears to mean that for exactly 
that reason other men cannot work, then the most 
important factor in his whole life is sure to be the 
conviction that there simply isn't enough work to go 
round." 
Then again, some contend that payment -by- results 
causes undue speeding -up which gives rise to excessive 
fatigue. Doubtless, wage incentives may cause excessive 
fatige, but that in practice they do so is improbable, 
since, after the transition period is passed, workers 
tend to adjust their speed of working so as to avoid over - 
tiring themselves. They quickly realise that beyond a 
certain point the extra effort involved is not worth the 
extra bonus earned.. Mr. H. M. Vernon of the Industrial 
Fatigue Research Board made some interesting investigations 
into this problem in 1928.(l) The men concerned. were a 
group of seven "blendpullers" whose job it was to lift 
and move on trolleys cases of tea weighing 130 pounds. 
On time -rates they averaged 156 cases per day over a 
period of three months, but in the autumn of 1927 they 
were made the subjecta of time- study, and were given a 
substantial bonus for all cases pulled in excess of a 
fixed minimum. In consequence their output rose 
(1) Reported in the Journal of the National Institute of 
Industd.al Psychology (London) January 1929. 
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steadily until in February the maximum figure of 323 cases 
was reached, more than double the normal number. The 
following week, however, there was a sudden drop to 270 
cases, and it was quite obvious that the men were suffering 
from over -fatigue. Mr. Vernon writes: "The finn became 
seriously alarmed that the men, in their keenness to earn a 
large bonus, might be permanently injuring their health, 
and they asked my advice. As I have had considerable 
experience with men engaged in heavy work in coal mining, 
iron, steel and tinplate production, where many of the men 
have to perform very arduous work at high temperatures, I 
was able to assure then that blend- pulling was not so 
strenuous as the work of these men, and that there was no 
inherent reason why the pullers should injure their health 
by over -exertion. They simply had not adjusted their 
effort to their working capacity. Most of the skilled men 
in the heavy trades mentioned are paid at a straight piece - 
rate, so they have an even stronger incentive than the 
blend- pullers to achieve amaximun output. Yet they 
manage, by long experience, to avoid a condition of over - 
fatigue. "(1) After a warning from the management against 
over -exerting themselves, the men settled down to a steady 
average of 302 to 320 cases a day, and they neither 
complained nor shewed any signs of undue fatigue. 
Wherever the product, the materials .used, and the 
methods of manufacture can be sufficiently standardised so 
(1) Ibid. 
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that differences in output will be almost entirely due to 
differences in skill or effort, there is a very strong 
prima facie case for payment -by- results. Even if this 
degree of standardisation is not possible, but the 
product is readily measured in cluantittative terms, as 
for example in coal- mining, payment -by- results is still 
possible. Wage incentives designed to increase output 
are particularly advantageous where oncosts are very 
high, and in this case, even if neither conditions of 
work nor product can be standardised., there will be a 
strong tendency for payment -by- results to be introduced. 
CHAPTER VII. 63 
THE EXTENT OF PAYMENT -BY- RESULTS IN BRITISH INDUSTTRIES. 
In the majority of British industries payment -by- 
results is practised in one form or another, and to a 
greater or lesser degree. A recent survey(1) covering 
the major trades of this country shewed that 64.5 per 
cent of the fins questioned operated some kind of wage 
incentive scheme, although of these 10.8 per cent qualified 
their statements in that the schemes only applied to 
certain departments or certain occupations. An American 
investigation,(2) concerned only with the machine and metal 
manufacturing industry, shewed that 77 per cent of the 
firms questioned employed payment -by- results schemes, the 
most popular being the "standard- hour" plan (40 per cent) 
and straight piece work (35 per cent). 
Góal- minim. The coal mining industry has come to be regarded as 
one of the most important in the British economy, and in 
this industry piece -rate working is the nonüal practice 
anong the direct workers underground, who number about 40 
per cent of the total labour force. It is frequently 
found that the incentive power of the piecework system is 
limited for a number of reasons. In the first place the 
fear of rate - cutting has long been a deterrent to maximum 
output; men of different degrees of skill and physical 
(1) "Personnel Management and Welfare" June 1947. 
(2) "Factory Management & Maintenance" Sept. 1946 (U.S.A.) 
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ability sometimes unite in striking a common level of 
output - less than the potential output of the litter 
workers - because to work harder and earn more would be 
to risk a reduction in their piecework rates. A retired 
sine- manager of long experience in the Scottish nits 
reported that when he started work as a young man in a 
Lanarkshire mine, he found that all the men working in 
squads of three or four to a ''place" produced the sane 
amount of coal, despite the fact that some were better 
workers than others. The better squads went home earlier 
than the others instead of working a full day and earning 
more money. On enquiring; the reas mn for this, he was 
told that if they did so the tonnage rate would be reduced 
by the management, according to the pace set by the better 
workers. Sometimes a four day week only was worked - 
known in Lanarkshire at the time as the "Four Day Week 
Policy" - to achieve the sane end. 
Quite apart, however, from the question of rate - 
cutting, the stimulus of payment -by- results is limited in 
mining because of the peculiar and often very unpleasant 
circumstances of the industry. The ordinary face -worker, 
so long as he is physically robust, requires comparatively 
little training for his job, and a substantial wage can 
be earned by the fairly new recruit. Probably no other 
trade offers such quick returns to boys leaving school 
as mining does, and these circumstances tend to encourage 
65 
a short -1 ;ern attitude to life. Then again, despite all 
the improvements of recent decades, mining is still an 
arduous and dangerous occupation, calling for s4stained 
physical effort of a very intensive nature. The miner 
works in artificial light and in a cramped posture, with 
distinctly unpleasant conditions of heating and ventilation, 
so it gives little cause for surprise that the shorter the 
time he works, the better the :Hiner is pleased. He soon 
reaches the point at which he regards the possibility of 
earning extra money by producing extra output as not worth 
the effort and discomfort involved, and after that point 
the power of the financial incentive fails. 
Discussion with officials and miners alike confirms 
the view that further increases in wages and bonuses on 
production will do little to increase output, as,once the 
point at which the miner is able to satisfy his normal 
requirements is passed, an increase in earnings only tends 
to encourage absenteeism, due, not to wilful laziness, but 
to the pressure of unpleasant conditions of work. 
-Fc+d 
There is, however, a case extending payment -by- results 
to oncost workers, perhaps in the form of a collective 
bonus based on a seam or colliery, in order to give these 
time -workers a more direct interest in the output of their 
pit, and to bring their wages more into line with those of 
the miners at the coal -face. The fact that the wages of 
indirect workers are considerably less than those of 
T rann o rt. 
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workers at the coal face was the cause of a recent strike 
in Lanarkshire.(1) In one particular colliery, the men 
who set the machines for the removal of the coal were 
paid sixteen shillings a shift as against a possible 
thirty -five shillings for men working at the coal face. 
Transport is of necessity a time -rate industry for 
the most part. Obviously the running staffs - drivers, 
firemen, conductors, and the like - cannot be paid by 
results, although there are "mileage bonuses" for engine - 
drivers, and it has been suggested that an extension of 
the payment of bonuses for prompt running might improve 
rail and road time- keeping. The manufacturing and repair 
work undertaken by transport organisations 
opportunities for the introduction of piece -work and 
bonus systems, and in railway workshops payment -by- results 
is very co.rnnonly found. This type of work, however, 
cones under the heading of engineering, to be considered 
later. 
Payment -by- results is extensively employed in dock 
work, and it is estimated that it now governs the gay of 
about 90 per cent of the workers. (2) Waterside work is 
extremely varied, and the piece -work schedules are 
consequently of a very complicated nature, the rates 
varying accoriing to the type of cargo handled, loading 
(1) October 1947. 
(2) "Economist" 20th. Sept., 1947. 
facilities at the dock, type of ship, and so on. 
Coal trirmning and bunkering, and the handling of products 
such as grain, timber, ores, and other cargoes the quantity 
of which is easily calculable in terns of weight or 
measurement, lend themselves easily to piece work. 
Customs and conditions, facilities and mechanical equipment, 
vary widely from port to port, however, so that efficient 
local negotiating machinery for the agreemènt of rates and 
the interpretation of points of difficulty becomes an 
obsolete necessity. Despite the inherent difficulties 
of waterside work, payment -by- results seems to work 
comparatively smoothly, and it is beyond question that 
without it the turn -round of ships would be consEerably 
slowed down. 
Metal Trades. The iron and steel industry is very largely a piece- 
work industrn it was recently reported that incentive 
schemes of various kinds apply to about 85 per cent of 
the men in the industry.(1) This means that the direct 
workers are virtually all on some form of payment -by- 
results, the reason being that the product is more or less 
standardised and easily calculable on a tonnage basis for 
rate -fixing purposes. 
Iron -founding falls into two broad groups, loose -box 
moulding, and the light casting trade. The former, 
in which the work is heavy, highly skilled, specialised, 
and organised on a job - production basis, is mainly a 
(1) "Economist" 15th. November, 1947. 
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time -bate trade. The latter, the production of rain -water 
and soil gutterings, pipes, etc. is more repetitive in 
nature, and lends itself to piece -work. In the industry 
as a whole, about 40 per cent of the workers are on piece- 
work, but in the moulding trade (light castings) the 
proportion rises to 85 per cent. This is because the 
repetitive nature of the work makes it more easily adapted 
to piece -work conditions. For the rain water and soil 
goods there are national piece -work price lists; in other 
trades prices are fixed by mutuality so as to give an 
average of 33 per cent over time rate.(1) In all 
foundries there are large numbers of workers other than 
moulders, many of whom must be paid on a time basis because 
of the nature of their work. Payment -by- results has 
recently been extended to pattern- makers, fonnerly regarded 
as exclusively a time -rate trade. Prices are expressed 
not in money terns, but in terms of time; this "standard 
times system" obviates the difficulties involved in 
changing piece -work prices every time base rates are altered. 
General The structure of British engineering is extremely 
En. ineering. 
diversified, and as a consequence both payment by time 
and payment -by- results are very widely found. Historically, 
the engineering trade unions have for long objected to 
payment -by- results, but despite this there has been a 
definite expansion - particularly during the two World Wars 
- of the practice of paying on an output rather than a 
time basis. Accoming to a recent Ministry of Labour 
(1) per National Light Castings Ironfounders' Federation. 
Survey, just under half the workers employed in the 
engineering industry are now paid by results.(i) 
Speaking before the National Arbitration Tribunal in 
December 1941, Sir. Alex. Ramsay, Directs of the 
Engineering and Allied Employers' National Federation, 
gave the following figures : - 
Category 
Percentage of workers on 
Time Wages Piece Wages 
Fitters 
Turners and machine worker 
32. 6 67.4 
at or above fitters' rate 25. 0 75. 0 
Turners and machine worker 
below fitters' rate. 20. 6 79. 4 
Lab ourers 81. 96 18. 04 
All classes combined 40. 6 59. 4 
(1) "Ministry of Labour Gazette" October 1947. The 
detailed figures for April 1947 were: - 
General Engineering and Iron and Steel 
Founding: Timeworkers 54% Pieceworkers 46% 
Electrical Enginering: 46 54, 
Marine Engineering: 60 40 
Constructional Engin- 
eering: 53 47 
Motor, Cycle, and 
Aircraft Manufacture 
and Repair: 48 52, 
70 
The above figures would cover some one and a half million 
workers in general engineering, and do not include railway 
workshop staffs. Of these latter, it has been estimated(l) 
that in 1944 some 49,000 were time workers and 51,000 piece- 
workers, whereas in 1939 the bulk of rai hay workshop staffs 
were on time -work. The increase in payment -by- results, both 
in the industry generally, and in rf.lway shops particularly, 
would be partly due to the fact that in 1944 many workers 
were employed on munition work, which is more easily adapted 
to this _nethod of payment, for it affords long runs of 
repetitive jobs. 
Ship- building. Piece -work is very widely found. in shipbuilding, since 
boiler -making, rivetting, drilling all lend themselves to 
this form of payment. Both standard price lists and mutual 
agreement of piece -rates are employed in the industry, and the 
effect of the two,World Wars, with their desperate need for 
more ships both merchant and naval, has been to extend the 
scope of payment -by- results very considerably. The standard 
price lists are negotiated separately for each district, e.g. 
the Clyde and Tyneside areas, and there are lists for riveters, 
platers, drillers, etc. In rivetting, payment is made on a 
squad basis, in accordance with the standard price -list per 
100 rivets. In hand rivetting the squad consists of two 
riveters, a holder -up, and a rivet heater; in machine 
rivetting, only one riveter is required per squad. The 
(1) Dr. W. McLaine, Assistant General Secretary, Amalgamated 
Engineering Union, in the "International Labour Review" 
June 1944. 
Wood-working,. 
earnings of a squad are paid by the employer to the 
squad leader, and he makes the distribution along the 
members of his gang. In plating, the price -lists are 
individual yard lists, as the conditions of working are 
very important in this trade and they vary widely from 
yard to yard. For larger jobs, the "contract" method 
of piece -work is applied. E tricians, joiners, pluraberq 
shipwrights and painters were traditionally paid on day - 
rates, but during the war they changed over to the 
contract system of piece -work and this generally still 
operates. Lieu rates are paid to workers who are 
usually remunerated. on a piece -work basis, but are 
working on ship ree,air work which is not considered suited 
to payment -by- results. Such men as rivetters, platers 
and. drillers, who are usually paid on a piece -work basis 
would not be willing to go on repair work on time -rates 
without some additional incentive. 
The woodworking crafts, comprising joiners, 
carpenters, coachbuilders, wheelwrights, patternmakers, 
and so on, are almost exclusively paid on a time basis. 
Inddecl, it has been the policy of the Amalgamated 
Society of Woodworkers to insist upon this. During 
the recent War, however, trade union rules were relaxed, 
and payment -by- results introduced, especially in the 
case of woodworkers engaged in the shipbuilding and 
ship -repairing trades. 
7 2 
Printing. In the general printing industry the normal basis of 
payment is a straightforward time rate. There is a certain 
amount of piece -work, principally in the binding section of 
the industry, and there are some old- established piece -work 
price lists covering the composition of type for newspapers. 
Schemes of payment -by- results have not been generally 
introduced, although the matter has been discussed in the 
Joint Industrial Council_ and has the support of many of 
the firms in the Industry, who hope that the tradit ional 
dislike of piecework may be removed. 
Textile Trades: The wages of 47%0(óf cotton workers are paid on a 
Cotton. 
piece work bas. Collective bargaining between trade 
unions and employers' associations is highly developed, 
and as a consequence, piece -work prices are fully 
organised in standard price lists, applicable over a 
considerable range of the industry. As the piece -work 
system is so important in the cotton industry, it will be 
dealt with more fully in a subsequent section. 
Wool. The system of standard piece -work price lists which 
is so highly developed in the cotton industry is not found 
to anything approaching the same agree in the other 
textile trades. Price -lists are certainly used in the 
woollen and worsted industry, but they are usually local 
lists, very much less intricate and comprehensive than 
those in the cotton industry. Payment -by- results, and 
the system of standard price- lists, is widely employed 
(1) 'Liinistry of. Labour Gazette" October, 1947. 
jute. 
Footwear. 
in the hosiery trade, 67% of workers being on piecework. 
The lists are agreed and periodically overhauled and 
extended by joint committees of employers and trade union 
representatives, and this has resulted in much better 
industrial relations than obtained. under the old regime 
whereby the employers agreed on and applied. a rate for 
the job without consultation with the workers. The 
machine departments - frames, knitting machines and seaners 
- are usually on piece -work, whilst the boarders and 
indirect workers receive a set time -rate of pay. 
Both time and piece -rate systems are found alongside 
each other in the jute industry. There are flat time 
rates, and time-rates plus a "stent" or bonus on production, 
and there are schemes of group payment -by- results based on 
a number of different factors. Spinning is :, ostly done 
by female operatives who receive time -rates varying 
according to the nLanber of spindles attended. 
Of the workers in the boot and she industry, 54 
Per cent of adult males and 46 per cent of adult females 
are paid on a piece -work basis. A considerably larger 
proportion of workers in this industry was paid by results 
in 1939, the figures being: adult males 67 per cent: 
adult females 61 per cent(2) Here is an industry in which 
daywork is gaining ground at the expense of piecework. 
As the product is more or less standardised, price -lists 
(1) Ibid. 
(2) From statement prepared by the Incorporated 
Federated Associations of Boot and Shoe 'Manufacturers 
of Great Britain. 
can be employed, and these are prepared on a district 
basis, so as to give an average operative an earning 
capacity of 25 per cent over the minimum wage rates. 
It is regarded as a principle in the industry that as far 
as possible a uniform system of prices should obtain, 
applicable or adaptable to the sane class of labour and 
materials in all areas producing similar classes or goods.W 
The reasons for the decline in the proportion of 
piece- workers in the boot and shoe industry during the 
years 1939 -1947 are various and not at all clear, but the 
change is primarily due to factors arising out of the war 
situation. It is estimated that as many as 50 per cent of 
the noiial labour force were lost to the Forces and other 
industries during the war, and this loss was naturally 
from the younger and more active workers, among whom the , 
proportion of piece -workers before 1939 would have been 
above the average. They were replaced by temporary 
workers as far as possible, and these came on to daywork. 
Then again, in the severe competition of the pre -war 
years, it was absolutely essential that a manufacturer 
should know his labour cost accurately, and that this 
labour cost per unit of output should not rise rapidly 
in the evenkof falling off in total output due to shortage 
(1) National Conference of Representatives of the above 
Federation, and the National Union of Boot and Shoe 
0perF.tives: Agreement of January 1946. 
Summary 
of orders for any cause. It was the practice in the boot 
and shoe industry that pieceworkers had no guaranteed 
minimum rate of wages; they were merely paid what they 
earned on piece -work. 
There is now a tendency for the proportion of piece- 
workers to rise again, and with the re- establishment of 
more settled labour conditions in the industry there is no 
reason why the percentage should not rise to or even higher 
than the pre -war level. 
The various methods of payment -by- results are, 
therefore, very widespread throughout the major part of 
British industry. Asked recently(l) in the House of 
Commons what percentage of workers engaged in productive 
capacit *es were affected by payment -by- results arrangements, 
the Minister of Labour replied: "Amongst the manual 
workers employed by firms in manufacturing industries in 
April last, 30 per cent were paid by piece rates or by 
other forms of payment-by-results." 
The two tables (2) appended to this chapter shew the 
estimated percentages of time- and piece- workers in 
various industries, and in all the industries combined, 
for April 1947 and October 1938 respectively. The wide 
variations between the various industries are noticeable, 
extending from none on piece -work in publik utility 
{1) 25th. November, 1947 
(2) Extracted from "Ministry of Labour Gazette" 
October, 1947. 
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services to 46 per cent in the metal trades, engineering 
and shipbuilding. Over the whole range of industries 
there has since 1938 been a slight increase in the 
proportion paid by results. The increase would have been 
much more mahked had not the rise in the proportion of 
males on piece -work been offset by a substantial fall in 
the proportion of women 18 years of age and over. This 
latter is in all probability merely a post -war phenomenon, 
and it is anticipated that the general trend will be towards 
an extension of payment -by- results under the stimulus of the 
need for increased output. 
77 
Percentage of Time and Piece Workers, etc., employed in April, 1947 and 
in October, 1938, calculated on the basis of the total numbers employed 
in each industry. 
Men (21 














Iron, stone, etc.,mining 
and quarrying 
Treatment of non- 
metalliferous mine and 
quarry products 
Brick, pottery and glass 
Chemical, paint, oil etc. 
Metal, engineering and 
ship -building 
Textiles 
Leather, Fur, etc. 
Clothing 







manufacturi ng industri es 
Transport, storage, etc. 
(excluding railways) 
Public utility services 
Government industrial 
establishments+ 
All the above 
Percentage of Time and Piece Workers in the las't 
pay -week in April, 1947. 
Time Piece Time Piece Time iece Time Piece Time Piece 
72 ! 28 93 7 - - - - 73 27 
84 16 89 11 77 23 - - 83 17 
68 32 77 23 56 44 67 33 66 34 
92 8 94 6 85 15 86 14 90 10 
54 46 62 38 48 52 54 46 54 46 
73 27 87 13 42 58 56 44 57 43 
66 34 83 17 77 23 80 20 70 30 
73 27 86 14 64 36 71 29 68 32 
94 6 95 5 81 19 84 16 89 11 
82 18 90 10 78 22' 82 18 83 17 
96 4 99 1 80 20 86 14 91 9 
98 2 100 0 93 7 - - 98 2 
65 35 75 25 58 42 66 34 63 37 
98 2 100 0 98 2 - - 98 2 
99 1 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 
90 10. 92 8 79 21 90 10 89 11 
77 23 82 18 62 38 69 31 74 26 
+ Excluding wage -earners in Admiralty establishments. 
Men (21 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
PAYMENT -BY- RESULTS IN THE COTTON AND BUILDING 
INDUSTRIES. 
In order to illustrate how the principle of payment - 
by- results can be applied in industries of totally 
different character and circumstances, a brief description 
will be given of the position in the cotton and building 
industries. The former is highly organised, and provides 
"the classical example of territorial centralisation ",(1) 
being highly localised in Ea st Lancashire and North 
Cheshire. The latter is composed of a multitude of firms 
varying in size from thé very small undertaking employing 
three to four men to the public works contractor or 
speculative builder employing a very working force. 
There is no concentration of the building industry in any 
one part of the country; it is scattered throughout the 
realm. The products of the spinning section of the 
cotton industry are highly standardised, and there are 
broad groups of products in the weaving and finishing 
sections. The products of the building industry, on the 
other hand, vary from the household garage to the factory 
covering acres of land. 
For these and other reasons the cotton industry has 
been "the natural home of piece -work systems "(2) whereas 
until the Second World War the building industry was 
(1) C.R. Fay "Great Britain from Adam Smith to the 
Present Day" p. 289. 
(2) G. D.H. Cole "Payment of Wages" p. 13. 
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traditionally a time -rate industry whose unions were 
adamant in their refusal to accept payment -by- results in 
any form. However, on the 20th. October, 1947 agreement 
was reached. whereby the principle of payment -by- results 
was introduced into the building industry, despite all 
the difficulties involved in applying it to an industry. 
which had always been considered unsuitable for such 
methods. 
I. COTTON. (1) 
The principal sections of the cotton industry are 
(i) Spinning and Doubling, i.e. making the yarn and 
twisting it into thread, (ii) Weaving yarn into cloth, 
and (iii) Finishing the cloth by bleaching, dyeing, 
printing, and so on. The cotton industry is highly 
specialised, being composed of a large nunber of firms 
each confining itself to a narrow range of functions 
within each stage of production...Vertical integration, 
that is the association of fines in successive stages of 
production, is comparatively rare, and the firm usually 
confines itself to one or other of the following six 
groups: (1) the Liverpool merchants and. brokers, 
(1) The structure of the cotton industry is well docu- 
mented, e.g. vide: 
Chapman: "The Lancashire Cotton Industry" 1904 
Todd: "The Cotton World" 1927 
Committee on Industry & Trade "Survey of Textile 
Industries" 1928. 
Alen: "British Industries and their Organisation "1933 
c ap.8. 
Report of the Cotton Working Party. H.M. S. O. 1946. 
The "Evershed" Report H. M. S. O. 1945. 
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(2) the spinners, (3) the yarn merchants and brokers, 
(4) the weavers or manufacturers, (5) the finishers, 
and (6) the piece -goods merchants. Thus, not only is 
production organised horizontally, but distribution is 
also detached from production. It was, however, the 
opinion of the Cotton Working Party that "a definite 
tendency towards vertical integration appears now to 
be at work either in the form of converters reaching 
back to acquire manufacturing interests or, conversely, 
manufacturers taking control over the distribution of 
their products. This tendency, however, has not been 
strong enough to bring about a radical change in the 
sectional structure of the industry. " (1) 
Cotton The spinning firms are for the most part larger 
S-o i rrnina. 
than the weaving firms, and most of the mills are 
owned by public limited companies. There has been a 
considerable amount of horizontal combination in the 
spinning industry, and there are now five very large 
combines, and other groups of mills working together 
with a community 6f interests, sometimes effected by 
the device of "interlocking directorates ". The 
position is shewn statistically below : -(2) 
(1) Report 1946 p. 37. 
(2) Ibid p.39. 
S2 
Size of Spinning Firms - 1940 
Number of spindles (mule equivalent) Firms Spindles 
(million M. E. 
Less than 20,000 spindles 23 0.3 
20,000 to 40,000 spindles 38 1.0 
40,000 to 80,000 spindles 78 4.5 
80,000 to 200,000 spindles 110 13.0 
200,000 to 1,000,000 spindles 26 7.1 
More than 1,000,000 spindles 5 13.2 
Total - all firms 280 39.1 
Collective bargaining between employers' associations 
and trade unions has reached a highly developed stage in 
the cotton industry, and as a result piece -work prices are 
codified into standard lists. Although the individual 
operations involved in the manufacture of cotton goods 
are extremely numerous and complicated, they can for the 
most part be reduced to standard elements. Then again, 
the output of the cotton industry is largely standardised, 
and can be measured in terms of yardage. Although 
conditions in the various mills vary widely, and the 
efficiency of the machinery employed is by no means 
constant, nevertheless mechanisation and standardisation 
are of such a degree that, within limits, a given mount 
of effort and skill can be relied upon to produce a given 
output. Thus it is possible to frame a standard list 
setting out in detail the prices to be paid for all the 




Mule- There are six mule spinning lists in use at the 
Spinning. 
present time, known as the Oldham, Bolton, Ashton, Hyde, 
Preston and Blackburn lists. The two first -named are by 
far the most important, covering as they do about 80 to 
90 per cent(1) of the total mule operatives. These lists 
are all extremely complicated and completely unintelligible 
to the layman; it is reported(2) that even such 
experienced investigators as Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
were forced to confess that "the principles upon which 
the lists are framed are so complicated that we... are 
still perplexed on certain points..." 
The basis upon which the piece -price is calculated 
in each list is not the same, and the lists fall into 
two broad groups in this regard. The process of spinning 
consists in twisting together the raw cotton fibres in 
order to make yarn, and in order to measure output one 
lust measure the length of yarn produced and the number 
of twists given to the yarn per unit of length. The 
a:aount of twist is closely connected with (a) the fineness, 
or "count" of the yarn, and (b) the speed of the 
spinning machine. 
(a) Generally speaking, the finer the yarn the more 
turns per inch are required in order to give the necessary 
strength. Therefore, the finer the yarn, the longer it 
(1) Evershed Report 1945. 
(2) Jewkes and Grey: "Wages and Labour in Cotton 
Spinning" p. 55. 
takes to spin a unit of length, and this is the variable 
which is made the basis of the Bolton, Ashton, Hyde, 
Preston and Blackburn lists. In these lists the piece 
-_)rites vary according to the fineness of the yarn 
produced. 
(b) Again, the speed at which the mule can work 
depends largely upon the number of turns per inch 
inserted in the yarn; the larger the number of turns 
required, the slower the speed of the mule, and the less 
the amount of yarn produced per unit of time. Thus, 
the speed of the machine can be made the basis for piece- 
work price fixing, and this is done in the case of the 
oldham list. 
Messrs. Jewkes and Gray, in their standard work on 
labour conditions in the cotton spinning industry, (1) 
illustrate the principles by the following diagram: - 
Piece- price must be 
related to - 
Output of yarn 
per hTur 
Which is a function 
of turns per inch 
Which varies with 
the speed f mule 
OLLHAJV! LIS T 
Which varies with 
the count of yarn 
BOLTON LIST 
The Bolton List is ;auch more a true piece -work list 
(1) Jewkes & Gray "Wages & Labour in Cotton Spinning" p.57. 
S 
than the Oldham, since it gives a certain price for each 
count of yarn and each length of mule, and a man's earnings 
are simply calculated by multiplying his output by the 
appropriate piece -price. The Oldhan list, on the other 
hand, has certain elements of a time -rate system in it, for 
it stipulates that the weekly wage of all operatives 
working ommnules of a given length shall be approximately 
the sane. This means that a piece -price has to be 
calculated (bearing in mind the speed. of the mule) which 
will enable this wage to be earned, and the result is much 
the sane as would follow from a simple time -rate system. (1) 
Under the Oldham system the main financial incentive 
is not to the operative, but to the employer, since if he 
succeeds in increasing the efficiency of his machinery and 
secures a high production per mule, his labour costs are 
reduced, because so long as the length of the mule remains 
the sane, the wages of the operatives are unchanged. On 
the óther hand, the Bolton list, being a true piece -work 
system, does not give the employer falling wages costs per 
unit of output as the latter increases. The sane price 
per pound of yarn produced is paid whatever the efficiency 
of the mules and whatever their output, so long as the 
length of the mule and the count of the yarn remains 
unchanged. Thecnployer, however, has the benefit of 
(1) For a full description of the method of calculating 
wages under the various lists, see Jewkes and Gray: 




falling overhead costs per unit of output, as production 
Eoes up. Whereas under the Oldham system provision is made 
for dividing the advantage gained from improved techniques 
between the operatives an the mill -owners, the other lists 
give the advantage entirely to the operative. 
The principle of standard price -lists is very old; 
Cha,aman(l) mentions lists existing in 1813 anc. 1836, but the 
present lists are of much more recent date. The first 
really comprehensive Oldham list dates from 1869, and. the 
present Bolton list from 1887, so that sufficient time has 
elapsed since their inception to allow of a considered 
judgment as to the effectiveness of their working in actual 
practice. 
Ring- spinning - by far the most popular method of 
spinning in other countries is gradually usurping the 
place of mule- spinning in Lancashire. Whereas mule spinning 
operatives are always men or boys, the ring spinner is always 
a girl or a woman. In mule- spinning the labour -unit is a 
team of three - the minder, the big piecer and the little 
piecer; the ring- spinner, on the other hand., is a semi- 
skilled worker and works alone on her ring frames. Owing to 
lack of organisation, ring spinners have always been anong 
the lowest -paid workers in the cotton industry, and it was 
not until 1912 that the desire to improve their conditions 
(1) Chapman: "The Lancashire Cotton Industry ". 
resulted in the establishment of the Universal List for 
Ring Spinning. This system embodies elements from both 
the time -rate and piece -rate method of wage payment; 
there is a weekly wage for each hundred spindles tended 
by the operative, irrespective of output, but this 
standard wage varies with two factors: (i) the count 
of the yarn and (ii) the a. ount of twist to be put into 
it. This can be seen in the following extract from the 
list : - 
Universal Ring Spinning List 
Wajes per 100 Swindles 
Counts Yarn with 
noraal twist 
s. d. 
Yarn with extra 
hard twist 
s. d. 
8's 3 7.243 
10's 3 3.783 
12's 3 1.188 
14's 2 9.729 
18's 2 7.134 
24's 2 5.405 
34's 2 4.107 
42's 2 2.811 










Cotton There are many more weaving firms than spinning; 
Weaving. 
most of them are private limited companies or partner- 
ships, and the average size of the units is much smaller 
than in the spinning section of the industry. 
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Size of Weaving Firms - 1940(1) 




Average No. of 
looms per firm 
Up to 200 438 38 7. 6 87 
200-400 194 56 11. 2 288 
400-800 253 146 29. 2 577`r 
800-2,000 153 177 35.4 1,157 
2,000 -2,500 13 30 6.0 2,315 
2,500-3,300 8 23 4. 6 2,901 
3,300-6,600 
6,600-9,400 4 30 6.0 7,509 
Total 1,063 500 100 470 
Despite the smaller degree of intégration present in 
the weaving section, standardisation of piece -work prices 
is even :lore more complete than in spinning. There is now 
a uniform weaving price -list in general use in North and 
North -East Lancashire, and it governs the wages of almost 
the entire industry. This list developed. out of the early' 
lists negotiated by individual firms, followed later by 
district lists, which eventually gave way to the "Uniform 
List of Weaving Pricés" legalised under the Cotton Manu- 
facturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act 1934. This 
list governs the wages paid to the weavers of grey and 
coloured cloths, and provides for a varying number of looms 
per weaver, such as (i) up to four looms per weaver (ii) six 
looms per weaver and (iii) more than six looms per weaver. 
Like the spinning lists, the weavers' list is extremely 
(1) Report of Cotton Working Party 1946 p.41. 
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complicated, and it is practically impossible for anyone 
without a technical knowledge of the industry to calculate 
a wage from it. There are also separate piece -work price 
lists governing the weaving of velvet and fustian cloths, 
sheeting cloths, waste cloths, towels and quilts. 
Briefly described, the Uniform List works thus: each time 
the shuttle moves across the loom it leaves behind a 
single thread, known as a "pick ", so that it is possible. 
to calculate the length of a piece of cloth by the number 
of picks which it contains. This is the basis of the 
price -list, according to which the weaver's wage is 
calculated on the number of picks put in by the loom. 
This was a satisfactory method in the old hand -loom days 
when the major part of a weaver's work consisted in 
throwing the shuttle by hand across the loom, but nowadays 
the machine inserts the pick, and the weaver's principal 
task is to keep the loom running for as great as possible 
a proportion of her working day. The stops which she 
tries to reduce to a minimum are caused by (a) changing 
the shuttle to renew the supply of weft, and (b) repairing 
breaks in the warp threads. Both of these factors are 
to a large extent outside the weavers' control, the first 
depending on the length of yarn in the shuttle, and the 
second upon the quality of the yarn employed. The 
piece -work system does ensure, however, that these 
stoppages will be reduced to a minimum, that is to say, 
Sw,ullary. 
90 
the effect is similar to that of the piece -work system 
operating in cotton spinning. 
The standard price -list system only applies to non- 
automatic looms, but these make up 96 per cent of the total 
number of looms in the industry.(1) In the case of 
automatic looms separate arrangements are made at individual 
mills and in different districts. This type of weaving is 
usually paid on a fixed wage system, plus bonus for 
efficiency, as distinct from the piece -work system ( with 
fall -back or guaranteed wage) found in the non -automatic 
section. 
How far is the system of piece -work price -lists found 
in the cotton industry conducive to increased productivity? 
T-o questions are involved: (a) does it encourage operatives 
to produce more; and (b) does it encourage mill -owners 
to increase the efficiency of their machinery and methods? 
Cotton spinning is one of those trades where output is 
only to a limited extent under the control of the operative, 
the most important element being the speed and efficiency 
of the machine itself. Then again, in the case of mule - 
spinning, only the minder is Paid by results, the two 
piecers being paid by time, but the fact that the mai4n 
charge of the mule is on piece -work will cause him to see 
that the piecers do not reduce his earnings by low output. 
(1) Ordinary looms: 468,654) Figures for 1939 taken from 
Total looms: 488,333) Cotton Working Party Report 
p. 42. 
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There is little doubt that the piece -work system does mean 
that yarn breakages are repaired more quickly, and the 
mule kept working at an efficiency nearer to its maximum, 
than would be the case if wages were paid on a time basis. 
As regards the second question, it has already been 
mentioned that the main incentive of the Oldham list is to 
the employer, encouraging him to lower his labour costs by 
increasing the efficiency of his machinery. Under the 
Bolton system, increased. efficiency does not give the mill - 
owner lower labour costs per unit, but it does mean lower 
overheads, and there is, therefore, still some incentive 
to the employer. 
Neither the Cotton Working Party tor the Evershed 
Commission recommended that there should be any general 
change -over to time rates of wages in the cotton industry, 
although the latter body felt that the present system was 
"an unnecessarily complex" structure which could "no 
longer be justified under modern conditions "(l) and the 
Commission recommended "the formation of a single list to 
take the place of the existing lists." A considerable 
amount of criticism has also been levelled against the 
Universal List for weaving. There is no doubt that it has 
served well in the past, protecting the weaver against 
exploitation and undercutting of wages in times of bad 
trade, but in its present form it has outlived its 
usefulness. The piece -rate for any particular cloth 
(l)t'Evershed" Report on the Cotton Spinning Industry 1945 
para. 77. 
remains the same however much the manufacturer tries to 
increase the efficiency of his plant by improving the 
looms or using better quality yarn; apart from a possile 
reduction in overheads, the employer gets no benefit from 
such improvements.(1) Since one of' the principal aims 
of the piece -work system: is to link reward with effort, 
a price -list which largely overlooks the two principal 
factors (shuttle changes and yarn repairs) which determine 
the effort required from the weaver cannot really be 
satisfactory. If it tends to perpetuate inefficient 
methods of production in an industry so vital as is 
Lancashire cotton then "the Uniform List must go ".(2) 
All these criticisms, however, with regard to both 
spinning and weaving, are levelled against the particular 
lists at present in existence, not against the piece -work 
system as such. It is significant that none.-.of the 
investigating bodies, critical as they have been, has 
recommended abandoning piece -work; changes in procedure 
rather than principle have invariably been the suggested 
remedies. 
(i) For 'description and criticism of the Universal 
Weaving List, vide the Interim Report of the 
Cotton Manufacturing Commission (the Moelwyn Hughes 
Commission) 1948. H. M. S. O. 
(2) Ibid: para. 59. 
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H. BUILDING INDUSTRY. 
Pre -war The building industry provides some interesting 
Position. 
material in connection with payment -by- results, for it 
has in recent years been the scene of an ambitious 
experiment in the application of the system to an industry 
which has traditionally been reagrded as suitable only for 
the day -rate method. The trade unions in the building 
industry have always been adamant in their refusal to 
accept payment -by- results in any form, and have been 
committed by their constitutions to time -rates only. 
.Indeed, the Working Rule Agreement for the Northern Region 
(Northumberland and Durham), the Manchester area, and 
Scotland expressly prohibited payment -by- results. 
Hostility was not so great in the civil engineering branch, 
and the Agreement of the Conciliation Board for this 
industry provided for the payment of bonuses in addition 
to time- rates. There was, however, no general scheme, but 
individual employers and workers negotiated their own 
arrangements for the particular job in hand. Even in the 
building trade unofficial schemes of payment -by- results 
were quite common, frequently being of the sub- contract 
type. For example, one large contractor was told by the 
union officials that if it was discovered that he had any 
men working on a piece -work or similar basis, they would 
"blackball" his contracts in any part of the country. 
Despite this threw, he put out the bricklaying work on 
i 
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sub - contract to leaders of gangs of tradesmen, for an 
agreed price per house, and the work was completed in two 
years instead of three. and at a profit of 166 per cent morel 
than the anticipated amount. 
War -time The military situation following on the Dunkirk 
needs. 
period during the Second World War became so acute that in 
the spring of 1941 the Government decided that something 
must be done to increase the productivity of the workers 
engaged upon the building programme connected with essential 
works of various kinds. The younger men having been called 
to the Colours, there was an acute shortage of the best 
workers, and the average age of the remainder was much 
above the nonnal. Workers who had been cirected to 
building under the Essential Works Orders were 
inexperienced, and the output of the industry was quite 
inadequate to meet the urgent needs of the war. situation. 
For this reason, the Government announced its intention 
of introducing a system of payment -by- results on all 
essential works, the arrangement to be only a temporary 
"change of practice" which would be abandoned after the 
War unless continued by mutual agreement. 
July 1941 This intention was carried into affect in July 1941 
Government 
scheme. by the Essential Work (Building and Civil Engineering) 
Order, 1941,which made it compulsory to pay on an output 
basis wherever possible on scheduled undertakings or 
sites, which at that time comprised practically all the 
work being done. A Joint Advisory Panel was fonned, 
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drawn from both sides of the industry; to assist the 
Ministry of Works in developing and administering the 
scheme. Regional Payment -by- Results Advisers were 
appointed by the Ministry to cover the whole country; they 
were men with wide experience of the building and public 
works industry, and were in a position to advise contractors 
and others on points of detail in the administration of the 
scheme. 
Basis of The method of bonus payment which had become customary 
the Scheme. 
in the civil engineering industry, namely bonus payable fOr 
all work over a fixed hourly output, was adapted under the 
Government Scheme to the building trade. Basic output 
rates for the various operations were fixed(1) and a worker 
who exceeded this target became entitled to a bonus in 
addition to his hourly rate, the bonus representing two - 
thirds of the saving in labour cost resulting from the 
increase in output. This was an adaptation of the well - 
known "Halsey" system of premium- bonus, a method which is 
discussed fully in a later section. 
For example, the basic output for unloading and stacking 
bricks (one throw) was 500 perman- houn(2) Therefore, a 
man was allowed two hours to stack a thousand bricks. If 
he completed the job in, say, än hour and a half, he was 
entitled to receive his ordinary labourer's rate of pay of 
(1) "Memorandum on Payment by Results, including Schedules of 
Trade Operations for which Bonus Rates have been fixed" 
H. M. S. 0. 1944. 
(2) Ibid. Appendix A; Schedule 1. 
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1 /6d. per hour plus a bonus calculated thus: - 
Time saved: ',- hour 
Bonus: two -thirds of time saved 
6d. 
Therefore, total pay _ 1; hours at 1 /6d. per hour, 2/3d. 
plus bonus, 6d. = 2/9d. 
A simplified method of calculation was adopted for the 
benefit of contractors; the schedules indicated the 
mount of bonus due for each unit of output above the basic. 
In the case quoted above, the bonus was 2/- per 1000, and 
since the worker stacked in an hour and a half 250 more 
bricks than the target figure, he was entitled to a bonus 
of 6d. 
The bonus rates were based on time -rates of 2/- per 
hour for craftsmen and 1 /6d. for labourers, and allowances 
were made where plus -rates were in operation. The bonus 
rates were uniform, regardless of district differences and 
changes in time rates from time to time. The basic output 
in each case was fixed with regard to normal working 
conditions, and if particularly difficult conditions of 
working were encountered, ''site adjustments" were authorised, 
on an agreed basis. 
Indirect workers, whose output could not be directly 
measured, received bonuses based on the bonus earned by 
the various direct workers whom they assisted. Chargemen 
were included in the bonus scheme, and they shared in the 
bonus earned by the gang for which they were responsible, 
but foremen :.and other supervisory staff were outside the 
scheme altogether. 
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Bonus was calculated on a weekly basis, and normally 
based on the output of the gang, each member sharing the 
bonus in proportion to the number of hours worked by each, 
and the individual time rates. 
Working of There is no doubt that the scheme had a beneficial 
the Scheme. 
and stimulating effect on production per man -hour, although 
an objective assessment is difficult to make owing to the 
lack of statistics with regard to output in the building 
trade prior to the War. However, the Payment by Results 
Joint Advisory Panel made a number of investigations into 
this problem, and in October 1943 a special Committee was 
established to consider the effect on output, and the cost, 
of the Government Scheme. Representative contractors 
were asked to submit evidence on the output position in 
(i) 1939, (ii) immediately prior to the introduction of 
the payment -by- results Scheme in 1941, and (iii) at the 
time of the enquiry. The Committee reported that the 
decline in output compared with 1939 had been arrested, 
and that output in 1943 was greater than in 1941, although 
labour costs had also increased. In work such as 
concreting and bricklaying increases in output of 25 -30 
per cent ware common, but if the contract as a whole, 
including preparatory and finishing work, was considered 
the increases were less marked. 
A comparison of actual output with the target figures 
can, however, be fairly accurately rnad.e, and the following 
:1 8 
table shows the position in the major branchés of the 
trade:- 
Average level of Output in Relation to Basic in the (1) 
Main Trade Schedules 
Operation 
Average actual 

























































Average actual ottput on all operations covered by scheme, 
weighted by volume of work recorded(= 34% over average basic 
output. 
Whilst the increases over the basic output are 
substantial, it must be borne in mind that the targets set 
in the scheme were definitely low by co.nparison with pre- 
1939 normal output. However, there is little doubt that 
the Scheme did a great deal to increase production per man- 
(1) "A Report on the Operation of the Payment by Results 
Scheme Applied under the Essential Work (Building and Civil 
Engineering Order, 1941, during the Period July, 1941 to 
March 1947" H. M. S. 0. 1947. 
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hour, and the division of the bonus between employer and 
employee gave an incentive to both to st;p up output. 
Among Departmental observations on the working of the Scheme 
were the following ; -(1) 
Ministry of Supply: "The general reaction of operatives to 
the system is favourable and men responded well by increased 
effort after original prejudice in some cases was overcame..." 
Petroleum Department: "Reports show that there was in 
general an excellent reaction on the part of the operatives 
to the bonus system; the men were interested in the results, 
and absenteeism was negligible. Since the introduction of 
the system, work has been considerably accelerated and 
marked progress achieved." 
IMlinistry of Health; "Results in operating the system have 
been influenced by the different conditions prevailing on 
sites. On the whole the operatives concerned have favoured 
the scheme.... Output has been affected in some cases by 
weather conditions, but the general results have been 
satisfactory, and in some instances have been described as 
excellent." 
Ministry of Aircraft Production; "Output in general was 
good but in a few cases men fix their own earnings target 
and limit their effort accordingly. In other cases the 
(1) Ministry of Works Information Sheet issued. in June 1942, 
i. e. approximately a year after the introduction of 
the 
scheme. It reported that "there was an average 
increase 
over basic output for March of 42%; this rose to 61% for 
April." 
lIf 
men were inclined to slack off when targets fixed on sites 
were reached." 
Quality of The Advisory Panel which investigated the working of 
Work. 
the scheme found that where supervision was efficient, and 
there was adequate inspection of work in progress, 
standards of quality were properly maintained. It is 
frequently maintained. that payment -by- results gives rise 
to shoddy workmanship, and whilst this may in certain cases 
be true. it is not necessarily so. The wage incentive, by 
encouraging the men to maintain a steady rate of working, 
avoiding unnecessary delays and waste of time, should 
release the supervisory staff to some extent from the task 
of maintaining discipline, and enable than to pay more 
attention to the maintenance of the required standards of 
quality. Under the Government scheme, bonus was not paid 
on work which was found at the time to be faulty, and this 
factor no doubt contributed to efficient working so far 
as quality was concerned. 
Effect on It was found that the scheme tended to increase the 
Manap;ernent. 
efficiency of organisation of work, for vhumber of reasons. 
In the first place, the regular reports on the smount of 
work completed, the time spent on bonused and non - 
bonused work, and the necessity for a regular measurement 
of results achieved, undoubtedly had a beneficial effect 
on management. Again, since the men's earnings were 
affected by delays due to bad organisation, their interest 
in the organisation of the work increased, and valuable 
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suggestions were forthcoming from the workers themselves, 
which had a salutary effect on site organisation. 
Post -war The war -time scheme of pannent -by- results only applied 
situation. 
to sites scheduled under the Essential Work Order, and the 
Government would not recognise bonus schemes for building 
operations on any non- scheduled work. Indeed, Defence 
Regultion 56AB definitely made it an offence to pay bonus 
rates. During the War, of course, the vast majority of 
building was for essential purposes, but when the war was 
over more and more domestic work was undertaken. This 
led to endless discussion on the merits and demerits of 
Payment-by-results, and on the output of the post -war 
building workers as compared with the 1939 position. A 
surveyor of repute reported the following experience, which 
he claimed was typical of the post -war situation in London, 
especially can small jobs: 
London Surveyor's 
Report. 07 Surveyor arrives on job at 12 noon to inspect work. 
No men on site. He is informed that the men have gone to 
dinner. 
(ii) Surveyor returns to job at 1.15 p.m. Still no 
men on site. He leaves a message with the tenant of the 
house to note time of men's arrival. 
(iii) Surveyor returns at 3 p.m. He is informed that 
the men arrived back at 2.15 p.m., but had now gone for 
their "tea- break ". 
(iv) Men arrive back at 3.15 p.m. 
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The surveyor was powerless to stop such incidents, because 
if he complained the men left the job for another one, and 
contractors would not take on his jobs if they thought they 
would lose their men: 
Mr. MarDle's In June 1947, Mr. A.E. Marples, r1. P. , himself a 
Exe_rinent s. 
builder, made a speech°*) in the House of Cannons, urging 
the adoption of payment -by- results in private building. 
He quoted the experience of Lord Quibell, another practical 
builder, who found that when bricklayers were paid at the 
regulation rate they laid approximately 250 bricks a day, 
but when they were paid by results their output rose to 
750 bricks a day. dIr. Marples himself had made interesting 
experiments in this field; on one of his building 
the bric layers were paid time rates; on the other a 
bricklayer was made a sub - contractor, so that in effect he 
was paid on a piece -work basis. On the first site, the 
men laid on an average 63 bricks per hour; on the second 
site, the men on piecework were laying 103 bricks per hour. 
Mr. Marples urged the Government to abolish Defence 
Regulation 56ÁB, and the unions to revise their attitude 
to payment-by-results - "to face the future instead of the 
past ". 
Edinburgh In the Autumn of 1947 the Scottish Building Costs 
Housi Córnmittee's 
8e ort. Committee prepared a questionnaire to local authorities 
on the building situation. The Housing Committee of 
(1) Reported in The Illustrated Carper r and Builder" 
4.7.47. 
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Edinburgh Corporation reported that the average cost of a 
four -apartment flatted house in 1938 in Edinburgh was £420, 
or about 10s. 5d. per superficial foot. In 1945, the 
tender cost of the seine house was £940 or 23s. per super- 
ficial foot. Although this increase would be largely 
accounted for by rises in the price of building materials 
(the index stood at 205.2 (1930 =100) in August 1947) , 
lower productivity per man -hour would also be an important 
factor. The Committee estimated that there had been a 
general decrease in output of at least 50 per cent, and 
gave the following details : - 





700 bricks per man 
per day 
Two men, one week 
Ter house 
One :man and one 
apprentice., one 
and a half weeks 
per house. 
25 -30 yards per day 
300 bricks per man 
per day 
Two men, three weeks 
per house 
One man and one 
apprentice, three 
weeks per house. 
20 -25 yards per day. 
The Committee, in view of this decline in product- 
ivity, favoured the introduction of a suitable system of 
payment -by- results. 
Home Counties A large building contractor working in the Home 
Co11ari soiz. 
_. - Counties recently reported(l an illuminating. experirre nt 
(1) "Economist" 10th. January 1948 (these figures were 
prepared before the introduction of payment -by- results 
into peace -time building). 
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which he had made into pre -war and post -war productivity. 
The comparison was made on two similar housing schemes in 
the same town, built by the same contractor, the one 
being completed in 1936, and the other commenced at the 
end of 1945 and completed in 1947. The houses were of 
similar spcification, except that the pre -war houses had 
an average floor area of 799 st -iare feet, and the post -war 
scheme an average of 837 square feet. The average house 
in the 1936 scheme was finished in 1661 man- hours, whilst 
the post -war houses took 2795 man -hours. Allowing for 
the greater floor area, the post -war houses took 
approximately 50 per cent more man-hours, representing a 
fall in productivity of 33 per cent. 
The Need for The very apparent fall in productivity in the 
Incentives. 
building trade, and the urgent need for houses gave rise 
to much public discussion of the problem. A growing 
feeling developed that since the principle of payment -by 
-results had been adopted owing to the exigencies of the 
war-time emergency, it ought to be extended into the post- 
war situation in order to help meet the equally urgent 
housing emergency. The building unions argued that the 
industry had too many ramifications, and that conditions 
varied too widely in different districts for a bonus 
system to operate without considerable friction, but 
many private builders were finding unofficial bonus 
schemes successful in increasing output. It was 
noticeable that private workers were working more 
efficiently than those employed directly by local authorities 
due in many cases to the fact that incentive schemes were 
in operation despite the Government and trade union ban, 
Government On the 19th. June, 1947, Mr. Durbin, Parliamentary 
Peace-time 
Scheme. Secretary to the :íinistry of Works, announced the 
Government's intention to revise that section of ReguItion 
5 A which forbade the payment of incentive bonuses to 
building operatives. This was followed by a proposal from 
the Mirstry of Labour for an increase of 3d. per hour in 
the minimum wage, and for the introduction of an incentive 
scheme to provide an increase in earnings to a level of 20 
per cent above time -rate. In the building industry itself 
there was established an Incentives Committee to review 
the position with regard to payment -by- results, and 
eventually the trade union leaders agreed to recommend to 
their .members the acceptance of the Government proposals. 
A ballot of the 600,000 members of the eighteen trade 
unions affiliated to the National Federation of Building 
Trade Operatives was conducted during September, and a 
majority proved to be in favour of payment -by- results. 
Following this ballot, the National Joint Council for the 
Building Industry approved the Government proposals on 
the 20th, October, and the long controversy can e to an 
end. The national agreement provided for an increase in 
time wages of 3d. per hour, and piece -rates which would 
enable the average worker to earn 20 per cent above his 
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normal day rate. The actual details of the target 
figures and bonus rates are left to individual agreement 
between employers and workers, an inevitable liberty in 
such a diverse and localised industry, but a central 
record of these local agreements is kept, and there is 
machinery for the settlement of any disputes which may 
arise. 
As the agreement only came into force on 16th. 
November, 1947 it is too early yet to pass any considered 
Judgment on its working. The scheme is definitely 
experimental and will be reviewed in two years' time. 
The fact that the "pill" of payment -by- results has had 
to be "sugar- coated" in the form of a substantial increase 
in time -rates, will mean that the scheme will add greatly 
to costs unless there is a considerable increase in 
productivity. However, the dual fact that a workable 
scheme was evolved during the war, and has been adapted 
also to peace-time needs, chews that payment -by- results 
is not only applicable to industries where operations are 
repetitive and standardised, but also to an industry which, 
because of its diversity and lack of standardisation, has 
traditionally been regarded as the exclusive province of 
the time -rate system. 
It'was reported(1) that the results of the first 
fortnight's working of the incentive scheme shewed on a 
(i) "News-Chronicle" 10th. December, 1947. 
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rough average an increase of 20 per cent in output. 
Leading employers who gave these figures said that the 
scheme had had a good response and had encouraged a better 
team - spirit among the operatives. After a period of six 
months or so has elapsed it will be interesting to have 
some factual information regarding the effect upon 
production of the incentive plan, in order that a 
considered judgment may be given upon its working. This 
information is likely to be forthcoming as the result of 
a survey being undertaken by the Building Employers' 
Federation, A questionnaire is being sent to every 
employer and the Federation hopes to make a full report 
in June 1948. Five months after the introduction of the 
incentive scheme, only about 10 per cent of employers had 
put it into operation, but the number was steadily 
increasing. Some employers had hesitated to introduce 
payment -by- results because of uncertainty about the future 
of the industry arising from the Government announcement 
of cuts in capital expenditure. 
CHAPTER IX. 1 08 
THE TRADE UNION ATTITUDE TO PAYMENT -BY- RESULTS. 
Traditional The traditional attitude of the trade unions towards 
Attitude. 
payment -by- results has been one of hostility, for the 
element of differentiation between workers which it 
involves is a departure from the union principle of 
uniformity and solidarity. In 1843, the Journeymen, 
Steam Engine Machine Makers and Millwrights' Friendly 
Society, which in 1851 becane the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers, recommended "to every branch to oppose by every 
legal means in their power syste.aatic overtime and piece- 
work. They consider them very injurious to the trade." 
The attitude of the engineering unions may be taken as being 
fairly typical of that of the other unions also, and the 
gradual developnent of the attitude of organised labour 
generally, can be traced very clearly in that industry. 
By 1889, although piece -work was regarded as an evil, 
its inroads into industrial practice had had to be 
recognised even by the official trade union rules. Those 
of the Steam Engine Makers' Society, for example, stated: 
"The principle of piece -work as applied at the present time 
is an evil to the workman and the trade in general. No 
member of this Society ahall seek to introduce it in firms 
where it has not been already worked or adopted, nor assist 
in making it general in firms where it is already in 
operation in single departments. Members violating this 
rule or principle will be dealt with as acting contrary to 
109 
the trade." 
The rules of 1892 of the Amalgamated Society of 
Engineers (now part of the Amalgamated Engineering Union) 
were even more categorical in their denunciation of piece- 
work: "Any member asking for or taking work by contract 
or piece -work in any firm or factory where piece or contract 
work does not at present exist shall, for the first 
offence be fined twenty shillings, for the second forty 
shillings, and for the third be expelled from the Society." 
This did not mean that members could not under any 
circumstances work piece -work, but only that they must not 
do so without the approval of the district committee of the 
Society. 
Adopted in 1920 and still in force, the current rules 
of the Amalgamated Engineering Union state: "No member 
shall ask for or take work by any system of payment -by- 
results or contract in as y firm or factory where such system 
of payment does not exist, without the approval of, and in 
conformity with, the conditions laid down by the districf 
committees. " 
Hostility During recent decades the bitter resistance of the 
Modified. 
unions to piece -work has gradually given place to an 
attempt to introduce into collective bargains various 
safeguards designed to pròtect the worker against the 
dangers - from his point of view - of the piece -work 
system. One of these safeguards is the "Manchester 
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guarantee ", so called because it was in that city that 
the practice originated of guaranteeing that the worker 
shall not receive less than the basic time -wage for the 
period worked, whatever his output may be. In this 
way the worker is assured that he will not receive less 
than the standard trade union rate of pay for the time 
spent in the factory, irrespective of his output during 
that time. For example, in the engineering industry 
both the trade unions and the employers' federations agree 
that "in all cases the time rate (i.e. the basic rate and 
the national bonus for time- workers) of the worker concern- 
ed shall be guaranteed irrespective of earnings. "(1) 
This view has been endorsed by the National Arbitration 
Tribunal, following a claim by the Engineering Joint 
Trades Movement. 
(2) 
A further safeguard that is widely adopted is a 
provision whereby the vo rker of average ability is assured 
of earning a certain percentage over time wages, usually 
something between ten and thirty ̂three per cent. For 
example, Industrial Court Award Number 728, of the 8th. 
July, 1922, applying to employees in railway workshops, 
provides, inter alia, that: "all orices, whether existing 
at the date of the coming into operation of this Decision.. 
or new prices, shall be such as to yield to the normal 
worker not less than 33 -1 /3rd. per cent. on the worker's 
time or day rate (excluding war wage or bonus)." 








ssociation"Handbok of nip a ion Eighth Edition 
2Ye ar d N. 4o 0 dated 2nd. December 1943. 
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Similarly the agreement(1) which has operated since 1931 
in the engineering industry states: "Piece -work prices and 
bonus or basis times shall be such as will enable a workman 
of average ability to earn at least 25(2) per cent over time 
rates, excluding War Bonus ". This sane agreement, which 
is discussed in greater detail in a later section, illustrate 
another safeguard which is frequently found in modern 
practice, namely a guarantee against rate - cutting, except 
where there has been a mistake in calculation or where 
materials, means or methods of production, or the Quantities 
have changed, or where the alteration is mutually arranged 
between the two sides. This safeguard eliminates one of 
the major evils of the piece -work system, for rate -cutting 
has always been one of the most fruitful sources of friction 
wherever payment -by- results has been introduced. Those 
systems, such as the Rowan, Halsey, Emerson and Bedaux (3) 
Which automatically cut the rate as the output is increased 
beyond a certain point, are still opposed, as a general rule, 
by the trade unions. it is largely because the workers 
feel that they are not receiving the whole of the fruits of 
(1) Memorandum of Agreement between the Engineering and 
Allied 311- oloyers' National Federation and the Engineering 
Joint Trades Movement - 23rd. June, 1931. 
(2) Increased to 272 per cent by National Arbitration 
Tribunal Decision of March 1943. 




their increased effort that these systems are opposed, 
and, in addition, it is often impossible, owing to the 
complicated calculations necessary, for the workers to 
check the mount of bonus due to them. Over and above 
all this is the feeling that the human element is being 
mechanised; that pride of craftsmanship, quality of work, 
and even health and comfort, are being saciced to speed 
of production. "(1) For these reasons, the unions have 
opposed these premium bonus and American -type systems of 
payment, and have preferred straight piece -rates wherever 
payment -by- results has been accepted at all. 
During the Second World War, opposition to piece- 
work was largely eliminated, and in 1943 at their Annual_ 
Meeting the National Committee of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union resolved "that the new stage reached 
in the war makes it imperative that production in the 
vital war industries must be intensified to ensure the 
final defeat of the Axis powers. We therefore instruct 
the Executive Council to meet the appropriate authorities 
and place before than the extension of systems of 
payment by results and the Government guarantee that 
rates will not be cut where earnings are increased through 
greater output ". In the same year it was reported(2) 
that the American trade unions were modifying their 
attitude to payment -by- results. Formerly hostile, 
they 
(1) "The T.U.C. Examines the Bedaux System of Payment -by- 
Results", published by the T.U.C. General Council under 
Ref. No. 3B/6/1933. 
(2) Magazine "Fortune" September 1943. 
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now regarded the system as inevitable or even, in some 
cases, desirable. Two reasons were suggested; first 
that the unions now felt they were strong enough to prevent 
abuses, and second that representatives of labour were 
comaonly being invited. to tare part in the aclnin.istration 
of nay.ient -by- results schemes. 
Present Although these changes in attitude were no doubt 
Attitude. 
largely prompted by tige urgent needs of the war situation, 
many of the more res )onsible trade unionists have realised 
that the °resent peace- time needs are hardly less desperate. 
For example, at the Trades Union Congress at Brighton in 
October, 1946, the outgoing chainnan, ;Jr. (now Lord) Dukes, 
urged the abandonnent of restrictive practices and opposition 
to piece -work systems and techniques of scientific manage- 
ment such as time and motion study. 
Those indefatigable investigators, the Webbsv sought 
to portray statistically the attitude of the trade unions 
to _r rment -by- results, in their standard work published in 
1897(1). Their survey excluded the transport and general 
labour unions, but of the rest they found 42 trade unions, 
with a membership of approximately 573,000 which insisted 
upon piece -work; 38 unions with a total of 290,000 members 
which insisted upon time-work, and 24 unions with a member- 
ship of 140,000 which were prered to accept both methods 
of payment. An accurate estimate of a comparable nature 
(1) "Industrial Democracy" pp. 286 -7. 
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would not be practicable today, for the process of 
amalgamation which has gone on in the union movement since 
the last century has meant that nowadays a great variety of 
workers are members of the same union, and the vast majority 
of unions now include both tune- and piece- workers. 
From enquiries macle of the principal unions in each 
industry, it seeds that the official attitude today towards 
payment -by- results is generally favourable. Only two of 
the unions included, in the survey definitely forbid piece - 
work in any form, the Analgalnated Society of Woodworkers, 
Electrical and the Electrical Trades Union, and both bodies relaxed 
Trades Union. 
their prohibitions during the war. It was agreed(1) to 
allow payment -by- results on electrical work in the ship- 
building and ship- repairing industry for the period of the 
war, the method to be that of group contract schemes and, 
not schemes of individual piece -work. 
(1) Agreement between the Shipbuilding Employers' 
Federation and the Electrical Trades Union, of 11th. 
February, 1943. 
At a recent conference the Electrical Trades Union decided 
to give its executive council permissive_powers to 
introduce systems of payient -by- results, after consultation 
with sections of the aembership concerned and, provided 
there were trade union consultations at all levels in any 
systems agreed to. 
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Amalgamated Rule 31 of the Amalgaaated Society of,Woodworkers 
Society of 
Woodworkers. renders liable to a fine of not more than three pounds, or 
expulsion from the Society, any member who "is or has been 
working on a co-partnership system, or any system of 
premium bonus or payment -by- results, except when working 
in aircraft establishments or H.M. Dockyards when they 
shall be allowed to work the system applying thereto "(1) 
The war -time relaxation of the rule forbidding piece -work 
led to keen discussion within the union with regara to the 
merits and de;nerits of time -work and piece -work. A 
series of conferences was held during 1945, and although 
traditionally the union had insisted on time- rates, it 
was felt that :)resent circumstances and future developments 
made it imperative that this attitude be reviewed. 
Individual piece -work was not acceptable, and "consolid- 
ation of the present basic time -rate with a guaranteed 
plus production percentage, was agreed as the only 
acceptable alteratuon to the system at present in operstion 
."(2) 
Accordingly it was agreed that as from 11th. June 1946 
collective piece -work systems could. be worked by members 
employed in the shipbuilding and shiprepairing industry. 
(1) As amended on 1st. July, 1940. 
(2) Report of Twelve ,!ieetings with Management Cont;littees 
convened by the National Executive Council of the 






The position in the building industry has been fully 
discussed in a )revious section. The National Federation 
of Building Trades Operatives, the largest labour group 
in the industry, has traditionally insisted upon the wages 
of building trades operatives being based on the time -rate 
system. The rules of the Federation and of its 
constituents specifically prohibited any kind of piece- 
work or bonus system. However, following on the 
experience of the compulsory system of payment -by- results 
- during the Second World War, negôtiations were instituted 
with the Employers' Federation, and in October 1947 it was 
decided that: "Notwithstanding any existing restrictions 
(regional, local or sectional) any employer may, in 
respect of work on a particular site, job.,i shop or 
factory, initiate an incentive system of bonus oayments 
proprotionate to the results achieved in perförming a 
definite task, allotted either to an individual worker or 
to a gang of workers or to a team comprising all the men 
working on that site, on the basis of giving an operative 
of average ability and capacity a reasonable opportunity 
to achieve on such work earnings 20 per cent higher than 
those yielded by the normal prescribed rate. "(1) 
Even though piece -work has been practised in railway 
workshops for a very long time, the general attitude of 
(1) Summary of Settlement regarding Incentives and Wages 
etc. of 20th. October, 1947; National Joint Council for 
the BuilC ing Industry. 
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the largest railway union - the National Union of 
Railwaymen - was, before the recent War, hoc-bile to the 
introduction of piece -work or bonus schemes. This 
attitude was, however, modified during the war years, with 
the urgent heed for increased production in railway work, 
and there has been a considerable increase in the number 
of workers in railway workshops covered by payment- by- result0 
schemes. Recently the National Union of Railwaymen 
concluded an agreement with the London Passenger Transport 
Board, providing for the introduction of incentive bonus 
schemes in respect of their workshop staff. The massive 
Transport and General Workers' Union, with its membership 
of nearly a million,(1) étrongly favours the principle of 
payment -by- results. 
Metal Reference has already been made to the position taken 
Trades. 
up by the Amalgamated Engineering Union with regard to 
piece -work. The United Society of Boilermakers and Iron 
and Steel ahi?builders favours the straight piece -work 
system} rather than premium bonus schemes. It has 
succeeded in negotiating district and yard piece -work 
price lists for such trades as rivetting, plating, 
caulking and welding, whilst in engineering there are lists 
negotiated within the shop between the men and the manage- 
ment. 
(1) Membership: Males 815,675; Fecales 159,090; Total 
974,765 (per Statistical Statement of 78th. Annual 
Congress of the T. U. C. , 1946.) 
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Speaking at a Conference(1) in 1947, Mr. J. Gardner, 
Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Foundry Workers, 
indicated the attitude of his union to payment -by- results 
when he said: We are of the opinion greater encouragement 
can be given to the acceptance of payment -by- results 
You will, I am sure, appreciate how far we have travelled 
when the foundry trade unions express a readiness to get 
down to a consideration of payment -by- results as an 
accepted principle in foundry employment. It is an 
indicate* of our desire and intention to explore every 
avenue for a solution to our difficulties." The 
determination of this trade union to extend the principle 
of payment -by- results was evidenced at the 1947 Annual 
Lelegate Meeting. In his report the General Secretary 
said: "There is also need for proper incentives being 
given, particularly. in such industries as our own, where 
unpleasant conditions and hard toil are a prevailing 
feature....With regard to the earnings of loose pattern 
moulders, conference delegates will be asked to consider 
a memorandum which will establish the principle of 
payment -by- results throughout the industry. Since 80 
per cent of our members are already employed on payment - 
by- results, this is in its < ;lf a mandate which your 
(1) Statement presented on behalf of the Foundry Committee 
of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering 
Trade Unions at a Conference with the Engineering and 
Allied Employers National Federation held on 8th. 
January, 1947. 
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Council cannot overlook." This point of view was 
apparently shared by the meeting, for the following 
resolution was passed: "Conference agrees that payment - 
by- results should be introduced wherever possible.1I(1) 
Textile The cotton industry has been dealt with in some 
Industry. 
detail in a previous chapter, and the textile trade unions 
are, generally, favourably disposed. towards payment -by- 
results, which is the accepted method in most trades. In 
cotton spinning, the Amalgarnated Association of Operativd 
Cotton Spinners and Twiners, and in cotton weaving the 
Amalga: rated Weavers' Association, both favour piecework. 
As far as the woollen industry is concerned, the National 
Union of Lyers, 3]achers and Textile Workers supports the 
Surnna ry. 
system of collective peice -work, and is strong in its 
advocacy of that method of wage payment. The tailoring 
industry is covered by Wages Councils' machinery, and the 
National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers admits both 
the time and niece -work systems. 
It will be seen from this survey that official trade 
union opinion has been swinging away from the traditional 
attitude of hostility to payment -by- results, and now tends 
to accept the system as inevitable, and even in some cases, 
desirable. It is probdD le that the attitude of the rank- 
(1) Resolution passed by the Annual Delegate Meeting of the 
Amalgaaated Union of Foundry Workers, June, 1947. 
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and -file membership of the unions is less advanced than 
that of its ]aaders on this issue. The results of a 
recent Gallup Poll(1) are illuminating: in reply to the 
question "Do you agree, or disagree, that production must 
go up before wages can be increased ?" the following 





Trades Union Members 67 25 8 
Non -Trades Union 
Members 69 18 13 
Total 69 20 11 
The second question: "Do you agree, or disagree, that 







Trades Union Member 62 27 11 
Non- Trades Union 
Members 68 17 15 
Total 66 20 14 
Finally, it was aked, "Do you approve, or disapprove, of 
niece- work ?" and the following are the replies : - 
(1) Survey No. 143A, conducted in February 1947 by the 
British Institute of Public Opinion. 
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Approve Disapprove Qualified Don't know 
Trades Union 
Members 45 38 7 10 
Non -Trades Union 
Members 52 27 7 14 
Total 50 30 7 13 
Thus it would seem from these results that whereas 
two- thirds of the population are of the opinion that piece- 
work is likely to increase production, only half the 
population are prepared to give it thdr approval. Trade 
unionists are stronger in their disapproval than non - 
trade unionists, and fewer of them agree that piece -work 
is successful in increasing production. This restriction- 
ist attitude of mina is, unfortunately, only too apparent 
in industry today, and it involves a psychological dis- 
incentive which is striking at the very heart of the 
British economy. It derives quite naturally from the 
hitherto understandable struggle of labour to prevent its 
exploitatión by unscrupulous employers, and to secure for 
itself a greater measure of economic security. A 
Government coi ittee,(1) reporting after the First World 
War found "that cases have occurred wherein should the men 
(1) Report of the Departmental Committee appointed by the 
Board of Trade in 1916 to consider the position of the 
Engineering Trades after the War, This Conïiittee received 
evidence from thirty -one different branches of the industry 
and completed its Report in 1917. 
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earn more than time and a third they have been fined by 
their Union ", and this 'go-slow' policy is by no means 
unknown today. Fear of unemployment has made workers adopt 
almost a 'Luddite' policy towards technical advances, and 
the following resolution was carried. by a large majority at 
a recent trade union National Committee: "That this 
National Committee requests that Executive Council should 
oppose the use of the stop -watch for the fixing of piece- 
work prices or times on all occasions." (1) This 
restrictionist attitude of mind, understandable enough in 
past decades of exploitation, has come to be identified 
among many workers with progress, with the result that a 
keen, workman cannot give of his best without 
incurring the disapproval of his mates. Official trade 
union policy has succeeded in abandoning many of the 
traditional restrictionist practices, but they still exert' 
a powerful influence upon the minds of the individual 
workers, and until they can be effectively removed, the 
economic recovery of this country will remain but a 
transient dream. 
(1) Twenty -Ninth National Committee of the Mmalganated 
Engineering Union, June 1947. Resolution carried by 41 
votes to 6, with 3 neutral. 
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C H A P T E R X. 
THE INDIVIDUAL PIECE -WORK SYSTEM. 
We have now to consider the various systems of 
payment -by- results which are found in this country. The 
simplest of these is that known as "piece- work ", where the 
employer does not pay so much per hour, but so much per 
piece, that is per unit of production. Clearly this 
system is most easily applicable to work of a repetitive 
nature, perfonned.in more or less standardised conditions, 
so that a given amount of energy and skill can be relied 
upon to produce a given output. The output must be 
measurable, in terms of tons, yards, numbers, or some 
other unit, so that the system is not suited to agricultur- 
al and clerical work, executive and administrative duties, 
where output cannot easily be computed. In shipbUilding,L 
for example, riveters, platers, caulkers, drillers and 
burners are nor;ially paid on piece -work when working on new 
ships, but this method of payment is not applicable to 
these trades when performing ship repair work. This means 
that these men have to be paid a "lieu- rate" to give them 
an increase over their basic time-wage; otherwise they 
would not be willing to undertake repair work. 
Llnphasis As a piece -worker's earnings vary directly with the 
on Quantity. 
number of units produced, for each of which the same payment 
is made, this encourages him to produce as many units as 
possible, and the emphasis is upon quantity rather than 
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quality of output. Thus, piece -work is most successful 
where quantity of output is the prime consideration, and 
where inspection for quality is easily effected. It is 
not suited to processes in which waste resulting from 
increased speed of working would exceed the gain resulting 
from the extra output. In such cases many employers only 
pay for work which passes certain tests, but even if this 
precaution is taken, the waste remains. 
Again, piece -work cannot properly fulfil its function 
in cases where the number of units of output produced is 
not under the worker's control, but is determined by the 
speed of the machine which he is tending, or the particular 
process in which he is engaged. In the Ford motor works, 
for example, production is almost entirely determined by 
the speed of machinery and conveyor belts, and since output 
is outside the worker's control, the piece -work system is 
not T plied. In the oil refining industry, where the 
thermakl and chemical processes are under close technical 
control as regards both quality and quantity of output, the 
piece -work system is not generally in use in Great Britain, 
or the East, or the United States of America. Point 
premium systems have nJt been markedly successful either 
in this and similar intricate chem cial processes. The 
volume of oil processed is maintained at the maximum 
throughout for which the particular equipment is cifically 
designed, the target being set and the output controlled 
by the technical staffs. 
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Advantages. The great advantage of the sttaight piece -work system 
is that it gives the greatest possible incentive to increased 
output, since the workers receive all the benefit of the time 
which they save - it is sometimes called a 100 per cent 
premium, or a 100 per cent sharing plan, although in fact there 
is no sharing involved. From the employer's point of view, 
therefore, increased output does not give him falling wages 
costs per unit of output - labour cost per unit is a constant - 
but the larger output does enable overhead costs to be spread 
over a largetnunber of units of output, so that total costs per 
unit are reduced. The premium -bonus seines and complicated 
sharing plans are designed to give falling labour -cost per unit 
of output as output rises, in addition to falling overhead costs 
per unit, but as this necessarily involves a constantly 
diminishing piece -work price, these systems have not the same 
incentive power that the straight piec -work method possesses.' 
The firms included in the present survey were asked to 
estimate the increase in output which had resulted from the 
introduction of the piece -work system, but accurate data proved 
difficult to secure. A number of finas had used the piece -work 
system for so long that they could not make any estimate; 
others had not the necessary data upon which to base an estimate 
but reported that there was undoubtedly a definite increase. 
Those fines which did make an estimate put the increase at 
varying figures up to 33 -1 /3rd. per cent. The average 
experience seems to be that output is increased by anything 
Case 1. 
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fro.;i a quarter to a third when piece -work is introduced in 
place of day work. American experience agrees with this 
estimate; one report(1) stated that the changeover should 
give an average of 30 per cent. increase in output, and a 
25 per cent increase in wages; another survey(2) of 659 
plants in the United States shewed that workers on incentive 
schemes received 10.3 to 18.2 per cent more -per hour than 
those on time- payment. (This second estimate of wage 
increases would be lower than the first because it included 
many incentive schemes other than piece -work, in which the 
time saved was shared between employer and employee). 
Three outstanding cases of increased output following 
the introduction of piece -work may be mentioned. One firm 
included in the present survey was one specialising in the 
manufacture of sweet confectionery. During the War another 
firm manufacturing a special kind of biscuit had its plant 
heavily bombed, and of the eight machine -units which it 
employed, only four could be salvaged. These were removed 
to the chocolate manufacturing firm's Dremises, and were set 
to work manufacturing biscuits for t 'e bombed -out owners. 
Previously, manufacture had been on a daywork system, but 
the chocolate firm were accustomed to piece -work practice, 
and they put the biscuit operatives on the sane system, 
basing their piece -work prices on the previous experience of 
(1) National Industrial Conference Board (U.S.A.) Report 1930. 
(2) Bureau of Labor Statistics Survey (U.S.A.) 1943. 
Case 2. 
1 2 A 
the biscuit manufacturers working on a time -rate system. 
After a time, the output increased so much under the 
stimulus of the wage incentive that the four productive 
units were producing more than had previously been produced 
by the eight original units. 
Another case of outstanding interest -was that of a 
firm whose peace -time production consisted of soft 
furnishings such as down quilts, bedspreads, cushions, 
curtains, etc. During the War, the firm turned over to 
the manufacture of parachutes and anti- torpedo nets amongst 
other things. In the early stages, until they were able 
to ascertain the proper times for each operation, the firm 
paid the operatives on a time -rate basis, and production 
was very low, partly due no doubt to the inexperience of 
both operatives and management, but - in the opinion of the 
manager - mainly due to the absence of any real-financial 
incentive. Business efficiency experts were called in and 
they advised long conveyor belts being installed for the 
parachute work. This was done, and the Ministry of Air- 
craft Production considered that good progress was being 
made, and were satisfied with both the production and the 
.price charged. It was clear to the management, however, 
that the belts could be speeded up without any strain 
being put upon the girls. A committee of girls from each 
belt was formed, and a system worked out whereby a bonus 
was paid to every girl on the belt whenever the committee 
considered that the seed of the belt coup- be increased 
Case 3. 
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to save a minute. One minute only was saved by this 
method. Various meetings were held with the coilittees, 
but they were emphatic that the main body of the girls would 
not be able to keep up viith the belt if it was speeded up 
further. Efforts were made to eliminate the slower workers 
by providing them with alternative work off the belt, but 
still production lagged, although it was clear to the 
management that many of the workers were capable of speedier 
work. Finally, the management posted up a notice to the 
effect that as from the beginning of the next pay week, the 
belts would cease working and a piece. -work system be 
installed, prices being based on existing production and 
rates of pay. The increase in output at the end of the 
following week was amazing. Production went up by 57 
per cent, and this increase later rose to 73 per cent, and 
was maintained at that figure. Absenteeism, which had 
hitherto proved a great problem necessitating a large 
number of spare operatives being kept on hand to replace 
the absentees, dwindled to very email proportions. Time- 
keeping had always been a difficulty, workers coming on 
duty anything up to half -an -hour late, but now many of the 
employees were found waiting to make a start a quarter of 
an hour before starting time, and getting quite annoyed if 
the mechanics were not ready to start the machines and let 
then get to work at once: 
The third case was that of a textile firm which was 
asked by the Admiralty as a war -time measure to manufacture 
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anti- torpedo nets. The work, which was performed by 
female workers, consisted of taking a 21 foot length of 
12 gauge wire and making a circular grommet with it by 
twisting it round and round itself, finally burying the 
ends into the centre of the strands. Each graamet was 
interlaced through those already made on the fraie, so that 
the final steel net, weighing about 22 tons, wa built up in 
rows and measured 75 feet by 40 feet when finished. The 
manager of the firm visited well -known rope- makers in other 
parts of the country in order to obtain times for the 
various jobs, and to see their plant layout. At first the 
workers were paid on a daywork basis, and the average rate 
of production per pair of workers was 800 per week. It 
was felt that this was inadequate and a piece -work system 
was introduced, with the result that output jumped to 
nearly 2,000 per week for each pair of workers, an increase 
of nearly 150 per cent. 
The results of an investigation(1) carried out by 
Experiments. 
Messrs. Wyatt, Frost and Stock are apposite to -this 
question of t,e incentive power of the straight piece- 
work system. The experiment was conducted on a small 
group of girl operatives employed on the wrapping, packing 
and weighing of toffee - all repetitive jobs. The 
workers were first paid a fixed weekly wage for a period 
(1) Industrial Health Research Board Report No. 69: 
"Incentives in Repetitive Work" by S. Wyatt, L. Frost & 
F.G.L. Stock. (H. ivI . S. 0. 1934). 
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of nine weeks, and this was followed by a competitive 
bonus system for a further period of fifteen weeks. 
During this time, the girls were ranked according to output, 
the slowest worker being given the same wage as before, 
the next being given an additional sixpence, and so on 
throughout the g roup. This bonus system was followed by 
a flat piece -rate which continued in operation for twelve 
weeks, making a total of thirty -six weeks for the whole 
experiment. The results were as follows: "The amount of 
improvement during the time -rate period was relatively 
shall (12 per cent) and there were indications that a 
continuation of this method of payment would have resulted 
in no appreciable increase in output. It was for this 
reason that the bonus scheme was introduced, and the 
immediate effect was an increase in output of 46 per cent. 
The curve of output continued to rise for the greater part 
of this period, but towards the end it remained at a fairly 
uniform level, and a further change in the method of payment 
seemed desirable. The flat piece -rate was accordingly 
introduced, and again there was a notable increase in out- 
put (30 per cent) which, after a temporary reaction, was 
maintained with very little change. "(1) 
Other effects Other factors in addition to the direct financial 
of Piece -work. 
incentive tend to increase output under piece -work. 
(1) Ibi d pp. 4-5. 
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Besides doing their work more quickly, workers will be 
anxious to ensure a steady flow of materials and partly 
finished goods, and will keep their machines in better 
working order, taking less time over minor repairs and 
adjustments, in order to make their bonus as large as 
possible. This is one of the principal advantages of 
piece -work in the cotton spinning industry, where to a 
large extent the operative's speed of working is deter- 
mined by the speed of the machinery, but where a great 
deal of time can be wasted over thread breakages and 
minor mechanical difficulties. Payment on a piece -work 
basis ensures that this lost irrte will be minimised. 
The worker's interest is aroused in the general organisa- 
tion of the shop, and in the efficiency of the ancillary 
workers, and this tends to promote a higher degree of 
overall efficiency. 
In short, under piece -work, the worker acts to a 
considerable extent as his own supervisor, since his 
earnings vary directly with the amount of work which he 
performs. Thus, the costs of supervision are substan- 
tially reduced, although the costs of quality control 
and inspection may have to be raised in order to maintain 
the required standards of quality. This tendency for 
piece -wo ers to act as their own supervisors was well 
(1) 
illustrated in the Industrial Health Research Board study. 
(1) Ibid pp. 20-21. 
Simplicity. 
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already referred to. The following figures shew the 
average number of times per week when one worker acted in 
a manner which disturbed or distracted the majority of the 
others;_ 
Time -rate: 20.1 Bonus -rate: 16.6 Piece -rate: 11.3 
It was noticeable that when they were paid by time, the 
workers wasted each other's time by talking and frivolous 
behaviour, whereas under the piece -work system their 
anxiety to earn bonus curbed this tendency. The relative 
amount of talking under the different methods of payment 
was found to be:- 
Time -rate : 1. 00 Bonus-rate: 0. 79 Piece-rate: 0.71 
One great advantage which the straight piece -work 
system has over the other methods of payment -by- results is 
its simplicity. Both for the worker and for the pay -clerk 
it is a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate the piece- 
work bonus and this is a powerful factor in favour of 
piece -work from both employer's and employee's point of 
view. It seems that the outlook of the British working 
man is fundamentally different from that of his American 
cousin, and this is the rock upon which so many of the 
American wage- incentive systems have foundered. Very 
frequently these are highly complicated, and the average 
workman cannot calculate how his wages have been computed. 
Even where time -cards are given to the workers to explain 
how the wage -packet has been made up, these are often 
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unintelligble to the ordinary worker. 
This element of simplicity in the straight piece- 
work system is also an advantage to the employer, for it 
reduces the costs of administering the wage plan. 
Although the firms included in the survey foúnd it 
difficult if not impossible to tabulate the comparative 
costs of administering the various wage - systems which they 
employed, it was noticeable that, apart from day -work, the 
piece -work system was the least costly of the various 
payment -by- results methods. Apart from the question of 
costs of administration, the piece -work times and prices 
are an invaluable aid to cost -accounting and production 
control. It is very much easier to estimate the lab our - 
cost involved in the manufacture of a certain article if 
that article is produced by piece -workers than if it is 
produced by time- workers. From the point of view of 
production control, the fact that output has to be 
regularly measured for piece -work payment purposes, makes 
very much easier the work of management in maintaining a 
check on the efficiency of the various sections of the 
plant. 
The advantages of the straight piece -work system 
may be sunned up in the words of the Superintendent of a 
large engineering firm on Glydeside :- "I prefer straight 
piece -work to the other systems, although I an aware that 
some employers have operated these systems successfully.. 
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Seventy -five per cent of my workers were highly skilled 
engineers - all trade unionists - with a sprinkling of 
other tradesmen, semi - skilled workmen and labourers. 
Immediately on my appointment I put into practice the 
system (piece -work) and had as reward thirty years of 
absolutely trouble -free experience on all wage problems. 
Throughout that time I never had an argument with a shop 
steward, nor a single deputation of workers to my office to 
discuss wages questions. My opinion of my staff of 
workers was that they were the finest group of workmen on 
Clydeside or any other side:" 
Disadvantages It ,nuF.t, however, be admitted that all the evidence is 
of niece -work. 
not in favour of piece -work, for even under ideal conditions 
of work the system suffers from considerable disadvantages. 
The most difficult problem involved in the adnirtration of 
a piece -work system is that of rate- fixing, and this is 
such an important matter that it will be discussed in some 
detail in the next chapter. In the matter of rate- fixing, 
the points of view of management and workers are inevitably 
conflicting, the former wishing_ to keep labour costs per 
unit as low as possible, and the latter wishing to 
Maximise earnings, and this conflict of interest may easily 
lead to ill -feeling. Even if there is a guarantee given 
by the eraplo,, er that rates will not be cut, employees may 
still limit their output since they fear that when 
new 
rates have to be set, these new rates will be "tighter ". 
Under the traditional method of fixing piece -work prices, 
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that is, on the basis of past experience, some rates will 
inevitably be "loose" and sane "tight ", that is, some will 
be over generous to the worker, and others bather niggardly.¡ 
Workers will naturally press for a relaxation of the latter, 
but, owing to the rate - cutting guarantee, the employer will 
not be able to reduce the former, so that there is a 
continual tendency for the average to be "loose ". This 
means that labour costs are unduly high, and the employer's 
competitive position in the market is Drejudiced. 
Wage- changes. A further disadvantage of the piece -work system is that 
in the event - in these days nuite frequent - of a new 
wage agreement being reached between employers' 
organisations and the trade unions, involving a change in 
time -rates of pay, this means that all the individual piece -1 
work prices in the plant will have to be adjusted, a 
terrific task in a large manufactory. For this reason, 
many manufacturers quote piece -work prices on a time basis 
rather than a cash basis, so that when basic time -rates are 
altered this does not involve the readjustment of the whole 
piece -work schedule. This practice is frequently adopted 
in the engineering industry. In iron- founding, pattern - 
makers have traditionally been time -workers, but recently 
Payment -by- results has been extended to this trade, piece- 
work prices being expressed in terries of hours bather than 
monetary units. 
Standard. Times Fully developed, this method of stating piece -work 
Sÿßem 
prices in terms of time, is known as the "standard times 
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system''. (1) There is need for strict accuracy in fixan.g 
task times, for if times are loose then unduly high bonuses 
will result, giving higher costs and lower efficiency than the 
optimum. If operators find that they can make adequate bonus 
easily, they will not trohble to exert themselves further. 
On the other hand the rate -fixer must not try to make rates 
too tight, or dissatisfaction and ill- feeling will inevitably 
follow. Traditional rate- fixing methods are inadequate for 
this system; time -study must be employed to forecast 
accurately the time required to perform the task. Each job 
is then given a standard time for its performance, and the 
employee is paid so much per standard hour of work done, 
irrespective of the actual time taken. For example, if 
the standard time is four hours, and the worker does the job 
in three, he has saved one hour, and this is paid to him as a 
bonus - for that job he receives a total payment of four hours 
at his own time -rate. From the employee's point of view, 
the financial result is exactly the same as if the work was 
paid for by the piece, and the worker gets the full benefit of 
any saving he makes; he can earn unlimited bonus, and this 
tends to make a strong incentive. TO the employer, however, 
the advantages over the ordinary piece -work system are 
obviously contherable. One has already been mentioned, 
namely the ease with which changes in time -rates can be put 
(1) This use of the tern. "standard times" must not be confused 
with the Westinghouse incentive plan of American practice. 
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into effect. Furthermore, production control is simplified, 
for all jobs, irrespective of the wage -level of the operative 
required for each, are computed in terms of a time unit, thus 
facilitating comparisons between the various jobs involved. 
This comparison is the more real because job values are 
divorced from differences in wage levels. 
Constant The employer regards it as a disadvantage of the piece- 
Labour-cost 
Iper unit work system that, since the same amount is pai( for each unit 
próduced, labour -cost per unit is a constant. This 
complaint is the "raison d'etre" of the premium -bonus systems, 
in which the piece -rate automatically falls as output increases 
giving a constantly declining labour -cost per unit. The 
constant labour -cost per unit of the straight piece -work 
system, however, means that the task of costing a job is 
very much simplified, as compared with the bonus schemes. 
It means also that the incentive value of the systemis 
maximised by allowing the worker the full benefit of the 
time he saves. In short, although it is true that total 
cost per piece is higher at high productions than under the 
time -rate system, higher productions are actually achieved 
under piece -work whebeas they are doubtful under daywork. 
Under piece -work, all the saving in overheads goes to the 
employer, and all the saving in productive time goes to the 
eiì loyee. This is probably the fairest principle to 
follow, for establishment charges are outside the worker's 
province on the one hand, and on the other, the effort of 
the employee is mainly independent of the management, 
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although it may not be strictly true (as the piece -work 
system presupposes) that ceteris paribus output increases in 
direct proportion to the effort of the workers. Where 
improvements in methods of production and orgaiis Aion are 
introduced, for example, the consequent increase in output 
has not been due to the effort of the workers, and the 
benefits of it should not pass to them, unless the new 
methods uuan that they have to work harder. There must be 
an easy and agreed basis, for read] ustAent of piece -work 
Prices or standard times in such circumstances, otherwise 
the result is both unfair and uneconomic, and there is no 
incentive to the employer to increase managerial efficiency. 
The protagonists of the premium-bonus systems contend that 
the sharing of the time saved gives this incentive to the 
employer as well as to the employee, and avoids the necessity 
for the alteration of bonus times when minor changes in 
method are made. 
Psycholozical to the difficulty of accurate rate -fixing,. and 
Disadvantage s 
also owing to v,.ria_tions in individual workers' capacities, 
payment on a piece -work basis leads to differences in the 
earnings of workers doing the same kind of work. This may 
have a number of undesirable consequences; it may lead to 
dissatisfaction, quarrels, and complaints. A Irge English 
company engaged in the manufacture of electrical equipment 
found that where the girls working on the same bench received 
different earnings because of differences in individual out- 
put, envy, jealousy and petty bickering became evident. 
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A changeover to a group system, whereby the output of the 
girls was pooled and a group bonus paid, resolved the 
difficulty. In some engineering workshops it was found that 
where employers paid on an individual piece -work basis, the 
workers voluntarily organised their own "fellowship" system, 
whereby the men, when they received their individual pay - 
packets, pooled their earnings and redistributed the balances 
on some mutually agreed basis. 
In their investigation on incentives,(1) Messrs. Wyatt, 
Frost and Stock found that quarrels and complaints were more 
frequent under piece -work than under time -work. The 
comparative frequency was:- 
Quarrels., Complaints. 
Time -rate. 1.4 2.9 
Bonus -rate 6.9 7.1 
Piece -rate 4.2 10.8 
When payment -by- results was introduced, "some of the workers 
accused the others of being 'mean' and 'hurrying' and jealousy 
was shown whenever an unusually high level of output was 
attained. Abusive and insulting remarks were fairly common 
and friendships were sometimes strained or broken. Needless 
to say, the slower and less capable operatives were generally 
responsible for these incidents....The bonus method of payment 
revealed unpleasant personal tendencies which had remained 
dormant under the time -rate and the individuals no longer 
worked as a harmonious group." Quarrels were less frequent 
(1) I. H. R. B. Report No. 69. (supra) 
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on the piece -work system than on the bonus -payment, but 
complaints about 'materials and conditions of work, indeed 
anything which seened to interfere with output became 
more numerous. 
Trouble of this kind often arises because of 
inadequate preparation on the part of the management 
prior to the introduction of the piece -work system. One 
Scottish engineer found that inhumber of firms with 
which he was at various times associated difficulties 
were encountered which were entirely due to the manage- 
ment's having failed to remove all possible hindrances 
to the successful operation of piece -work before 
introducing it. Unsatisfactory tools, insufficient 
supply of material, alterations to drawings and methods, 
inadequate crane or lifting services for heavy materials, 
were frequently the cause of trouble, making the worker 
dissatisfied at finding his earnings curtailed by what 
he considered. - often justly - as the mistakes of 
rn anagem ent. 
Whilst the answer td this particular problem is 
entirely in the hands of the management, others are not 
so easily overcome. Owing to the fact that some prices 
are almost inevitably "loose" and others "tight ", 
workers tend to seek for those jobs which yield high 
earnings, and shun the others, and complaints of 
favouritism are frequently forthcoming. These 
complaints may not be entirely unjustified, for an 
Effect on 
Quality. 
1 4 I- 
unscrupulous foreman will often give the bosely priced 
jobs to his favourite workers and force those whom he 
happens to dislike to perform the less remunerative tasks. 
This danger is not, however, peculiar to piece -work; on 
daywork too the foreman can give the hard, dirty and 
unpleasant jobs to one worker and reserve the pleasanter 
tasks for the favoured few. 
One of the gravest disadvantages of the piece -work 
system is that it emphasises quantity at the expense of 
quality. In his anxiety to earn bonus, the worker may 
tend to hurry unduly over his work, and produce articles 
which will only just pass inspection and no more. If 
there is a high reject rate and materials are expensive, 
the loss due to wastage may outweigh the gain from 
increased output. Hence, for really successful working, 
the piece -work system is most easily applied to operations' 
in which inspection of large quantities can readily be 
undertaken by someone other than the worker himself, or by 
some Mechanical device. 
This is not to say, however, that the piece -work 
system is not applicable to the maintenance of high 
standards of quality. A well -known manufacturer of 
musical instruments of very high quality, uses the piece- 
work system almost exclusively, since the jobs can be 
standai ised and efficient quality control maintained. 
;;unlit Modern techniques of nual ity control ensure that a 
Control. 
constant watch is kept on the quality of output throughout 
the period of production, not merely on its m iaple tion. 
For example, a firm manufacturing in peace -time gramophone 
motors and clocks, and in war -time engaged in precision 
engineering, has the following inspection arrangements. 
There is a Foreman Inspector who is in charge of the 
personnel who do the actua inspection. Under him are 
Shop Insoe ctors, trained for the work, and each in charge 
of the inspection in a particular department. These Shop 
Inspectors are responsible for checking the first parts off 
a new set -up on any machine and under thee- come female 
Viewers, who keep going round the machines chedd.ng 
the ono rk as it is produced. 
Their method of quality control is adapted from that 
suggested by the Ministry of Supply(1) And is redly a form 
of organised sampling, coupled with graphical records. 
The total product of each machine is divided into a number 
of sub- groups, either by time intervals (e.g. an hour's 
production) or by box size, etc. A sample of components 
is taken from each sub -group, the sample representing about 
5 to 10 per cent of the sub group. Thus, if production 
was at the rate of 150 per hour, and the number in the 
sample was fixed at five, a sample would be taken every 
(1) "A First Guide to Quality Control for Engineers ": 
Ministry of Supply, London, September 1943.. 
Vide. also: "Production and Engineering Bulletin ": 
Ministry of Labour, Vol. 4. No. 29, May, 1945. 
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30 to 40 minutes, so that the number of components in each 
sub -group would be 75 to 100. This sample may be taken 
at random, or the inspector may take the last five 
components produced; the first gives a more representative 
sample, but the second indicates more clearly the state of 
the machine at the time of sampling, and is used where 
frequent fine adjustment of cut, feed and speed is necessar; 
When the sampling has been done, the measurements are 
taken on each individual component in the sample. It may 
be a measurement of dimension, weight, pressure, strength, 
electrical resistance, or anything else which can be 
measured. These measurements for the several components 
are added together and the sum divided by the number in 
the sample, giving the sample mean or average, usually 
denoted by x. Then the smallest individual measurement 
is subtracted from the lrgest in the sample, and this 
gives the sample range, usually denoted by w. The noting 
of the measurements, and the above calculations are done 
on the data sheet,(1) which also indicates the relevant 
data regarding the job, e.g. contract number, drawing 
number, machine number, dimension, and so on. The 
sample mean and the sample range are plotted on the 
control chart(2) consisting of squared paper on which 
details are given of the job and the dimension to be 
checked. On the chart are ruled two black lines, one 
(1) Appendix A(1) 
(2) Appendix A(2) 
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above and one below the dimension that is being worked 
to on the machine, indicating the tolerance allowed as 
per the drawing. For example, if the size being aimed 
at is, say, 2 inch with a tolerance of + 0.005 inch, then 
the upper line will be ruled at 0.505 and the lower line 
at 0.495 inch. Inside these two lines are ruled two 
more lines, usually in red ink. These are the quality 
control limits, and are calculated on a formula based on 
the theory of probability4 
1) 
So long as none of the 
points plotted on the chart to indicate the sample mean 
comes outside the control limits, the operation is said 
to be "in a state of control ". If a plotted point does 
fall outside the control limits, the job is stopped and 
all the components produced since the last sample was 
taken are given a 100 per cent inspection. The cause 
of the error is investigated and, if necessary, the 
machine adjusted until the job is again coming off the 
machine satisfactorily, as indicated by the plotted 
points being within the control limits. If this 
investigation is carried out each time a "wild" point 
appears, faults will gradually be detected and corrected 
until a state is reached in which the points rarely or 
never fall outside their control limits. This process 
of adjustment is well illustrated in Appendix A(2). 
(1) For method of calculating control limits, 
vide 
'First Guide to Quality Control for Engineers" 
(Ministry 
¿ ' Supply) p. 5. 
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An important advantage of this method of quality 
control is the psychological effect on operators and 
setters, for they have constantly before them on the machine 
or bench a graphical record of the Quality of their work, 
which helps to keep than up to standard. idost important 
of all is the continuous nature of the inspection; the 
work is constantly checked as it cone s off the machine, 
instead of waiting until a lot of parts have been made and 
then sorting out the good from the baci tgr a 100 per cent 
inspection. If some such method as the above is adopt ed, 
there is no reason why piece -work should result in an 
unduly high proportion of rejects. 
Quality - Some firms have developed these techniques even 
Bonuses 
further, and encourage the maintenance of high standards 
of quality on piece -work by the introduction of quality 
bonuses. For example, a firm of rubber manufacturers 
adopts the straight piece -rate per unit or per 100, with a 
guaranteed minimum time -rate, and in addition a daily bonus 
for low scrap -figures, and where a certain "target" Output 
is exceeded. 
The actual details of the various schemes of quality 
bonuses vary widely, but the following may be cited as an 
example. The industrialist who introduced the scheme 
felt that -a positive incentive was more successful than a 
negative one; that an additional award offered for high 
quality of work was more likely to produce consistently 
good.. work than a system of penalties only for bad work. 
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Accordingly he put into use the following over -riding 
quality incentive ('1) in addition to normal piece -work : - 
% rejects (either sera Over - riding quality bonus 
hour or recoverable) due to oence per 
bad. work by operator 
0 to 1 12d. bonus 
1.1 to 3 ad 
3.1 to 5 2d 
5.1 to 7 4d. 
7. 1 to 10 Nil 
10.1 to 12 :d. penalty 
- 
12.1 to 15 7.-d 
15.1 to 20 
20. 1 to 25 ld. f, 
25.1 to 35 /.J d. 
35.1 to 45 3d. 
Over 45 % 6d. penalty, or 
loss of all 
- 
bonus, if more 
than 6C. 
The bonus is calculated over the aggregate of each day's 
work, not on each individual job; this makes for the 
expenditure of a minimun of clerical effort. 
To sim up the position with regard. to quality under 
a piec-work system of wage payment: there is no doubt 
that the emphasis which piece -work places upon quantity 
;oust inevitably tend to reduce the sense of craftsmanship 
of a worker, and may encourage him to produce shoddy work, 
On the other hand, if the product is one which can be 
fairly easily inspected in large quantities by so; ieone 
other than the worker hi.cLself or by some mechanical device, 
the modern techniques of quality control, coupled perhaps 
with a system of quality bonuses, should be quite adequate 
to the maintenance of the desired standards. 
(1) Illustrated. graphically in Appendix ''A ":¢) 
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CHAPTER XI. 
PIECE-WORK: PROBL,;i;7S OP RATE-FIXING. 
I. RATE - CUTTING. 
One of the most difficult problems encountered in the 
administration of the piece -work system of wage -payment is 
that of rate- fixing. The traditional method is to base 
piece -work prices on past ex_7erience.of operation times, 
but the previous output on day work is only a very imperfect 
measure of what will be done under piece -work. The modern 
techniques of time and motion study are as yet not widely 
used in this country except in mass-production plants, but 
there is really no other accurate means of assessing piece- 
work prices. 
Rate - cutting. This problem óf accurate rate- fixing leads to another, 
namely that of rate- cutting, which has, perhaps more than 
any other one factor, been the cause of failure to operate 
successfully the piece -work system. If prices fixed by 
the traditional methods are fixed too high - as they may 
easily be - the worker earns excessively high wages from 
the employer's point of view, and so he may be tempted to 
cut the piece -rate. For example, a Scottish confectionery 
firm took over the manufacture of an English firm's product 
when the latter's premises were damaged by enemy action. 
Piece -work prices were fixed on the past experience of the 
parent firm working on a day work basis. These prices 
proved to be so liberal that production wänt up by leaps 
and bounds, thus giving the girl operatives unduly high 
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piece -work bonuses. This caused dissatisfaction among the 
Scottish firm's staff engaged. in the manufacture of that 
firm's own products, for its piece -work prices had been 
more accurately fixed. by :Weans of time- study. The Ldmur 
Manager is in a cleft stick, for he knows that if he cuts 
the "loose" rates, this will cause trouble with the operatives 
on those jobs, whereas if he leaves things as they are his 
own staff will become dissatisfied, and demand increases in 
their own rates. 
Restriction Rate- cutting. inevitably results in bad industrial 
of Output 
relations, and it frustrates the power of piece -work as an 
incentive to greater output. Indeed, if workers suspect 
that in the event of their substantially increasing their 
output piece -rates will be cut, they will restrict their 
output to a limited anount. Reference has already been 
made to the "four day week" policy of the Lanarkshire miners 
in 1914, who deliberately restricted. their output for fear' 
of rate - cutting. Deliberate restriction of this kind has 
sometimes been either imposed. or encouraged by the trade 
unions, for it was reported(1) in 1917 that "cases have 
occurred wherein should the men earn more than time and a 
third they have been fined by their union." Again, 
'over -booking', that is, earning more than the agreed 
percentage over time -wage, is sometimes punishable by fine, 
and those corm fitting the offence for the third time may be 
(1) Report of Departmental Committee of the Board of Trade, 
appointed to consider the position of the Engineering Trades 
after the War. 1917. 
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liable to expulsion from the union. Nowadays, however, 
this "go- slow" policy would not be the official policy of 
the trade unions, and does not appear to be upheld by any 
published union rules or regulations. Where it does appear, 
it is the result of concerted agreement of the men in the 
shop. There are many trade union rules which do in fact 
result in restriction of output, but these are not concerned 
with the specific problem of rate- cutting. For example, 
there are restrictions on the employment of non -union men, 
dilution of skilled labour, working of overtime, extension 
of payment -by- results schemes, employment of certain classes 
of men on certain machines, and so on. 
Falling Even where the piece -rate is not unduly "loose ", an 
Labour -costs 
employer may be tempted to cut the rate due to his desire to 
secure falling; labour -costs per unit as output goes up. 
Whilst the worker who manages to increase his output 
naturally contends that he should receive the full benefit 
of his improved efficiency, the employer may argue that in 
view of the intense competition against which he has to 
fight it is imperative that he should. achieve lower labour - 
costs per unit of output. His total costs per unit will 
fall automatically as output rises, since the burden of 
overheads will be spread over a larger output, but. in order 
to secure falling wages -costs per unit, piece-rates must be 
cut. This is the idea behind the premium -bonus systems 
such as Rowan and Halsey, and the American sharing plans. 
Indeed, employers may easily allow the piece -work 
system to become virtually a time -rate system under a 
different name. Under a time -wage, the amount which is 
expected of a man as being a. reasonable day's work is usually 
fairly well defined and understood. Under piece -work the 
rate is fixed so that an average man working reasonably hard 
will earn a certain wage; if the rate is cut in the event 
of his exceeding this level, there is little real difference 
between the two methods, at least so far as their ultimate 
results are concerned. 
The feeling seems to be quite widely held that if a 
piece- worker earns 25 to 33 per cent over time wages, that 
is as much as he can expect. An employer frequently 
contends that a certain class of worker is "worth" so much 
a week, and that if the worker by producing a greater output 
puts his earnings above that recognised level, the piece -rate 
should be cut. Not unnaturally this extremely short- 
sighted policy tends to develop a great distrust of the 
piece -work system on the part of the workers, and the result 
is that although piece -work is in theorty supposed to 
encourage the maximum output, in fact it only induces the 
worker to produce a certain limited. amount. "If the 
worker's price is to be cut as fast as he increases his 
output, be will be more than human if he does not keep- 
down his output to the lowest limit that he can get the 
employer to accept. "(1) 
(1) Cole: "Payment of Wages" p. 27. 
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During the Second World War there was no limitation 
of piece -work earnings owing to the obvious need to avoid 
any loss of output which might damage the war effort. 
The Minister of Labour told the House of Cannons that this 
was definitely Government policy; he said: "It was said 
in a previous debate that I had caused some uneasiness by 
the statement, which I had made publicly, that I did not 
mind what was earned on payment -by- results, so long as it 
represented production. We were asked whether or not 
that represented Government policy. My answer is: 'Yes, 
emphatically.' When a rate is fixed through the 
procedure existing in industry and the people increase their 
output, it is not our concern, from that point, what they 
earn. The more the people increase their earnings, the 
lower they make the cost of production and there is 
greater production for the war effort. "(1) 
Under war -time conditions, of course, the urge to 
increase output derived not only from the financial 
incentive but also from patriotic motives encouraged by 
Government propaganda. It was said of the days following 
Dunkirk: "Men fell exhausted. at their lathes, and workmen 
and working women did not take their clothes off for a 
week at a time. Meals, rest, and relaxation all faded 
from their minds and they just carried on to the utmost 
limit of their strength. "(") 
(1) Mr. Earnest Sevin, Minister of Labour, speaking to the 
House of Commons on 29th. July, 1941. 
(2) Mr. Winston Churchill, Prime Minister, JU1r, 19 ̂1. 
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Guarantees Although the need to avoid restriction of output is 
against rate - 
cutting. much more Tparent under the exigencies of war, it is no less 
important in peace, and especially so in the present economic 
crisis. More and more employers have come to realise the 
folly of rate-cutting, and whereas formerly it was practised 
openly, nowadays few employers of any real standing have 
recourse to this short - sighted policy. 
A Government Corru.zittee(1) reporting in 1917 made the 
following recommendation: . "We are of the opinion that a 
piece -rate once fixed, and proved to be reasonable after 
fair trial, ought not to be disturbed, except by adjustment 
through agreed rise and fall of wages or in very special 
circumstances - such as the introduction of an improved 
machine or method of producing the same article. Naturally, 
a piece -rate on a new article cannot be arrived at with 
any degree of certainty until its production has continued 
for some time. When the pork has once been reduced to a 
piece -rate, it should not be ca'able of being disturbed, 
except by adjustment, without the consent of the local 
Employers' Association and +. the Branch of the Trade Union 
affected." 
This recommendation has in many cases been accepted, 
and in a number of industries where collective agreements 
have been negotiated these provide guarantees against the 
possibility of rate cutting. For example, in the 
(1) Report of the Departmental Committee of the Board of 
Trade on the Engineering Trades, 1917. 
Agreement(1) 
3 
covering the wages of railway shopmen, the 
following clause appears: "No niece -work price 
shall be altered. unless the material, means or method of 
production is changed." In the engineering and allied 
industries, the position is regulated thus: "No piece -work 
prices, bonus or basis times once established may be 
altered except for the following reasons: - 
(1) A mistake in the calculation on either side, or 
(2) The material, means or method of ?production or 
the quantities are changed, or 
(3) A mutual arrangement has been come to between the 
employer and the worker in the same way as a new price is 
arranged.. 
:,iistakes in Agreements such as these should, with reasonable and 
rate s. 
honest interpretation on both sides, meet the case, but in 
spite of this difficulties have still been encountered. 
With regard to mistakes in price -fixing, some workers 
contend. that employers are more ready to discover mistakes 
when rates are "loose" than when they are "tight''. 
Frequently this difficulty of inaccurate rate -fixing can 
be to some extent resolved by the workers setting off the 
loosely -priced jobs against those which are tight, but if 
(1) Industrial Court Award No. 728 of 3 th. July, 1922. 
See Appendix "B" (1). 
(2) Memorandum of Agreement between the Engineering and 
Allied Employers' National Federation and the Engineering 




the employer takes advantage of the clause in the 
agreement to reduce the lone price, and fails to increase 
the tight price, the worker's level of earning suffers. 
It is doubtful, however, if this contention could be 
maintained in the majority of cases, for in organised 
trades the unions are usually strJng enough to press an 
increase in low prices; indeed the majority of employers 
contend that on an average prices tend to be loose rather 
than tight. There are, of course, inevitably two 
points of view on the matter of what is, and. what is not, 
a "reasonable" price, and the difficult nature of the 
problem merely serves to emphasise the necessity for 
accurate rate- fixing at the very outset. 
This is, however, difficult in the case of completely 
new jobs, for it inevitably takes longer to do a job for 
the first few times than it does after a rhythm of 
movement has been achieved. In the case of one 
agreement(1)this problem has been dealt with thus: - 
"The company guarantee that the standard output required 
to earn standard piece or bonus money will remain 
unaltered and that standard outputs on new jobs 
(including all existing jobs for which the final rate 
has not yet been set) will be similarly guaranteed when 
sufficient time and practice have been allowed for 
attaining normal skill on the job. " 
(1) Agreement in operation at the Rowntree Cocoa Works, 
quoted. in Rowntree: "The Human 
pp. 51 -52. 
Factor in Business" 
See Appendix B (3). 
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Changes in The most frequent cause of dispute in the administratioi 
Methods 
of these rate -cutting guarantees is that of rate reductions 
arising out of changes in methods. It has been claimed 
that "r&rts on which high bonus has been earned have been 
withdrawn from production and reissued with some minor 
modification which has not reduced the amount of work to 
be performed, but has enabled the 'modified' product to 
be classed as new work, and retuned. "(1) The trade unions 
frequently maintain that methods are changed Merely in 
order to make possible a cutting of rates, or that when a 
cut follows a genuine change in:iethod, the cut in the 
rate is quite disproportionate to the reduction in the 
amount of effort or time required to do the job by the 
new method. 
The numerous and complicated problems involved. in 
the administration of a piece -work system - or any other 
wage system, for that matter - emphasise the need. for 
full co- operation based on mutual trust and understanding, 
between management and men. In one collective agreement, 
the responsibility of both sides is officially recognised, 
for the agreement provides, inter alia, for "Reciptocal 
Obligations It shall be obligatory (i) on the part 
of the employer-to pay the full rate of wages for all 
output; (ii) on the part of the operatives to use their 
trade skill and productive ability to the best advantage 
(1) Dr. W. IvlcLaine (.Amalgamated Engineering Union), writin 
in the "International Labour Review" of June 1944. 
and fullest capacity, and with no restriction of output 
following a change of organisation or machinery. "(1) 
(1) Agreement of January 1946 between the Incorporated 
Federated Associations of Boot and Shoe _anufacturers of 
Great Britain and Ireland, and the National Union of Boot 
and Shoe Operatives. 
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The problem of rate- cutting, discussed in the last 
section, demonstrates how important it is that rate - 
fixing should be accurate from the very outset. 
Unfortunately it is not easy to find a fair output basis 
for rate -fixing purposes, but it is essential that the 
nearest possible approach to the ideal should be found. 
In this country, piece -rates are usually calculated 
so as to give a reasonably skilled worker, working at a 
normal speed, a certain -percentage over his basic time- 
rate. Mention has already been made of the fact that in 
the organised trades there are often negotiated agreements 
including specific provisions on this matter.(1) This 
spe:ified percentage is freçquently between 25 and 33 
per cent, although the "Evershed" Report( ?) on the 
cotton spinning industry recommended that "the proper 
relationship between the piece -rate and the time base 
minimum will be expressed by calculating the piece -rate 
earnings of an operative of average skill and industry - 
in a nortal week to yield a wage not less than 20 per 
cent above the time bas e minimum." This is a lower 
standard than that operating in the engineering industry 
(27- per cent) and the railway workshops (33 -Ard. per 
cent) because in cotton spinning the worker only has 
partial control over the volume: of output. The speed 
of the machine is determined by the count of the yarn 
(1) See, e.g. Appendix "B" (1) & (2) 
(2) See Appendix "B" (4) 
being spun, and the only way in which the operative can 
increase production is by shortening as much as possible the 
time taken to perform operations requirin( the machines to 
stop, such as repairing yarn breakages, doffing, cleaning 
and so on. 
Job Analysis Whatever the percentage over time -rate may be, 
however, two problems have to be solved, viz. (a) What 
constitutes a normal or reasonable output per unit of time? 
and (b) What time -rate shall be taken as the basis? As 
regards the latter question, in the organised trades there 
are standard rates, fixed by collective bargaining, for 
each class of labour, which can be taken as a basis. Where 
there are no such collective agreements - and even where 
there are, so long as the agreed rate is regarded as a 
minimum - the modern technique of "job analysis" may be 
employed in the determination of base- rates. Only a brief 
mention of this method may be made here, as it is a study 
of its own, and has a well -documented. literature, mainly of 
American origin. (1) 
Job evaluation is a technique of grading occupations 
in terms of the duties involved; it is concerned with the 
job an not with the individual employee - the rating of 
individual employees is known as "merit- rating" and is 
dealt with in a subsequent section. (2) 194 
(1) Vide: Smyth & Murpjy: "Job Evaluation & employee Rating" 
BaldaEton: "Wage Setting based on Job Evaluation" 
Benge "Job Evaluation and Merit-Rating" 1941. 
194Q 
"Job Analysis ": A Classified and Annotated 
Bibliography" 1932. 
(2) Vide post: chapter XV. 
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The job analyst watches the job being peAbmaed, and 
may question the operators.and their supervisors, and 
then he writes up his analysis which will include 
details of all the operations involved in the job. He 
will also prepare a job specification, a statement of 
the physical and mental requirements of the job, which 
will be used for the interviewing of candidates, training 
of newcomers, and so on. 
Ranking After the job has been analysed it must be rated. 
Method. 
The simplest method is by comparing the job with others 
of a comparable nature. This course may be satisfactory 
in a small plant, but not where there is a wide and 
complicated variety of jobs to be analysed. The jobs 
are listed, their relative positions vaxiying from the 
highest valuations at the top of the scale to the lowest 
at the foot, depending on their relative difficulty and 
responsibility. This method of rating inevitably tends 
to be somewhat arbitrary, and the results are difficult 
to justify if exception is taken to them. 
The factor comparison method of job rating involves 
a comparison of jobs factor by factor instead of on an 
over -all basis. Jobs are analysed according to factors 
such as mental effort, skill, physical requirements, 
responsibilities and working conditions(1) and then 
arranged in order of their possession of these various 
(1) These factors are listed and elaborated by Eugene 
J. Benge, (who was largely responsible for the develop- 






characteristics. Points are assigned to each factor, and 
are convertible into a money scale. When a certain number 
of "key jobs" have been rated in this way, new jobs are 
compared with the key job list and rated in relation to it. 
Point The most fully developed method of job rating is that 
Systems 
of the ",point system ", in which the relative worth of the 
various jobs is evaluated by assigning to each a number of 
points, which are convertible on a money scale. Such 
factors as those mentioned in the previous paragraph are 
taken, clearly defined so that the description means the 
sane to all who read it, and then sub -divided into degrees, 
these also being very clearly defined in order to assist 
accurate rating. The various factors are weighted accord- 
ing to their relative importance, and a certain number of 
points are allocated to the succeeding degrees of each 
factor. Instead of being compared with each other, as in 
the two previous methods of rating, each job is compared 
with and rated according to the established points scale. 
Thus any error in rating is not carried over into smother 
comparisons as it is with the ranking am factor - comparison 
methods. Since there is an established scale, in which the 
union representatives may have collaborated, it is much 
easier to explain and justify the rating of any job which is 
disputed. It is important to realise that no system of job 
rating can be mathematically accurate, but it does enable 
"controlled judgments, or educated gnzesees "(1) to bé made 
(1) Bethel, Atwater, Smith & Staclßnan: "Industrial 
Organisation and Management ". p.563. 
which will approximate to the ideal. Deter_ainatíon of the 
weights to be allocated to each factor is a diffd ult 
problem, as is also the standardisation of job -raters' 
judgments so that several raters investigating the same job 
will assess it similarly. 
Rate -fixing. Job analysis enables management to fix the time - rate :. 
which is to be the basis of the piece -work prices, but it 
does nothing towards answering the other major problem of 
rate -fixing, viz. "What constitutes a normal or reasonable 
output per unit of time?" There is inevitably a difference 
of ()Anion between _management and men on this point, the 
former being desirous of keeping down costs, and the natter 
wishing to have the quantum of work set as low as is feasible 
The traditional method of rate- fixing is to baw the 
rates on past experience of operation times, e. g. if the 
time usually taken to do a particular job is 30 minutes, 
the time -rate is 2/- per hour, anc' the agreed percentage 
over time- rate(1) for piece -work prices is 33 -1 /3rd., then 
the piece -price will be 1 /4d. (40 minutes at 2/- per hour). 
(1) Some have claimed that there should be a definite 
guarantee given of a certain percentage over time -rate, 
irrespective of output, owing to the factthat piece -work 
involves extra intensity of effort over time -work. This 
would not seem to be justified, however, for (a) it would 
be unfair to time- workers who would still be paid at a 
lower rate, and (b) the piece- workers would probably not 
bother to work any harder than before, knowing tat they 
were sure of getting theii enhanced payment anyway, 
102 
Frequently, however, when piece -work is replacing daywork, 
it will be found that the time taken to do the job under 
daywork has been excessive. If this time is used to fix 
the piece -rate, the employer tacitly agrees that the past 
rate of output should be made the basis of future working. 
But this will mean that piece -rates will be "loose ", and the 
level of costs may prove crippling when output goes up under 
the stimulus of the'over- strong financial incentive. Piece- 
work is not the remedy for low output caused by inefficient 
production control and supervision. The remedy rather lies 
in re- organisation, which may be costly to undertake, but 
will hot be a permanent mill -stone as would niece -work 
founded on loose job -rates. 
Tune- study. It has been contended that "when rates are set by the 
ordinary methods of past perfonnances and judgment, the 
earning power of the same operator on different kinds of 
work usually varies from the average by 25 to 60 per cent. 
On the other hand, where rates are set by unit. time or 
motion stud.ies....this variation is actually reduced in 
practice to well under 5 per cent. "(1) Although this may 
be an over - statement of the case for time -study as a basis 
for rate- fixing, there is no doubt that it does give very 
much more accurate results than the traditional arethods. 
Its use has always been more widespread in the United States 
than in this country, but more and more British employers 
are using time -study methods for setting rates on jobs 
(1) Bulletin of the Taylor Society, Vol.XIII, June, 1928. 
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which are repeated many times. This extension of the use 
of time -study is mainly confined to mass -production plants, 
where conditions of working are standardised, and the 
processes are repetitive and rnechaaised. In job - 
production plants the traditions methods of rate- fixing 
are still widely employed. The use of time and motion 
study, particularly when coupled with job analysis, enables 
very accurate prices to be fixed, and reduces the danger of 
rate - cutting and the other evils discussed in the previous 
section. If rates are not accurately set there is a danger 
of continual conflict arising from workers trying to force 
up the "tight" prices, and employers trying to force down 
the "loose" ones, and the consequent strain on industrial 
relations inevitably retards production. 
As in the case of job analysis, so with time and motion 
studs: the practical details of the technique are outside 
the scope of the present study, and again the method has a 
large literature of its own. 
(1) 
Only a brief account will, 
therefore, be given here. The objects of time and motion 
(1) Vide, e.g. Hendry: "A Manual of Time and Motion Study" 
1946. 
"An Introduction the Theory and Application of 
Motion Study" H. Mi S. 0. 1945. 
Lowry, Maynard & Stegemerten: "Time and Motion 
Study w Formulas for Wage Incentives" 1940. 
Carroll: "Time study for,Cost Control" 1943. 
Barnes: "Motion and Time Study" 1940. 
Shumard: "A Primer of Time Study" 1940. 
Chane: ";lotion and Time Study" 1942. 
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study have been defined as: "To subject each operation 
of a given piece of work to a close analysis, in order that 
every unnecessary operation may be eliminated. and to 
determine the quickest and best .:iethod of performing each 
necessary operation; also to standardise equipment, 
methods and working conditions; then, and not until then, 
to determine by scientific measurement the number of 
standard hours in which an average man can do the job ".(1) 
Many firms which employ time -study for rate- fixing do 
not secure the full benefit which they might gain because 
they do not e:uploy the associated technique of motion study. 
The first step should always be a thorough analysis of the 
job in order to discover any possible way of improving 
efficiency by eliminating unnecessary movements, reducing 
as far as possible sudden changes in direction of movements; 
using both hands simultaneously, employing habitual, 
rhythmic and natural movements, and so on. Frank B. 
Gilbreth, the "father" of motion study, developed the 
method of dividing each operation up into its component 
parts, and then seeking the answer to these two questions: 
(i) "Is this movement absolutely necessary ? "; and (ii) "If 
so, is it being done in the most ef. :icient manner possible ?t 
ïdot until all possible improvements have been made in the 
job should it be timed for the purpóse of rate- fixing; 
otherwise the pricing may later prove to be "loose" as 
workers find ways and means of improving the method of 
working. 
(1) Lowry, Maynard do Stegemerten: "Time and Motion Study ". 
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This division of the operation into its elements is 
essential for satisfactory time- study, for it enables a 
much more accurate study to be made. One of the 
difficulties encountered in time -study work is that the 
workers may adopt a "go -slow" policy when the study is 
being made, knowing that if the rate is slack this will 
enable than either to take things more easily, or by 
working at their normal speed to earn abnormally high wages. 
By timing each element separately, and studying a number of 
different workers, the time -study engineer can keep a better 
chekc on this practice. The workers may, for exanple, 
agree anong themselves that a job should take six minutes 
to complete, but if the time -study engineer times the 
elements separately, he may find that worker "A" does 
element (i) in one minute, worker "B" in minute, and 
worker "C" in 14 minutes. Ele :lent (ii) may take "A" 3 
minutes, "B" 4 minutes, and "C" 2 minutes. Element (iii) 
may take "A" 2 minutes, "B" 14 minutes, and "C" 2 minutes. 
All the workers have taken six minutes over the whole job, 
but the shortest time for each element is (i) 3 minute, 
(ii) 2 minutes and (iii) 14 minutes, making a total of 4 
minutes dnstéad of six. 
This division of a job into its elements can Vw in 
tic 
certain cases( made the basis of what might be called "pre- 
determined rate -fixing ", as has been done by at least one 
large manufacturer of electrical apparatus. In this case, 
it was found that many elements were common to a wide 
range of operations, e.g. (a} picking up piece from tray, 
(b) applying lubricant to drill, (c) grasping drill handle, 
and so on. These standard ele_ents, combined in various 
ways, made up the various jobs which had to be performed. 
Thus, if each element could be time- studied and a 
comprehensive list made of the standard times, 'any job 
which was made up of a number of those standard elements 
could have its rate fixed as it were synthetically.(l) 
This was, in fact, undertaken, and at present the rate - 
fixing department has standard times for all the elements 
normally found in the jobs performed in the plant, and a 
rate can be given for an individual job without actually 
time- studying that particular operation, but simply by 
building it up from its several standard elements. One 
great advantage of this method is that, since the times 
fixed for the elements are used as standards and are 
employed time and time again, it is justifiable to spend 
much more time and effort on the establishment of an 
(1) The system was at first termed "synthetic rate- fixing ", 
but this name was subsequently abandoned for a very 
interesting psychological reason . The term "synthetic" 
has come to be assoá.ated in the minds of the workers with 
war- tine substitutes, inferior to the real thing, and the 
firm found that the mane attahced a similar stigma tóthe 
rate- fixinL system. After a considerable amount of heat 
had been generated by this trivial point, the system 
eventually became quite acceptable to the workers under 
the revised. title of "pre- determined rate- fixing ". 
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accurate time than would be warranted for the timing of an 
ordinary operation. Ten time- studies are taken on each 
of ten operators, giving a hundred timings in all, from 
which the standard time is selected. 
An element in regarded as the 'smallest definable 
movement an operator makes in the performance of a 
complete operation; sometimes it is so small that it is 
impossible to time and it has to be tined in conjunction 
with another small element adjacent to it. The pictorial 
diagrans(l) spew the build up of elements - including some 
of these small amalgamated ones - to form three complete 
operations, a simple drilling operation, a forming operation 
and a capstan operation. 
The basic principles are the sane whether the work is 
machine, finishing or assembly. The accompanying rating 
form(2) chews how the job -rate is built up from the 
standard times of the component elements. This card is 
kept in the shop office and is made available to the 
operator who can, if he wishes, challenge the rate should he 
consider that the build -up does not correspond with the elements 
which he is performing. This frank disel osure of the 
method and details of rate- fixing tends to dispel suspicion 
and improve relations betwen operators and rate -fixers. 
By this method of pre- determined rates it is possible 
to establish the cost of a -job before the work on it 
actually commences, enabling the sales department to Live a 
(1) Vide Appendix "b"(5), (6) and (7). 
(2) Vide Appendix "b"(8). 
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tender based upon an accurate cost of production figure 
rather than an estimate. Again, the fact that all the 
elements in a potential job are already timed, enables the 
production department to plan a more accurate works 
schedule, and offer a more certain delivery date to the 
firm's customers. The method clearly has definite 
possibilities, and it may be expected to gain in popularity 
by virtue of the considerable advantages which it offers. 
The stop -watch is the ca aonest device used in time - 
study; a more elaborate method is to take a motion film of 
the operation, including a clock in the -picture, and keeping 
a check on the speed of the camera. This method is more 
costly, but it has the advantage of giving a oenaanent 
record which can be used for subsequent training purpises. 
The film can be run through at slow -motion in order to 
chew trainees how the high- speed. operations are carried out. 
A further advantage of the canera technique is that the 
question of a change of raethpd is never in any doubt there 
is ermanent record of how the job was originally perform- 
ed and there can be no room for dispute. 
Even though it is usual to take a n tuber of studies 
before fixing a rate, it is not always practicable to take 
a sample of a size that would give a statistically accurate 
average. This involves studying a nu:;iber of workers, and 
studying each one several times in order to smooth out 
fluctuations in speed of working. Instead, the time - 
study engineer often seeks to "normalise" the 
Allowances. 
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performance, by adjusting the actual time taken to what 
he considers the average time of the normal worker should 
be. lIe "rates" the operator's speed of working on a 
points basis, similar to that employed in the Bedaux 
system(1), taking 60 points as the non_nal speed of working 
(since there are sixty minutes in an hour). Thus, if 
the time -study engineer felt that the operator was working 
at 25 -)er cent greater speed and effort than the normal, 
he would give him a rating of 75, and a'p'ply this leveling 
factor to the recorded time in order to bring it to the 
normal which could reasonably be erected of the average 
operator working over a considerable period of time. 
This rating process is a frequent source of criticism 
of the time - study method of rate -fixing, and the workers 
often contend that the rating is a purely arbitrary 
process which completely destroys the scientific accuracy: 
of the time-study. It is certainly true that the rating 
can never be mathematically accurate since, "after all, 
it is not the stop watch which deter_iines the standard 
time, but the judgment, experience and fairness of the 
time -study man ". (2) 
The scientific accuracy of time -study rate- fixing, 
is further undermined by the fact that allowances of 
(1) Vide post: chap. XIII. 
(2) Kress, in the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, Vol. XIII 
. _June 1928. 
(Rating is more fully discussed. in Chapter XIII.4 
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various kinds, involving elements of judgment and 
opinion, have to be added to the recorded tines in order 
to give the task time. In the first place an allowance 
must be made for fatigue, particularly in heavy work. 
"Difference between work a man can do for short times 
and what he can maintain, is greater than realised. 
There may be 40 per cent variation between daily 
production of good worker and that which would result 
from his rate at times during the day. For poor 
workers this va.riation is even greater. A rapid pace 
(1) 
for a short time does:.not Drove that it can be maintained." 
Allowances for fatigue are particularly difficult to 
.assess; in one investigation it was found that a third 
of the companies in question gave no allowance for 
fatigue, whilst others gave as high as 65 per cent 
allowance(g) Up to about 5 per cent will be allowed 
for personal needs, and there will be allowances for 
unavoidable delays, and in some cases a "process 
allowance" where the operator has to be idle for part 
of his time due to machine speeds, the requirements of 
particular processes, and so on. All allowances are 
at best nothing more than educated guesses, so that 
the final result is Wade up of a combination of some 
accurate measurements and some guesses, 
(1) Roe and Lytle: "Operation Study and Rate Setting" 
in "Management Handbook" 1924. 
(2) Stearns, in the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, 
Vol. XIII. Jule 1928. 
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and it is the accuracy of the latter which determines 
the accuracy of the final result. This element of 
arbitrariness tends to make workers suspicious of time- 
study unless every care is taken to ensure their co- 
operation by taking; than into the confidence of the 
management in joint consultation. 
Tine -study and Time -study has always been a source of trouble in 
the Worker. 
industrial relations, and has been denounced by the trade 
unions, who claim that it destroys craftsmanship and 
enables manage<<ient to rob the worker of his reward for 
extra effort expended. Generally, however, the 
opposition comes not so much from official trade union 
sources, but from the workers themselves. Official trade 
union policy seems to be coming to recognise the place of 
time -study in modern management, if properly and fairly 
administered, and a recent trade union pronouncement(1) 
suggested that the time was ripe for the abandonment of tl`e 
traditional trade union opposition to the techniques of 
scientific management such as time and notion study. 
It must be admitted that the trend of modern 
industrial developments - time -study among them - is 
towards the elimination of craftsmanship, and the reduction 
of the worker to a mere cog in a machine. Professor 
G.D.H. Cole() quotes the story told by Miss Isabel Sloan 
on her return from visiting scientific management 
(1) By Mr. C. Dukes, 0.B.E., retiring president of the 
Trades Union Congress, at Brighton, October 1946. 
(2) "Payment of Wages" p. 58. 
Choice of 
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factories in America. One factory manager proudly 
pointed out a worker who seemed to be working very 
efficiently and quickly. "That ", said. he, "is our best 
worker. Of course, he is a little feeble-minded:" Many 
workers object to time and motion study because they 
contend that the data collected may be used by the 
management for the purpose of speeding up even to the point 
of "slave- driving ". 
This view is supported by the fact that many time- 
study engineers conduct their observations on very fast 
workers, claiming that they will have a better rhythm of 
work and therefore give better results. This was the 
view put forward by F. W. Taylor and it is widely held, 
particularly by American time -study engineers.(1) Even 
if allowances are made in favour of the more average worker, 
this does not satisfy the critics, who feel that it is an 
unfair system designed to over- speed the ordinary man. 
It is true that one should not expect men to work at a 
speed which will in the long run prove injurious to health, 
and it would seem to be wiser to conduct the studies on 
workers of good average ability rather than on exception- 
ally fast men. 
In one mass production plant where time -study is 
widely employed, workers chosen for time - studying 
are 
selected jointly by the management and the shop 
stewards. 
(1) Vide, e.g. Piacitelli: "Selection of Workers for 
Observation" in the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, 
Vol. XII I , June 1928. 
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The latter are dlowed to watch the timing in order to 
ensure the job being fairly done, and they are paid their 
average wages for the time spent in this way. 
In another large ,mass production plant, engaged in 
the motor industry, the rate- fixers, after toile- studying 
a job and fixing the rate for it, have to demonstrate that 
the time is reasonable by doing the job themselves for a 
whole day in the scheduled time. This automatically 
disarms criticism from the workers that the timing is too 
tight. 
A further precaution which must be tdcen is to ensure 
that as far as possible the conditions under which the 
time -study is taken are those which will obtain nonnally 
in the factory. A time -study is a kind of laboratory 
experiment, an( the conditions of work and the reactions 
of the personnel may not be entirely natural. The 
management, for example, may arrange tools and supply 
materials more efficiently than usual, and unless this is 
going to be a permanent feature it will distort the results 
and cause difficulty with the staff. In some cases it 
will be impossible for actual working conditions to be 
identifise7 with those obtaining when the study was made. 
Different pieces of steel will be of varying h r'_ness, 
and will, therefore, take varying times to turn on a 
lathe; different lengths of cloth may be of different 
texture; weather conditions aajs affect. the materials or 
Summary. 
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the processes; hold -ups may occur in the supply of raw 
materials and partly finished goods - all factors outside the 
control of the workers, and yet factors which still influence 
speed of working. 
In view of all these difficulties, the need for full 
co- operation between management and men is evident. Ivery 
opportunity should be taken to gain the confidence of the 
workers, and full use should be made of the channels avail- 
able for joint consultation on these problems. A piece -rate 
committee may be set up to provide machinery for the discuss- 
ion of rating matters, and in the event of dispute the 
matter should be referred to this body for settlement. 
If the shop steward. is allowed to share in the time -study 
arrangements, a guarantee given that no arbitrary action will 
be taken without reference to the workers' representatives, 
and the machinery of joint consultation fully eAployed, 
there is no reason why the problems should prove insoluble. 
It may be concluded, therefore,that despite all its 
associated problems, time- study does provide the best method 
at present available of fixing piece -work prices. Without 
it, rates are unlikely to be accurate, involving the danger 
of rate- cutting and a host of other difficulties. Time - 
Eu.dy is particularly valuable in repetitive work, where 
operations are performed many times by a large working staff. 
Obviously in such circumstances it is desirable to limit the 
movements performed to the minimum, for any waste of effort 
N d5 
or time involved in each operaLion may be multiplied 
hundreds of times during the course of a single day. 
Similarly, any error in rate -fixing will be multiplied, 
and if the rate is loose, costs may be unduly inflated. 
In the case of batch- and job- production plants, as in 
small -scale engineering for example, it may still be 
profitable to employ time and motion study, for in the 
manufacture of the various individual machines, many of the 
processes will be reducible to standard. operations, which may, 
by time- study, be put on a satisfactory piece -work basis. 
In the definite craft trades, of course, nether time -study 
nor piece -work is suitable. 
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III. MUTUALITY AND PRICE- LISTS. 
"Mutuality" The traditional method of negotiating piece -work 
prices is that known as ''mutuality'", which means that 
"the prices to be paid (are) fixed by mutual arrangement 
between the employer and the workman or workmen who 
perform the work. "(1) This is still the method adopted 
over a large part of the industrial field, particularly in 
job- production plants where the number of different 
operations is large and the number of times each is 
performed is small. The negotiating may be done by 
individual workers, groups of workers, shop stewards or 
shop committees. In the unorganised trades the workers are 
in a much weaker bargaining position compared with their 
employer, and there may be no minimum time -rate guarantee, 
no rate - cutting guarantee, and no question of bargaining 
over rates - they may be fixed by the employer on a "take 
it or leave it" principle. This attitude is less likely 
to be found where labour is unionised, and in times of 
labour shortage when the employer is anxious to keep his 
staff. 
Bargaining_ with individual workers nowadays is 
somewhat unusual, anC there is usually an element of 
collective action introduced whereby the men decide among 
themselves what level of prices they are prepared to 
accept. This common action may express itself in formal 
shape tri the formation of a shop committee or piece -work 
(1) National Engineering Agreement of 1907. 
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committee, charged with the duty of negotiating piece -work 
prices with the management. Ideally this should not be 
representative merely of the workers, but should be a channel 
of joint consultation. 
Price- Lists. In many highly organised trades there exist lists of 
piece -work prices covering the most commonly found operations 
or products. The price -list is only found where operations 
or products are more or less standardised, but as 
standardisation and large -scale production are extended, the 
field of price -lists grows and that of .Mutuality diminishes. 
The growth of collective bargaining, too, has extended the 
scope of price -lists and the development of this system is 
one of the most outstanding achievements of trade union 
practice. 
Standard lists can only be drawn up where there is the 
maximum possible degree of collective bargaining between 
employers' associations and the trade unions. Then again, 
the operations must be such that output can be calculated 
fairly easily on a nunericalpweight, yardage, or some 
similar basis, and conditions of working must be such that, 
within reasonable limits, a given amount of effort and skill 
always produces a given output. The price -lists, existing in 
the cotton industry have been ciscussed in a previous 
section(1) and it is here that the .nethod is most highly 
developed. These cotton lists did not come into existence 
all at once, but developed from the lists-of individual 
(1) Vide chap. VIII. 
Sunaary. 
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mills, through the district list stage, and ultimately to 
th,.e uniform lists in use in North and North -East Lancabhire 
for cotton weaving. Spinning lists are not universal, 
but district in character, as are also the lists for other 
sections of the cotton industry. In the iron- founding 
industry there is a national list(1) for the moulding of 
"rainwater and soil goods ", a section of the industry in 
which there is a considerable element of standardisation of 
processes and conditions of work. 
Many piece -work price -lists are of a district 
character, as in the ship -building industry(2), wool, and 
boots and shoes. In the mining industry there are separate 
lists for each pit or seam. In the manufacture of boots 
and shoes, Local Boards of Arbitration prepare piece -work 
lists for their various districts upon the principle "that 
it is desirable as far as possible that a uniform system of 
prices should obtain....so that the essential conditions and 
prices can be applied or adapted to the same class of labour 
and materials in all areas producing similar classes of 
goods. "(3) 
To sum up the position relative to piece -work price - 
lists, we have seen that, for success, a given amount of 
--1 Vide Appendix "B" (9). 
2 Vide Appendix "B" 10) and (1l). 
3 Agreement of January 1946 between the Incorporated 
Federated Associations of Boot and. Shoe Manufacturers of 
Great Britain, and the National Union of Boot and Shoe 
Operatives. 
skill and effort must always produce a given output. 
This raises the problem of defective materials, such as 
bad yarn for the weaver or bad castings for the turner. 
A similar difficulty is raised by mechanical breakdowns, 
which are frequently encountered in machinery which has 
been over -driven to meet the exigencies of war. Then 
again, conditions vary widely from one factory to another; 
in one, machinery is up -to -date, in another, old- fashioned; 
one plant is well planned, lit and ventilated, another is 
ill - arranged, gloomy and stuffy; organisation of work is 
good in one firm, bad in another; and so on through a 
whole catalogue of divergencies. To meet all these 
difficulties, the price -list necessarily becomes 
extremely complicated, and as revisions take place and 
new jobs are added to the list, the machinery of 
negotiation has to be kept almost constantly in operation. 
Where there is a sufficient degree of standardisation,, 
however, the price -list system offers considerable 
benefits to employer and worker alike. The necessity 
for individual bargaining is eliminated, and there is a 
clearly understood basis which should reduce friction and 
ill -feeling betwen employer and worker. The employee 
has the advantage of piece -rates fixed by collective 
bargaining between employers and trade unions whose 
bargaining power is much greater __ than 
that of the individual worker or ad hoc association of 
workers. The wider the area covered by the price -lists 
the greater the advantages gained, but the more difficult 
does the problem of diverse conditions become. 
CHAPTE R XII. 
PR EMIUM BONUS SYSTEIvIS. 
Mention has already been made, when considering the 
straight piece -work system, of some of its peculiar 
disadvantages, among them particularly the difficulty of 
accurate rate -fixing, and also the fact that piece -work 
yields a fixed labour cost per unit with increasing output 
(this latter being a disadvantage only from the employer's 
point of view). These two factors have been the primary 
motivating forces in the development by employers of 
alternative schemes in which the benefit of any time saved 
is shared in some definite proportion between the employer 
and the employee. 
The essence of these premium bonus systems as they are 
called, is that the piece -rate per unit of output declines 
as output goes up; then if, owing to difficulties of 
measurement, the rate is fixed too high, the effect is not 
so serious for the employer as it would be tinder straight 
piece -work. Not only so, but if new facilities or methods 
are introduced, enabling the work to be done in a shorter 
time, no revision of the time allowed may be necessary since 
the employer automatically shares in the benefit of any 
time saved. If the change is very comprehensive or 
fundamental a revision will of course, have to be made, 
but since the piece -rate falls as output rises rate -fixing 
does not need to be so accurate as in piece -work, where even 
small changes in methods necessitate revision of the piece- 
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price. 
The falling piece -rate also gives to the employer the 
advantage of falling labour -costs with increasing output. 
Thus, whereas straight piece -work offers an incentive to the 
worker, premium bonus systems offer also an incentive to the 
employer to increase output by providing better facilities, 
toils, flow of materials and working conditions. Since the 
employer knows that these improvements will reduce not only 
unit oncost but also unit labour -cost, he has a definite 
quid pro quo for his additional expenditure. The "Evershed" 
Committee on the Cotton Spinning Industry realised the 
im stance of this, for it reported: "Where increased 
production or its equivalent is attributable to the 
installation of new machinery, improvement or re- arrangement 
of old machinery or to new methods of labour deployment, 
some part at least of the financial benefit must go to or 
be retained by the employer so as to provide an incentive 
to the installation of such new or improved methods or 
machinery. Having regard to the capital cost which may be 
involved, the saving to the firm arising from the greater 
spread of overheads would not normally be a just or 
sufficient return. "(1) 
Origins of One of the best known of the premium bonus systems is 
the Halsey 
27_112? the Halsey method, introduced in 1890 by Mr. F.A. Halsey, 
an American engineer, and superintendent of the Rand Drill 
Company of Sherbrooke, Canada. The method was introduced 
(1) Ibid para. 29. 
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into this country by Messrs. G. and J. Weir of Cathcart, 
and is frequently known in Britain by the name of that firm. 
Mr. Halsey brought the claims of his method before his 
fellow engineers in 1892;1) and emphasised that it overcame 
the "fundamental fault of the piece -work plan ", namely 
that "any increase of effort by the workman redounds to 
his own benefit alone - the employer having no share in the 
consequent saving of time ", whereas under day -work "any 
increase of effort by the workman redounds solely to the 
benefit of the employer ". These objections were pointed 
out to be "the exact antithesis of one another ", and Halsey 
claimed that his premium plan "in a sense splits the 
difference between the day-work and the piece -work plans "(2 
The Halsey plan purports to be an attempt to harmonise 
the apparently conflicting interests of employer and employe 
in this regard. "While the employee desires high wages 
per day, the employer desires, and if he is to live must 
have, low wages per unit of product...." Under the 
premium bonus system "the workman is paid by the day, and 
is expected to produce a minimum amount of work for his 
day wage. But for any excess of output beyond that 
minimum he receives a premium, the amount of the premium 
being based on the excess, and being less per unit of 
(1) American Society of Mechanical Engineers - Transactions, 
Vol. XII. 
Vide also: "American Machinist" 25th. January 1902. 
(2) "American Machinist" 9th. March 1899. 
) 
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product than the old wages cost. "(1) 
The Working The British premium -bonus systems are fundamentally 
of the Halsey 
System. different from their American counterparts in that the task 
times are not fixed by time- study. In the American systems, 
the worker is not really expected to improve on the times 
set, but only to reach them. Since the British systems do 
not set a task time on a rigorous scientific basis, the 
bonuses are paid on the basis not of output per se but of 
time saved, that is to say, they are designed to encourage 
the worker to do the job in less than the allotted time. 
A certain time is allocated to each job, determined 
from previous experience of average operation times on the 
day -work system, and the worker is offered an agreed per- 
centage of the wages of any time saved, in addition to the 
day rates for the time taken. Halsey was not dogmatic 
with regard to the percentage bonus which should be paid, 
but suggested that it might be 33 -1 /3rd. per cent. He 
felt that the time allowed should be liberal bather than the 
bonus percentage, since if too high a premium was offered 
the incentive might so encourage increase in output that 
wages would rise to abnormal levels. When the Halsey method 
was introduced into Britain by Messrs. G. and J. Weir of 
Glasgow, they fixed. the bonus at 50 per cent, and the 
majority of British firms which adopted the system have 
followed this precedent. For this reason the method is 
sometimes known as the "59 -50 Sharing Plan ", and this equal 
(1) F.A. Halsey, in "The Engineer" January 1902. 
division of the time saved is more easily negotiated with 
the workers, who are more likely to feel that they are being 
fairly treated. Once the operation time has been fixed, 
it remains unaltered unless the method of doing the job is 
changed. 
Assuming that the Halsey -Weir bonus of 50 ner cent 
applies, the fox =aula is :0 
Wages = (Tune taken plus half of Time Saved) x Rate per 
hour. For example, if the operation time is two hours, and 
Worker A does the job in an hour and a half, he saves half an 
hour, and his wage.will be:- 
14 plus 4 = 14 hours at, say 2/- per hour = 3/6d. 
Since he receives 3/6d. for lz hours work, his real hourly 
rate is 2/4d. instead of 2/ -. 
If, however, he manages to complete the task in one hour* 
he saves an hour, and his wage will be :- 
1 plus 2 = 137 hours at 2/- per hour = 3/ -. and his 
real hourly rate is 3/- per hour. 
It will be seen that as his speed of working increases, 
the worker receives a constantly diminishing price for each 
successive unit of output; if he does the job in the 
standard. time he receives 4/ -; if in lz hours, 3/6d; if in 
1 hour, 3/ -. This ( iminishing piece--)rice is of the essence 
of the premium bonus systems; it gives the employer the 
advantage of falling labour costs per unit of output as the 
latter increases. It also, meets, to soLa.e extent, the 
difficulty of rate- fixing, for if the rate is fixed too high 
(that is, the operation time is too liberal), the results are 
not so serious to the caployer as they would be under straight 
piece -work, foi' the piece -rate automatically cuts itself as 
(1) 
output rises. ) 
Although this arrangement is an advantage to the employer, 
it constitutes a serious disadvantage from the worker's point 
of view, since he gets only half the benefit of the time he 
saves, and he often feels disgruntled at having to share with 
his employer the fruits of his owil efforts. Many contend 
that the system is unfair in that the harder a man works the 
less he receives for each extra increment of energy expended. 
This is unsound for, after a certain point, 
each additional unit of output produced involves an aver - 
increasing "real cost" to the worker, which cannot be 
adequately rewarded by a constantly diminishing piece -price. 
Indeed, even if the piece -price oar unit re.aains constant with 
increasing output, the worker may not be adequately rewarded, 
for, owing to the operation of the economic "law of diminishing 
marginal utility ", each additional increment of income gives to 
the recipient less satisfaction than the one before. There is, 
therefore, a case to be argued for an increasing piece -rate 
as output rises. 
9' ins of Another premium -bonus system, worked on a somewhat 
the Rowan 
ayste;n different basis from the Halsey, is that which goes by the 
nane of its inventor, Mr. James Rowan, of the firm of 
(1) This is shewn graphically in Appendix "CU. 
F 
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David Rowan and Co., Glasgow, Introduced into their 
marine engine plant in 1898, the Rowan System is designed 
to meet even more drastically than does the Halsey plan the 
difficulties arising out of bad rate -fixing and its 
inevitable concomitant - rate -cutting. "There inevitably 
comes a time - if the ówrkian continues to improve in skill, 
or to give evidence of a continuous and successful 
application of intelligence to his work - when the gains of 
the workman appear excessive compared with his fanner 
earnings as a mere supplier of labour by the hour. The 
employer would be more than huiaan who did not, at this stage, 
ask himself the question 'Have I not made a .mistake in 
fixing prices ?' "(1) In many cases this condition will 
remain .:ierely incipient, for the workman soon discerns the 
level of earnings regarded as normal by his employer, and 
he knows that if his earnings rise above this level a cut 
in prices can be expected. Consequently the worker 
deliberately restricts his output to that level, and the 
piece -work system becomes merely a disguised form of day -woric 
Rowan set out to discover a system which would give a 
guarantee against arbitrary rate cutting, thereby reducing 
the possibility of deliberate restriction of output, and 
yet at the sane time give to the employer some participation 
(apart from the reduction of unit overhead costs) in the 
benefits of increased output. He felt that the employer 
(1) Mr. Slater Lewis, in the "Engineering Magazine" 
Vol. 18, 1899 -1900. 
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could not guarantee not to cut rates under the straight 
piece -work system, for there was at that the no 
satisfactory method of fixing piece -rates with any 
degree of accuracy. Not only so, but the straight 
piece -work system did not give the employer that element 
of participation in time saved, which Rowan considered 
essential if there was to be any incentive to the 
employer to increase the efficiency of his plant. 
Outline of Thus the origins of the Rowan system are much the 
the Rowan 
System. same as those of the Halsey method, but the calculation 
of the bonus is on a different basis. Like the Halsey 
plan, this system does not demand scientific time studies 
for rate- fixing, but a time is allotted to each job on 
the basis of past experience of operation times, and if 
the worker "reduces this time allowance, his rate of 
wages per hour, while he is working at the job, is 
increased by the same percentage as that by which the 
time allowance has been reduced. "(1) For example, if 
the operation time is reduced by 10 per cent, a bonus 
of 10 per cent is paid on the wages of the time actually 
taken to do the job, 
When the work is issued to the employee, he is 
given a job ticket with a description of the work to be 
done and the time allowed. to do it. The work 
completed, the job ticket is initialled by 
the foreman, 
(1) Paper read by Mr. Janes Rowan before the internation- 
al Engineering Congress held in Glasgow in 1901. 
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who records the time taken, and when the work has been 
exanined and passed by the inspection, the job ticket passes 
into the Rate- Fixing Department for payment. If the work 
does not come up to standard, the worker loses his premium 
on that particular job. 
The formula for calculating wages under the Rowan system 
is:- 
Wages =(Time taken plus Time taken x Time saved)x Rate per 
( Time allowed ) hour 
Take the cases used in the illustration of the Halsey system. 
Worker A does in an hour and a half a job for which the time 
allowed is two hours, the rate per hour being 2/ -. His 
wage will be :- 
l; plus l;- x = 1R hours at 2/- = 3/9d. 
2 
If he manages to do the job in one hour, he receives : - 
1 plus 1 x 1 = 1; hours at 2/- = 3/ -. 
2 
Thus the Rowan system Lives a more generous payment than the 
Halsey -Weir (with 5o per cent bonus) until the time saved 
is 50 per cent of the time allowed. After this point the 
Rowan bonus is less than the Halsey, giving a more certain 
safeguard against loose time fixing. If the time allowed 
has been badly over -estimated, the effect will not be so 
serious from the employer's point of view as it would be 
under the Halsey pla n. The worker can never secure a 100 
per cent bonus since this would mean doing the job in no 
time at all, and saving the whole time allowed. 
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Advantages Professor Barr of Glasgow, who employed the Rowan 
of Rowan. 
method in his own manufactory, and was an active 
protagonist of it, wrote: "the Rowan system,,,gives a 
larger premium than the Weir system for small savings in 
time, and a smaller premium for very large savings. But 
if a man can do, say, four pieces in the time allowed for 
one, that must be put down to a wrong estimate of the 
reasonable allowance of time, anc: not to the workman workin 
four times as hard, or as effectively, as he would be 
expected to do if on timework. The Rowan system would 
appear, therefore, to be much more rational since, while 
giving the workman greater inducement to increase his 
productiveness on a reasonable estimate of the time in whick: 
he may be expected to do the work, it provides against an 
unreasonable remuneration being given on account of an 
erroneous estimate having been made by the rate- fixing 
department of the time a piece of work should take. It is, 
I think, reasonable to assume that a workman will not be 
entitled, on account of extra exertion, to receive more 
than double the wage he is prepared to accept, and has 
agreed to accept, ón time work. The inducement to cut 
rates is, therefore, almost eliminated under .Rowan's system, 
even if a very liberal estimate has been made. "(1) 
For this reason the Rowan system is used principally 
in engineering firms whose jobs are largely non -repetitive, 
(1) "The Engineer" 18th. April 1902. 
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so that the expense of making elaborate time-study 
analyses for rate -fixing is not warranted. In these 
circumstances, price -fixing,, tends to be rather "loose" and 
the Rowan system guards against heavy losses to the 
employer on this account. As, however, with only 
reasonably accurate rate -fixing, workers are not likely 
to be able to cut times by more than half, the Rowan 
method in practice tends to be more generous than the 
Halsey -Weir. It may, in fact, be so generous as to 
defeat its own ends, in so far as it makes it easy to 
earn a substantial bonus with only moderate effort, and 
gives comparatively little inducement to very great 
attempts to increase output. 
One advantage of the premium -bonus system is that 
when improved methods are introduced which enable the job 
to be completed in a shorter time, there is no need to 
"block" payment until the job has been investigated with 
a view to Jtering the rate, for the increase in bonus is 
not so great as it would be under straight piece -work. 
It is also an advantage where an incentive scheme is being 
newly installed and the management is not sure of the 
accuracy of the time values. It is impossible for the 
worker to earn 100 ?per cent bonus or over, so that there 
is no need to fix maximum limits. Sorne employers fix a 
minimum bonus, giving a guaranteed wage above the time -rate 
level, but this detracts from the incentive value of the 
premium -bonus plan, and may give rise to demands for 
1 9 2 
increases from day- workers not on bonus. 
Attitudes to The Rowan system, like its near- neighbour, the Halsey - 
Sharing of 
Time saved. Weir plan, has very definite limitations, and neither method 
is really .popular today. Finns which have used premium - 
bonus syste:ls for some time - notably some Scottish 
engineering firms - still retain it and oper ,tè it 
successfully, but few companies are instituting it for the 
first time, mainly because of the men's objection to sharing 
the time saved with their employer. Although the time 
allowed ma:: be more generous than in the case of straight 
piece -work, the sharing of the time saved is yet a powerful 
disincentive. The worker argues that the employer unfairly 
secures a dual advantage; in the first place, he only pays 
for part of the time the worker saves; and secondly, the 
employer automatically has the benefit of spreading oncost 
over a larger volume of output. 
Employers reply that falling labour costs are necessary 
in order to enable them to meet competition and sell the 
larger output produced. Then again, they say, the worker 
should not have the full benefit of the tithe saved, since 
part of this saving is caused by the efforts of the employer 
in providing improved management, machinery, tools, 
inspection methods, conditions of work, and so on. 
In any case, wherever premium -bonus systems are 
operated nowadays, the time allowances are so liberal that 
the sharing of the time saved is something of a fiction. 
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We have already seen that in the organised trades there 
are frequently agreements stipulating that piece -work 
Prices and bonus times shall be such as to enable the 
average operator to earn so much, say 25 per cent., over 
his time =wage, and even where there is no formal agreement 
this is the usual practice. This means that when the 
rate -fixing department has measured or estimated the time 
required to complete the job, a certain addition is made 
in order,to give the required bonus over time -wages. If 
this is to be 25 per cent, the following additions will be 





25 per cent. 
50 " 
33 -1 /3rd. per cent. 
If the required bonus for an average man is 33 -1 /3rd. 
per cent., the following are the additions tó the 
estimated time: - 
Piece -work 33 -1 /3rd, per cent. 
Halsey 100 
Halsey -Weir 66- 2 /3rds. " " 
Rowan 50 " It 
It was not James Rowan's original intention that 
these additions should be made, however. "For premium - 
bonus, the standard time or time allowed is the average 
time which the average workman takes to do the job under 
ordinary time -rate conditions, whilst giving a fair day's 
output for his time wages -- no wore and no less." 
1 q 4 
(1) 
This would not satisfy the trade union demand that wages 
under payment -by- results should be at least about 25 per 
cent above time wages, and would_ not, therefore, be 
acceptable today. 
Where these allowances are made, however, the premium - 
bonus systems - although less favourable than piece -work 
to the quick worker - are more favourable than piece -work 
to the slow worker, a fact which is not generally 
appreciated when the sharing of time saved is under 
discussion.(2) Nevertheless, the psychological disincenti 
of the sharing of gain with the employer remains, even 
though the standard times are liberal and so adjusted that 
the average man earns the same percentage over time -rate 
whether he is on straight piece -work or on premium- bonus, 
and it is doubtful if its ill effects upon employee 
relations can ever be fully eli:iinated. Although the 
recent corrnnittee(3) reporting on cotton spinners' wages 
felt that the employer should share in any time saved as 
a result of en ìanced plant efficiency as well as greater 
employee effort, they fount' it "a much more difficult 
matter" to give practical expression to this theory. 
They concluded "that the full benefit of all increased 
(i Sir Vim. Rowan Thompson: "The Premium Bonus System "p.3e. 
(2 Vide Appendix "C "(1). 
(3 "Evershed Report" on the Cotton Spinning Industry, 1945. 
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production or its equivalent should belong to the 
operatives as representing the fruits of their own skill 
and energy. "(1) The report continued: "If the piece - 
rate incentive is tie real, the operative must feel 
assured that additional effort if made will not result in 
reduction in the piece -rate. "(2) 
Trade Union When the premium -bonus system carne to the fore just 
attitude to 
Premium -bonus. after the turn of the century, the unions at first oppos- 
ed. it strenuously. This hostility was, however, to some 
extent modified by the fact that a nunber of influential 
people in the world of labour favoured the new method, 
including Mr. G.N. Barnes, then Secretary of the 
Analga;.nated Society of Engineers, the principal society 
in the engineering industry, and Mr. Sidney Webb (latterly 
Lord Passfield). In August 1902, the Carlisle Agreement 
was drawn up between the Amalgamated Society of Enginars 
and the Engineering Employers' Federation, under. which 
the union accepted the premium -bonus system on condition 
that the Employers' Federation agreed to advise all 
employers using the system to introduce certain safe- 
guards. It was agreed "1. That the employers' 
representatives should convey the terns of the following 
memorandum to the members of the Federation; and 
2. That the representatives of the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers should, on the other hand, remove all 
restrictions to the working of a bonus system in 
(1) Ibid, paragraph 30. 
(2) Ibid, paragraph 31. 
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federated workshops." The text of the memorandum - 
popularly known as the York Memorandum - reads as follows: - 
"The employers' representatives have not the power to 
settle the conditions which should be observed in 
connection with the working,: of a bonus system without 
having previously obtained authority from the Federation 
in proper form. They are, however, prepared to advise 
all employers who wish to establish such a system in the 
meantime to adopt the following suggestions: - 
1. The time rate of wages (for each job) should in all 
cases be paid. 
2. Overtime and nightshifts to be paid on the same 
conditions as already prevail in each workshop. 
3. A time limit, after it has been established, should 
only be changed if the method or means of manufacture are 
changed. 
4. No firm should. establish the bonus system without 
intending to adhere to it. "(1) 
The Agreement also provided that times should be 
fixed so as to allow men of average ability to earn time 
and a third, and gave a guarantee that men woulé' not be 
dismissed merely for exceeding time allowances. The 
(1) Memorandum of decision in Central Conference between 
the Executive of the Engineering Employers' Federation 
and the Executive Council of the Anialgalated Society of 
Engineers, held at Carlisle, 19th. to 20th. August 1902. 
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The Agreement gained the approval of Lord Passfield, who 
"believed the system to be a good one for trade unionise ". 
He would have preferred a piece -work price -list system, but 
felt that neither employers nor workers were ready for such 
an institution, and the existing piece -work systems were 
very unfavourabke to the workers. "Under these 
circumstances" he concluded, "the premium -bonus system, as 
provisionally agreed to, seems to be an admirable expedient. 
The ArnalgaAated Society of Engineers may safely agree to 
it. "(1) Largely on the basis of this recoim endation, and 
that of M r. G. h. Barnes, the membership of the union 
ultimately ratified the agreement. 
Unfortunately, the advice of the Employers' Federation 
was not binding upon any individual finn and the safeguards 
proved. to be very inadequate, and were frequently ignored. 
Although the union was committed. to the system there were 
strikes against it, and many trade unionists refused to 
work under it. This opposition increased until in 1909 
the Trades Union Congress officially condemned the _)reinium- 
bonus system. '-he Congress of that year was held in 
Nottingham, and the following for.ial resolution was carried 
unani:aously: "This Congress strongly condemns the modern 
method of increasing output by the introduction of the 
premium -bonus system of working, regarding it as utterly 
opposed to the principles of trade unionism inas.iuch as it 
creates a form of sweated labour, and. acts as a factor in 
(1) Letter to the "Engineers' Monthly Journal" of 
October, 1902. 
198 
increasing the number 6f unemployed, and hereby recommends 
that societies should use every effort to stop the further 
development of the system, also to take steps to abolish it 
wherever it has been introduced." 
Following upon this resolution the Parliamentary Committee 
of the Trades Union Congress called a conference of societies 
concerned, and this conference appointed a Committee of 
Enquiry which collected information regarding the working of 
the premium -bonus system. This Committee was "of the 
opinion that the premium -bonus system, by encouraging 
individual selfishness, is demoralising to the workman. 
That, by destroying craftsmanship and encouraging specialis- 
ation it is harmful to the industry." The Committee 
concluded that although the system was in fact being more 
and more widely used, practically all those who had had 
experience of it condemned it because it tended to destroy 
trade unionism and collective bargaining, caused unemployment, 
led to deterioration in the quality of workmanship, and 
fostered ill- feeling in the workshop. 
No united action was, however, taken to abolish the 
system, although individual organisations resisted it. It 
continued to spread, and during the War of 1914 -18 its 
extension was to some extent accelerated. The trade union 
attitude has, however, generally remained unalterably 
opposedto the system, and it is today a method of declining 
importance in the majority of industries.. The straight 
piece -work system gives a much more pOwerful incentive, and 
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avoids the dissatisfaction caused by the sharing of the 
time saved with the employer. It is much more readily 
accepted by the majority of workers, and_ has the support of 
the trade unions. With the development of modern 
techniques of rate- fixing, such as time and motion study, 
the danger of loose rate- fixing is much reduced, and like- 
wise the tendency to rate- cutting. Thus the prime raison 
d'etre of the premium -bonus system has to sane extent 
disappeared, and it finds little favour nowadays with either 
employers or employees in this country. 
American In America, however, these "sharing plans" as they are 
Practice: 
Emerson. called have a very wide acceptance, and there is a 
multitude of different with its own peculiar- 
ities and claiming its own avantages :3one of the better- 
k nlowy are the Diemer, Baum, Barth and Everson. Discussion 
of these purely American system is outside the scope of 
this thesis, which is concerned only with British practice, 
'_ut the latter has been adapted by a number of British 
firms an so it merits mention. It is based on an 
efficiency computation; a time is determined for the 
particular job, and the worker who is able to complete it 
in this time is regarded as 100 per cent efficient. On 
either side of this point, above and below it, a 
calculation of the worker's efficiency is made, and a 
corresponding bonus paid in accordance with an empiric 
scale set up by the author of the plan. 66 per cent 
200 ' 
efficiency is regarded as the basis, and anyone below this 
level is regarded as sub -normal and liable to be transferred 
to soue more suitable work or to be dismissed. At 67 per 
cent efficiency a small bonus (a percentage of the time-wage 
for the hours worked) becomes payable, and this bonus 
increases rapidly to 10 per cent at an efficiency rate of 
90 per cent. For every additional one per cent gain in 
efficiency thereafter, a bonus of one per cent is paid, so 
that at 100 per cent efficiency, the bonus is 20 per cent. 
(l) 
A small bonus becomes payable, therefore, below the 
standard performance, and there is a gradual transition 
from the guaranteed day -rate to the piece -rate, as 
perfor.iance improves. The smooth transition is secured 
basing the bonus on the parabolic curve. If the worker is 
less than 67 per cent efficient, he receives merely his 
time-wage; if he is between 67 and 100 per cent efficient, 
he receives the wage for the time taken, plus a certain 
percentage bonus on that time taken. If he is over 100 
per cent efu i.cient, the worker is paid: - 
(Wages of ) plus (Wages of ) plus (Certain 
bonus % of 
(Time taken) (21 ae saved) -- (Wages of time taken. 
It is important. to notice that the Emerson bonus is based 
on the time taken, a constantly diminishing amount as 
efficiency increases. Hence the downward slope of the 
piece -rate curve, thus: 
(1) For full bonus scale, vide Appendix ''C" (5). 
Instead of the horizontal 
line of the straight 
piece -work system, under 
the Emerson plan the 
piece -rate falls 
gradually as output goes 
up. This is somewhat 
similar to the position 
found in the Halsey and 







(Time taken falling) 
bonus, and leads to the sane sort of criticism from 
workers, who contend that they should receive the full 
benefit of the time which they save. 
The efficiency percentage is calculated as the 
ratio between task time and time actually taken, and the 
average is struck over a period of a month, or at least a 
week, in order to smooth out fluctuations. If during a 
40 hour week a worker completes jobs whose task time totals 
30 hours, his efficiency will be:- 30 x 100, i.e. 75 per 
40 
cent., and this will give him his weekly wage (say 100 
shillings) plus a bonus of 1. 31 per cent., i. e. a total 
of £5.1.4d. 
Harrington Emerson repeatedly claimed that the 
employee receives the full benefit of the time which he 
saves, and in a sense this is true in that for every piece 




time actually taken. Under straight piece -work, however, 
the worker not only receives the "task time" as it were, 
but also a constant addition to this (usually 25 to 33 per 
cent), whereas under the person plan the bonus declines 
with increasing output, since it is calculated upon a 
constantly diminishing figure, viz. time taken. 
As the bonus begins well before full efficiency is 
reached, however, the Emerson plan is beneficial to those 
just learning a job, and may serve to encourage banners to 
increase their proficiency. The early bonuses are, however, 
very small, and the fact that there is no sudden increase in 
bonus at the task level removes a powerful incentive to repah 
that point. Then there is the fundamentó defect of the 
diminishing piece -rate above task, which greatly detracts 
from the incentive value. 
However, a number of firms in this country have adopted, 
modifications of the Emerson plan. One English manufact- 
uring company, employing over two thousand workers, has a 
scheme based on the Laèrson technique. Jobs are scientifi- 
cally time-studied in order to establish task times, and 
job analysis is used to set base- rates. Bonus begins 
after 80 per cent efficiency, and rises steadily to 25 
per cent bonus at 100 per cent efficiency, thus: - 
Efficiency: 80% Bonus: Nil 
90% 
100% 25% 
120% " 50% and so on. 
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The finn claims that the scheme has been very successful in 
achieving economies in unit cost of production. It has 
been well received by the majority of the workers, and is 
considered to have been the means of retaining workers who 
might otherwise have been attracted to some other firm which 
paid higher wages. The .management hesitated to say, however 
that the scheme had been the means of promoting good 
employee relationships, although it formed part of a wage 
agreement with the National Union of General and Munièlpal 
Workers. 
Taylor's The objection to the falling piece -rate with increasing 
Differential 
Piece -rate. output is so fundamental, and so utterly alien to the simple 
psychology of incentives that plans devised 
employ precisely the opposite principle, viz. a piece -rate 
which rises with increasing output. This takes cognisance 
of the dual principle discussed above, namely (i) that the 
law of diminishing marginal utility applies to income as 
well as to other commodities, and (ii) that after a certain 
point every increase in output necessitates a more than 
proportionate increase in effort on the Tart of the worker. 
F.W. Taylor, the American pioneer of Scientific 
idanagement, incorporated this principle in his "differential 
piece -rate plan ". This was based on his experiments with 
time and motion study by which methods he sought to determine 
what constituted. a reasonable day's work. Having fixed 
upon the standard rate of output, he próposed that this, 
and any excess over the standard should be paid for at a 
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substantially higher rate (50% higher) than output below the 
standard. He offered a generous reward for output at and 
above the task level, but severe punishment for those who 
failed to come up to standard. Taylor himself suggested 
that "the lower differential rate should be fixed at a figure 
which will allow the workman to earn scarcely an ordinary 
day's pay when he falls off from his maximum pace, so as to 
give him every inducement to work hard and well. "(1) In 
this system there is no guaranteed minimum wage, and instead 
of a gradual progression towards the task level, as in the 
Emerson plan, the task level is very clearly indicated by a 
substantial step up in the wages line thus : - 
Task 
Time taken falling 
This means that if an employee makes task level on Monday, 
and only just fails to do so by a few minutes on Tuesday, his 
wages for the two days will differ by over 50 per cent. 
Thus the system is extremely rigorous, devised with the delib- 
erate 
(1) "A Piece Rate System ", American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, June 1895. 
purpose of singling out sub -normal workers, and keeping 
only the best workers in the plant. It requires completely 
standardised conditions of work, methods and equipment, so 
as to ensure that the performance of the task in the 
allotted time is regularly possible for any first class 
worker. It is only practicable where long runs of the 
same operation are undertaken so that workers can be kept 
on the same job for a considerable period and are able to 
settle down into a good rhythm of work. 
Gantt: Task It can hardly be denied that Taylor's system does 
plus bonus. 
offer a very strong incentive to reach high standards of 
perfor:nance,'but it was so rigorous that those employers 
who used it were in constant conflict with their iaen. 
.Among the major points of conflict was the unfairness of 
the system to the worker who failed t0oine up to standard, 
and the new worker just learning the job, neither of whom 
had even the guarantee of his basic time -rate. 
An associate of Taylor, by name H.L. Gantt, sought to 
overcome this objection by introducing the "Manchester 
guarantee" of the basic time -rate for performance below 
task. It is similar to the straight piece -work system 
with guaranteed minimum, except that the transition from 




Time taken falling 
Time- study is used to determine the standard or task 
time, and the worker who makes the task is paid a bonus on 
the task time; the worker who fails to make the task is 
guaranteed his ordinary time -rate for the time which he 
takes, and in sorne cases he may even be paid a proportion 
of the bonus if he just fails to complete the job in the 
time allowed. Thus, the Gantt system represents (a) a 
time -rate system for workers of less than the standard 
efficiency, and (b) a piece -rate system for workers of 
standard or more than standard efficiency. The bonus 
varies between 20 and. 100 per cent, but it is always based 
on the standard time, not the time taken, as in the Emerson 
plan; hence the horizontal wages line above task level. 
The worker who fails to make the task receives merely his 
time -wage, but if he does the job in the standard time Or 
less, his wage is :- 
Task time x Rate per hour plus % Bonus oT Task time. 
As in the Taylor plan, the advantage of, reaching the 
standard performance is emphasised by the substantial bonus 
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so that the incentive power of the system is strong. 
Merrick Another adaptation of Taylor's system was that of 
Multiple 
piece -rate. D.V. Merrick, who introduced his multiple piece -rate plan 
in the Winchester Repeating Arms Company. He appreciated 
the incentive value of the differential piece -rate, and 
thought it might be improved by breaking up the one large 
step into two smaller steps, thus giving some measure of 
encouragement to workers who were striving to reach the 




Time taken falling 
Merrick suggested giving the first bonus (of 10 per cent) 
at 83 per cent of the task level, and a further 10 per 
cent at task. 
Thus there are evolved three piece -rates, each higher 
than the last, and this necessarily involves rising labour 
cost per unit of output as output increases. 
It can, 
however, be arranged that the steps are such 
that the extra 
labour cost involved is more than offset by 
the reduction 
in overheads, and the added incentive power of 
this 




work is of great value both in encouraging the less 
efficient workers, and in keeping the efficient ones "on 
their toes ". 
Merrick's plan has been combined with Gantt's and 
adopted quite frequently in British plants where a 
constantly expanding output is desired. The psychological 
effect of the multiple piece rate system was recognised by 
Mr. C.A. Mace(1) when summing up the results of his 
expeimental studies on incentives: he said that multiple 
piece -rates would "perfonn something of the psychological 
functions of handicaps and bogeys in games of skill with, 
of course, the added interest which the different standards 
would entail." 
Carpet A well -kno !n firm of carpet and rug manufacturers in 
Maaufacture. 
England employs this method in its Woollen Spinning 
Department. The unit of production for "doubling and 
reeling" is a pack of 240 lbs., and it is known that a 
good worker nan do about eight packs in a week. The piece - 
rate per pack up to six packs per week is 10 /6d; for the 
next two packs per week per worker the piece -rate is 11 /- 
per pack; for the next two 11/6d. and so on. After 
nearly two years working, the system has been found to have 
undoubtedly stimulated. production and resulted in less 
absenteeism. 
(1) "Incentives - Some Exierimental Studies "; Industrial 
Health Research Board Report No. 72, 1935, H. M. S. 6. 
209 
Chocolate A Scottish chocolate manufacturer has a similar scheme 
Manufacture. 
in some productive departnents. Piece -rates are fixed by 
time- study, the figures being agreed with the shop- stewards. 
and if output exceeds the target figure higher piece -rates 
come into operation. The scheme has the general acceptance 
of the staff, and it is considered that it has contributed 
substantially towards increasing output. The sane piece -work 
bonuses are paid for workers on the sane job, irrespective of 
what their base -rates may be. This encourages the younger 
members of the staff whose base -rates are lower than those of 
the older girls. 
There is no doubt that the multiple piece -rate plan 
is psychologically sound.. It provides the greatest possible 
incentive to increase output; the worker has all the benefit 
of the time he saves; and due regard is paid to the 
diminishing marginal utility of income and to the fact that 
every increase in output after a certain point demands pro- 
gressively more effort. If the demand for the manufactured 
commodity is elastic, so that a small reduction in price 
results in a more than proportionate increase in demand, it is 
particularly proftiable for the manufacturer to increase his 
output even if costs fall only slightly. In these circum- 
stances the rising labour costs per unit involved in the 
multiple piece -rate system, so long as they are compensated 
by a fall in unit overheads, will hot be a handicap, and the 
system will be that :Host likely to succeed in stimulating the 
f 
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desired increase in output. The practicability of 
employing this method might profitably be explored by many 
more manufacturers in these days when an increase in 
production per man-hour is so vital to the national well- 
being. 
2 .q 1 
C H A P T E R XIII. 
POINT PiEMIUM SYSTEMS. 
In the 1930's a new nane - Bedaux - cane on the 
industrial scene, and was heard all too frequently in 
connection with strikes and labour troubles. The Bedaux 
system of wage payment waslntroduced into Great Britain in 
1924 by a London photographic works which imported. it from 
its parent company in the United States. The method 
achieved considerable vogue in America, being adopted by 
important finds such as Libby, Swift, Jantzen, and so on, 
and was taken up by a large nunber of European firms 
including Fiat and Pirelli in Italy, and Glantzstoff- 
Courtaulds in Germany. Following its introduction into 
this country it spread fairly rapidly so that within ten 
years well over two hundred oompanies(1) were employing the 
system, including factories manufacturing ball bearings, 
paper and metal boxes, confectionery, caneras, chemicals, 
textiles, fertilizers, hardware, tyres, furniture, toilet 
preparations, and a host of other products. 
So much acrimony has been associated with the nane of 
Bedaux, however, that nowadays many firms will not admit 
that they employ the system, although closer investigation 
reveals that the method which they use is fundamentally 
based. on the Bedaux plan. Other American systems, such as 
the Haynes Manit and. the Dyer methods, are similar in 
principle to Bedaux, and the latter may be taken 
as typical 
(1) "Manchester Guardian Connnercial" 10th. June, 1933. 
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of a large selection of plans which can be grouped under 
the title of "point premium systems ". 
Problems of The disadvantages associated with the time -rate and 
Time- and piece - 
worn.. piece -work systems have been fully discussed above, and it 
was the intention of Charles E. Bedaux, a French -American, 
to produce a wage incentive method which would embody the 
advantages of both time and piece -work and yet avoid their 
disadvantages. The great advantage of the time -rate 
system is its simplicity - hours worked x rate per hour = 
wage. But, as the late Professor John Hilton pointed out 
in a broadcast talk in 1933, the modern method of collective 
bargaining fixes the wage level, that is "the amount of 
money for the work, but not the amount of work for the 
money." The purpose of the piece -work system is to fix 
the "amount of work for the money" and to provide that 
which the time -rate system so sadly lacks, an incentive to 
&eater effort. Unfortunately the introductión of piece- 
work brings in its wake a host of problems connected with 
rate -fixing because of the difficulty of putting an accurate 
cash value on human effort. 
In 1911 Charles E. Bedaux "became impressed by the 
need of a means of measurement that would render it possible 
to set quantitative values on human physical effort. "(1) 
He realised. that if there could be found a method of 
determining what really did reoresent a proper output per 
(1) Booklet "Bedaux Measures Labour" published by 




hour, then, so long as there was a guarantee of this out - 
put, the time -rate system - with all its advantages of 
simplicity - would operate quite satisfactorily. "The 
em-Dloyer would know that he was getting 60 minutes' worth 
of work for one hour's pay, and the worker would know he 
(1) 
was getting one hour's pay for 60 "minutes' worth of work." 
Professor Hilton's difficulty would thus be resolved and 
this was what Bedaux set out to do. 
Finding a The primary fundamental in such a quest was clearly 
Unit of Work. 
the discovery of some standard of work measurement, 
Lffort 
corresponding to the pound, the yard or the acre, and for 
a period of five years Bedaux engaged in research along 
this line. Although the various kinds of work in which 
huiiankind engages are so many and widely different, there 
are three factors which are common to all, namely effort, 
relaxation and time. 'The Bedaux system is "based upon 
the principle that all hanan effort may be measured in' 
terms of a common unit, that unit being made up of a 
combination of work and rest, with the proportions 
dependent upon the nature of the effort and the subsequent 
relaxation required to compensate for it. As tasks vary, 
the ratio of work to rest within the unit varies, but the 
unit itself remains constant. "(2) 
To deal with the first common factor - effort - a 
standard has to be established by which various types and 
(i) Paper by Wir. P.K. Standring read before the Manchester 
Branch of the British Works Management Association on 14th. 
February 1934. Reprinted in "Industry Illustrated" in 
i a and June 19 34. 
2 Bedaux: "Bedaux Measures Labour ". 
intensities of effort may be compared. The standard óf 
effort which Bedaux set up as normal was the effort 
expended by a man walking about on level ground at three 
miles per hour, and he claimed to be able to express any 
other kind of effort in terms of this standard. This 
standard effort is called, for convenience, 60, and the 
Bedaux engineers were trained to rate the effort expended 
by the worker in performing the task under review on this 
basis. If a man was expending effort one -third greater 
than the standard (walking on level ground at three miles 
an hour) he would be rated at 80, and so on. 
Relaxation is, however, essential in any kind of work, 
the amount varying according to the needs of the job, and 
Bedaux built up, between 1911 and 1916, what he called his 
"relaxation curve ". He believed that "man should be 
considered as a force renewed by rest, food, and thought; 
that the force is spent in certain elementary perforinannes, 
lifting, pulling, pushing, pressing, and that the nature 
of a movement and the frequency of its repetition 
determine the amount by which the force is drawn upon. 
The result of these beliefs was an attempt to determine 
the elementary notions employed by man in working, and the 
rest periods related to them, so that the values ascertain- 
ed cpuld be used as a basis in all time-study work. "(1) 
Bedaux formulated a number of "laws" of effort and 
relaxation, and embodied them in his "relaxation curve" 
(1)Article in the "American Machinist" of 16th. February 





which took account of such factors as weight handled, 
rapidity of motion, pressure applied, length of cycle, strain, 
etc. , and chewed "the rest or relaxation times that should be 
considered as necessary to offset working times, "(1) for 
various types of work. 
The introduction of the third element - time - enabled 
Bedaux to fix upon his unit of work: "the aiount of work a 
nominal man can do in one minute when working at ordinary 
speed in ordinary conditions and availing himself of his 
full measure of relaxation," This unit is known as a "B" 
and it is a "fraction of a minute of work plus a fraction of 
a minute of rest, always aggregating unity, but varying in 
proportions according to of the strain. "(2) 
Thus the three common elements of effort, relaxation and 
time are all embodied in the unit, which becomes a "yardstick' 
by which the work of mechanics and labourers, men and women. 
direct and indirect workers, is all reduced to a common 
denominator. 
The Bedaux system seeks to equate work and wages, and 
in order to do this, two factors must be recognised, viz. 
(a) the mount of skill, experience and responsibility, 
recruired; and (b) the an ount of effort expended. The 
first factor affects the base rate payable for any 
Particular type of work, and it involves job analysis along 
the lines already discussed in the section oh piece 
-work. 
Bedaux base rate analysis attempts to relate the 
basic 
(1) ,:Morrow: Ibid. 
(2) Bedaux: Ibid. 
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hourly rate of pay to the requirements of the job, by 
analysing those requirements and comparing them with those 
of other jobs. The fixation of base rates is, of course, 
circumscribed by the existence of trade union rates of ply 
negotiated by collective bargaining, so far as the organised 
trades are concerned. 
Time- study. The usual methods of time-study are employed, but the 
technique of "rating" (l) is given a place of paramount 
importance. The Bedaux engineer not only times the job, 
but also assesses the effort which the worker is expending 
in terms of the standard of walking at three miles an hour 
on level ground. In addition, the question of relaxation 
receives and the Bedaux engineers, using the 
relaxation curve, make an appropriate allowance for rest, 
varying with the nature of the job. 
Take the case of an operative who is found on time - 
study to be doing job A in exactly two minutes. The 
engineer rates the effort expended by this worker at 80, 
that is, one -third greater than walking at three miles per 
hour on level ground. If the worker, working at an 80 
rate does the job in 120 seconds, then clearly if he worked 
at the standard (60) rate, he would take 160 seconds. An 
addition to this time must be made for relaxation, and, 
assuming that the appropriate relaxation allowance is, say, 
12i per cent., then the standard time for this particular 
job A would be: 160 plus 20 = 180 seconds. 





Thus, the B- rating for the job would be 3 -B (180 seconds 
= three minutes of nonual effort and relaxation). A 
number of these time- studies would be taken on different 
workers, and a mean struck before the final B- rating was 
decided upon. 
In certain processes the worker has not complete 
control over his output, for the nature of the work 
demands that he work more slowly than he would otherwise 
do. It would be unfair for him to be penalised on 
this account, so there is provided what is called a 
"process allowance ". It is generally claimed that a man 
can work steadily at an 80 rate, rather than the standard 
60, so he is paid for the work he does at an 80 rate, 
and the balance is paid for at base -rate and is called 
the process allowance. For example, imagine a worker 
who is required to perform operation X, which is rated 
at l0 -B6, on the chassis of a motor car. The cars 
come along the conveyor belt at the rate of four per 
hour, so that for that worker there are only 40 -Bs of 
work to be done each hour, and he is therefore unable to 
complete his quota of 60 -Bs per hour. Assuming that 
he works at an 80 rate, the 40 -Bs of work would occupy 
half -an -hour, and the remaining half -hour would be paid 
at base -rate, and regarded as process allowance. Thus 
this man would be credited with 70 -Bs for his hour's 
work. 
A similar arrangement operates in the case of time 
2 1 
lost through breakdowns or shortages which are outside the 
control of the operative. For every minute lost in this 
way the worker receives a credit of one B, so that he is not 
penalised unj.stly. 
Totalling The number of Bs allocated to each job, together with 
t} e Credits. 
any process allowance which may apply, is posted on the 
notice -boards, Lach worker keeps a time- sheet, recording th . 
jobs done each day, and at the end of the day the total of 
Bs credited to him for jobs done, process allowance, and lost 
time, will be easily calculated. The standard output is 
60 -Bs per hour, that is 480 for an 8 -hour day, but the 
standard is such that the average man will accumulate 75 to 
80 credits per a skilled man will do even 
better. Bedauxie a wage- incentive system, and additional 
pay is given for additional effort above the standard. 
Any Bs in excess of 60 per hour are termed "premium Bs ", 
and their money value is equla to the base -rate divided by 
60. The Bedaux system.is a sharing plan, and the worker 
does not receive the full benefit of the time he saves. 
75 per cent of the premium goes to the worker, and the 
remaining 25 per cent is put to a premium reserve out of 
which the premiums payable to supervisors and indirect 
workers are met. This division is justified on the 
grounds that the direct workers must have the co- operation 
of supervisors and indirect workers if they are to produce 
the high B -hours which give them a bonus. Throe 




base -rate, and premium based either on their own B- 
credits, or, if the performance of the direct workers 
depends largely upon them, their premiums may be 
calculated on the basis of the average B -hour of the 
department served. The efficiency of the department and 
its individual workers is indicated on the daily posting 
sheet which appears on the notice -baord and spews the 
number of Bs produced by each worker during the ?previous 
day, the resulting B -hour, and the amount of premium 
earned. In this way interest is maintained, and a 
competitive spirit aroused between individual workers 
and departments of the organisation. 
This, in outline, is the Bedaux system; what of 
its merits and demerits? One large English woollen firm 
reported that in the first year after changing over from 
a piece -work system which they considered efficient to the 
Bedaux method, costs fell by 30 per cent., and operators 
earnings rose by 15 per cent. as the result of increased 
production per operator per hour, This initial success 
encouraged the firm to extend the system to four other of 
its plants, and it has been found to offer substantial 
advantages over piece -work. It has given the management 
a production control which they did not have before, in 
as much as operators are expected to come up to a set 
standard per hour or per day, and this has reduced the 
need for supervision. Bedaux has also given than a 
very accurate costing system which they consider 
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invaluable. 
Another firm, manufacturing paint in the Midlands, 
introduced Bedaux into its plant and was able to change 
over from a 47 -hour week tab_ 40 -hour week; wages rose by 
25 per cent, costs were cut, and trade increased. The 
chairman said: !'It is really simple ". The work is not 
harder, but it is so organised that every man is now working 
sixty minutes every hour - and not only fifty minutes an 
Lour as in the old easy -going days." 
In a survey of twenty -nine plants operating the 
Bedaux system, it was found that on an average labour costs 
fell by 30 per cent; operator productivity increased by 
78 per cent; and operators' earnings tose by 17 per cent(l) 
The maximum reduction in labour cost was 57 per cent, in 
a firm of 500 employees, manufacturing teleprinters and 
transmitting and receiving apparatus. The best figures 
for productivity were found in a factory of 600 employees 
manufacturing paint, varnish and printing ink; operator 
productivity in this plant rose by 176 per cent. 27 per 
cent was the Maximum for increases in operators' earnings 
- this was achieved in a firm of soap, perfume and toilet 
manufacturers, also with 600 employees. It is claimed that 
these improvements have come about because of what, Bedaux 
calls "unused capacity to produce ". He says: It is 
not uncommon to find well -managed plants with well- organised 
facilities, and with labour working under some incentive 
(1) Cyclostyled sheet issued by Chas. L. Bedaux= Ltd., 
dated 26th. January 1934, and entitled: 
"Analysis of 
Results of Typical Applications ". 
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system, producing 45 to 50 Bs an hour. The difference 
between 50 Bs an hour and 80 Bs an hour represents unused 
capacity to produce, recognisable only when disclosed by 
actual measurement of the work involved The results of 
Bedaux applications in over 200 plants in different 
industries,...have been an increase in production of 44 per 
cent, accompanied by an average reduction in labour costs of 
20 per cent, and an increase of labour earnings of 15 per 
cent. " (1) 
Procuction One of the most important advantages of the Bedaux 
Control. 
system is its use in production control. This applies to any 
"points" system which reduces the various types of labour to 
a common denominator, whereby standards are created and 
performance measured. If a department has 100 employees 
working a 40 hour week, assuming that it is the norm for 
operators to work at an 80 -rate, the department should produce 
320,000 Bs during every week. However many jobs are done 
in that department; however many different products made; 
however many staff or process changes madel.; a production of 
320,000 Bs may be expected, and if it does not materialise 
the fact is immediately revealed and can be investigated. 
This universal "yardstick" of efficiency, which can be 
applied to all parts of the productive organigation, is of 
great value as a,_:management "tool ". 
Each employee has a daily time-card or checking -card 
upon which is registered each job done during the day. At 
(1) "Bedaux Measures Labour" (Chas. E. Bedaux Ltd.) 
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the end of the day, the card is totalled. for hours worked, 
machine time used, process allowance, losttime, etc. , and 
the total number of Bs made is computed. This B- figure 
divided by the number of hours worked gives the B -hour 
averaged by the employee during the day. These figures 
are posted on a departmental posting sheet, the names of 
those averaging less than 60 -B appearing in red. The 
weekly analysis sheet summarizes departmentally the posting 
sheet, and shews the total time and B -rate attained ddLly 
in the department. Each foreman is given a copy to enable 
him to check his department and visualise his own premium 
bonus. He can see at a glance which operators are 
efficient and which are not. This sheet also goes to the 
management, who can thus compare the efficiency of the 
departments. With this information available, the 
management can account for every minute of every man's 
time, so that if lost time or process allowance seems to 
be excessive, an investigation can be made with a view to 
improving methods or progress control. The analysis 
shews up immediately how much of a productive worker's 
time is taken up with waiting for materials, or fetching 
then or doing some other non -productive task, so that 
bottle -necks and hold -ups are revealed immediately and 
clearly. 
As a method of production control, therefore, 
Bedaux gives valuable indices of (a) the labour 
efficiency of each department, (b) the comparative 
Costing 
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efficiency ratios of each department, (c) the efficiency 
of the supervision, (d) the ration. of productive effort 
to total effort, (e) the ratio of indirect labour to 
direct labour, (f) departmental and total output, and so 
on. Bedaux's usefulness as a tool of production control is 
undoubtedly one of its greatest advantages. 
Closely linkéd with production control is costing, 
and again in this sphere the advantage of having a common 
denominator - the B -unit - is evident. Standard cost 
per B is found by dividing the base or hpurly rate by 60 
(as there are 60 Bs per hour in the standard performance). 
This standard cost per B multiplied by the B -value of a 
job fixes that job's standard costs, which can then be 
compared with actual costs. Comprison of standard and 
actual cost enables discrepancies to be investigated and 
accounted for by the discovery of idle time, inefficient 
performance, unsuitable staffing, machine breakdowns, 
material shortages, correction of defective work, and so on. 
The allocation of overhead costs, too, is facilitated. 
In the hypothetical case of the department of 100 employees 
working a 40 hour week, oncost per B is simply calculated by 
dividing the total oncost for the department by 320,000. 
This anount, multiplied by the B -value of any job, gives 
the appropriate figure of oncost for that particular 
operation. This method is more satisfactory than either 
the machine -hour or the man -hour system, for the B- output 
of the department can be adjusted to changes in machinery 
2 2 4 
or staff, and the allocation of oncost remain accurate and 
simply calculated. 
;;age- changes. An allied advantage is that the B unit is independent 
of changes in wage -levels. With ordinary piece -work prices, 
if there is a change in base -rates, the whole price -schedule 
has to be altered, involving perhaps thousands of calcula- 
tions. Since the amount of work involved in a job remains 
unchanged unless the job itself is changed, its B- rating 
will be the same despite changes in wage -levels. If the 
base -rate is raised, the calculation of wages is not 
complicated, for it merely involves a change in the 
multiplier. This is the same advantage which was noticed 
in the case of the "standard times" system of expressing 
piece -work prices in terms of time rather than cash. 
Disadvantages: Turning to the disadvantages of the Bedaux system, 
(a) Sharing of 
premium. the incentive power of the method merits attention. 
Clearly, Bedaux suffers from the sane disadvantage of Rowan, 
Halsey and the other "sharing plans" in that the worker does 
not receive the full benefit of the time he saves, and there- 
fore has not the same incentive to increase his efforts. 
It is usual for 75 per cent of the premium to go to the 
worker, and 25 per cent to indirect labour, including 
supervision. This was one of the points at issue in the 
strike which occurred in 1931 -1932 in the Wolsey knitting 
plant at Leicester, and it was dealt with in the agreement(1 
which followed the settlement of the strike thus: 
(1) Vide Appendix "D" (1)_ 
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"Premium - Wolsey Ltd. agreed to give the direct worker 95 
per cent of the premium earned, in place; of the 75 per cent 
at present in operation. It was stressed, however, that in 
the interests of the workers it was essential that there 
should be team spirit, and that the indirect worker should 
have an inducement to give the direct operator good and 
efficient service. It was therefore agreed that the direct 
worker should give 5 per cent, of the premium earne, to 
which Wolsey Ltd. were prepared to contribute a further 5 
per cent in order to maintain the team spirit." 
This means that the foreman's bonus depends upon the 
average B -hour of his department, and it would seem to be 
an incentive to an undesirable form of supervision, tending 
to "driving" rather than organising and leading. As a 
leading American trade union leader has said: "The prospect 
of this precnium designedly spurs each foreman to concentrate 
on speeding -Up slow or backward workers with a view to 
increasing their daily effectiveness. A humorous aspect 
is given to this arrangement by the fact that the foreman's 
Premium is a deduction from the premium earned by all the 
workmen in his department. u(1) A't.well -known rubber company, 
when it installed the Bedaux system, tried to avoid this 
difficulty by paying the supervisory premiums out of the 
firm's funds without affecting the wages of direct labour. 
The mount of premium paid was based on the premium B -s 
developed in the department, however, so that the incentive 
to "drive" would seem to be still present. 
(1) Vide next page. 
(b) Rating. 
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The objection to sharing the premium would undoubt- 
edly be much less strong if it were shared only with 
indirect labour as distinct from the supervision. This 
was the view of a large engineering fire which changed 
over from piece -work to Bedaux "because of the psychologi- 
cal appeal...that indirect workers share d in the rewards 
of increased production at a standard cost. Here we saw 
an aid for overcoming the defects of human effort through 
co- operation. We hoped, for instance, that if for any 
reason material was not moving from operation to operation 
fast enough, the indirect worker... would_ see that for him 
it meant decreased wages in that he would not share because 
increased production was not forthcoming, and he would 
complain loud enough do that management would become 
interested." It can hardly be denied that it is desirable 
to link the interests of the direct' and indirect workers, 
but if the latter term is extended to cover supervision, 
the dangers would seem to outweigh the likely gains. 
Some little doubt has already been expressed above in 
connection with the time -study practice known as "rating" 
whereby the time -study engineer not only times the operator 
on the job but also Assesses the speed at which he is 
working. Bedaux goes even further than this and claims 
to be much more scientific in that long experience and 
(1) Previous page: Mr. Godfrey C. Brown (Consulting 
Ehgineer to the American Federation of Labour), quoted 
by 
P. Glading in "How Bedaux works" (Labour Research Depart - 
mlt) July 1932. 
227 
intensive research hagG given a basis upon which an 
accurate measurement can be made of effort involved, and the 
ap,)ropriate relaxation time required. As Dr. Northcott 
has claimed, however, this "ranking is arbitrary, not 
scientific; it is an estimate, not a measurement ", and he 
goes on "Even though it be true that the rest and relaxation 
curve has a scientific basis, this estimate of the rate of 
effort which is quite without scientific quality is so 
significant a factor in the compilation of a 60 B point 
standard as to deprive the result of any special claim to 
scientific value. "(1) In the course of the present 
investigation, special inquiry has been made of many time - 
study engineers on this question of rating, and whilst they 
are almost unanimous in their claim to be able to rate an 
operator accurately, they are extremely vague as to their 
methods and the scientific basis of their claim. Terms 
such as "informed judgment ", long experience ", "careful 
estimate ", and so on occurred with great frequency, and 
there is little doubt that rating - and most certainly 
Bedaux's more elaborate labour measurement - can never be 
anything more than an educated guess. 
A more accurate timing could be obtained. by taking a 
sufficiently large number of studies to iron out 
irregularities and give the natural time 
for the job. 
(1) Article by Dr. C.H. Northcott "The Bedaux 
System - A 
Critical Appraisal" in "Unity ", idlay 1932. 
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For example, a large firm of electrical manufacturers in the 
North of England, conscious of the difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of accurate rating, abandoned the practice in 
favour of a system of averaging. Appendix ''D" (2) spews the 
results of ten separate time studies of the sane operator, 
and also the results of ten time studies of ten different 
operators all performing the sane operation. The wide 
variations are apparent, and it was found to be very difficult, 
if not impossible, for ten diffe. °ent rate -fixers, timing each 
of the operators, to "level" them to an average operator 
efficiency by the rating technique. It was they efore 
decided that for each element of a job, there .should be taken 
ten studies on each of ten different operators,(1) giving a 
total of one hundred readings. The time which was to be made 
the base -time was selected by what is termed the "thirty per 
cent method ", which. consists of accepting the first timing 
which occurs three times, as the selected value. The ten 
selected timings are then treated in the sane -Manner and the 
finally selected timing becomes the basic time for that 
particular element. It is emphasised that this method gives, 
not the average time for .performing the element, but the 
o )erators' "natural time ", i. e. that which corresponds to their 
natural rhythm of work. An average may include widely 
fluctuating times, some quite abnonrial, and these will adverse- 
ly affect the value of the final average. The usual allowance 
(1) Vide Appendix "D" (3). 
(c) Fatigue. 
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are made in addition to this basic time, for fatigue, 
personal needs:,t and so on, and each of these allowances 
is decided upon only after protracted time studies made on 
a wide range of operators over a long period of time. 
One of the most frequently he criticisms of the 
Bedaux system is that it gives rise to over -speeding and 
(1) 
consequent fatigue. For exaaple, one union pronouncement 
declared: "When this scheme was first explained to us one 
of the points in its favour did. seem to us to be the 
acknowledgement by Bedaux that no operator could be 
expected to continuously perform an operation without some 
allowance for rest and relaxation. We are more than 
sorry to find that the supposed relaxation is nothing but 
a myth, since in almost every case the operator is 
compelled by force of circumstances to absorb the whole of 
this allowance in order to attain her standard rating... 
(In making the time- studies) tale aeer has stood with 
them the whole of the day, and with the exception of 
breaks for meals the girls have invariably worked 
continuously the whole day through. We cannot accept 
this as a natural effort, since no operator could 
continually work under such pressure, and when girls have 
under such conditions only produced just over a 60B hour 
then we feel there is just cause to offer criticism.... 
The same evidence is sub:iitted from all sources 
to the 
(1) "Report on the Bedaux System of Labour Measurement" 
by the Executive Committee of the Leicester Hosiery 
Union, 1932. 
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effect that the system has had such a speeding up effect 
as to render it almost imposible for the operator to work 
with any degree of comfort." Certainly the Bedaux 
system displays a complete ignorance of the nonnal out out 
curves and the principles of rest pauser, in that the 
allowances for relaxation are given as fractions of a 
minute, and the operatives are meant to take their rest 
-causes in this way, i.e. continuously throughout the 
working day, 
The National Institute of Industrial Psychology(1) 
undertook a brief investigation into the effect of 
Bedaux on fatigue, in the Brunswick Mill of the Lancashire 
Cotton Corporation Ltd. Although the investigation was 
short - a period of ten weeks, with a holiday break inter- 
vening - the results are valuable as being the work of a 
scientific and impartial body. the conclusions of the 
investigators were: "There is no general evidence of 
undue fatigue, although isolated cases of abnormal 
fatigue have appeared from time to time. There is 
evidence of some factor affecting the pulse- product, 
but this alone does not provide conclusive proof of undue 
fatiue. Analysis of the sickness rate discloses no 
(1) Investigation conducted under the joint auspices of 
the Lancashire Cotton Corporation, and the 'ianchester, 
Salford. and District Weavers, Winders and Doublers' 
Association. R-sults quoted in the "Report on the 
Bedaux and Kindred Systems" presented to the Management 





conclusive evidence of undue fatigue for the period 
reviewed. The Bedaux system was inaugurated on the 16th. 
June. After ten weeks' experience...33 per cent of the 
operatives stated that they felt more tired than they did 
under the previous system. This percentage rose to 37 
at the end of twelve weeks. The percentage of 
operatives feeling more bored under the Bedaux system 
was 57 per cent after ten weeks' experience, and 55 per 
cent after twelve weeks. There has been....a rise in the 
pulse product for the group under observation. This 
rise has been mare rapid than the increase in B -hours 
recorded, indivating an increasingly greater expenditure 
of energy in the effort to maintain or to increase 
production." These results would seem to indicate a 
situation akin to that of the blend - pullers investigated 
by H. Vernon in 1928.(1) When a new incentive scheme 
is introduced, there is almost invariably a spurt in 
production which may result in fatigue, but when the 
transition period has passed operators usually settle 
down at a pace which is well within their capacity and 
which does not involve them in undue strain. 
Two undoubted disadvantages of the Bedaux system are 
its costliness and complexity. As qualified and highly 
paid engineers have to be employed for some considerable 
time, the cost of installing the system is high, but 
this criticism is not valid if production is sufficiently 
(1) Vide supra, Chapter VI. 
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stimulated, for then the returns exceed the outlay. For 
example, one finn claimed: "We ran a separate ledger at 
t ?,_e time of the installation, and in it was placed the 
charges of the installation and the account was credited 
with the difference in cost of points produced. We began 
to give credits to the account at the end of eight weeks 
and the ledger'shewed a credit balance departmentally at the 
end of ten months. In other words the installation was 
paying for itself within a year's time." 
Complexity. The system is difficult for operatives to understand, 
and this complexity tends to detract from its incentive 
value. It is practically impossible for the ordinary 
worker to calculate the amount due to at the 
end of the week, and in some cases a trade union represent- 
ative has been specially trained to check the figures on 
behalf of the workers concerned. Without this protection, 
the worker had to rely on the management to deal fairly 
and honestly with him, and this position is not readily 
acceptable to the majority of employees. 
Trade Union The following resolution was passed at the Newcastle 
Attitude. 
Trades Union Congress in 1932: That we instruct the 
General Council of the T.U.C. to institute an inquiry into 
the ï3edaux System of labour measurement, and to report their 
11 
findings to affiliated societies at the earliest opportunity.' 
As a result of this decision a questionnaire was sent out, 
to which a hundred and four trade unions replied. Only 





thirteen of these had had any experience of Bedaux, and in 
five of these cases attempts to introduce the system had 
been successfully resisted. In almost every other case 
the trade unions had opposed the system and had been 
successful in securing modifications and guarantees which 
protected their members against its harsher demands, 
The uni ns objections are mainly threefold: (a) to the 
sharing of the time saved with the employer; it is felt 
that the worker is not receiving all the fruits of his 
increased effort; (b) to the complexity of the system 
whereby it is virtually impossible for the ordinary worker 
to check the bonus payable to him; and (c) "Over and above 
all this is the feeling that the human element is being 
mechanised; .that pride of craftsmanship, quality of work, 
and even health and comfort, are being sacrificed to speed 
of production. "(l) 
ine of the best -known strikes in connection with the 
Bedaux system is that which occurred in the hosiery works 
of Messrs. Wolsey Ltd., of Leicester, and which lasted 
for a period. of eight weeks. The firm was determined to 
introduce Bedaux, and the Hosiery Union was equally 
determined to oppose it, but at length the strike was 
brought to an end as the result of an agreement(2) 
follówing joint conferences presided over by the Lord 
(1) "The T,U.C. Examines the Bedaux System of Payment 
by Results" (1933) p.4. 
(2) For teat of agreement, vide Appendix "D "(1). 
Examples. 
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Mayor of Leicester and an officer of the Milttry of Labour. 
This agreement illustrates how the "points" systems, of 
which Bedaux is typical, may be adapted to British 
conditions. The agreement safeguards the workers' 
position and gives them increased earning capacity than 
before; they have the advantage Over piece -work of the 
elimination of unpaid waiting time, and the protection of 
the minimum wage. Joint consultation in the fixing of 
rates, and the guarantee that sufficient thidies will be taken 
to give a fair average reading, are steps in the right 
direction, and these concessions, together with the more 
generous division of the bonus, have done much to make the 
scheme acceptable to all concerned. 
In short, much depends upon the manner in which the 
system is administered; like any other method of p jment, 
it can be used by unscrupulous employers as a tool of 
exploitation; on the other hand, reasonably applied, it 
can be an aid to greater efficiency and increased output. 
A Scottish biscuit manufacturer succesta.11y operates its 
own adaptation of the Bedaux system without any hostility 
from the staff. Time study is carried out tgAscertain 
the number of units of work which can be performed in an 
hour by a normal operative; the result is expressed 
numerically and is known as the Unit /Hour factor. This 
factor is set to give a normal operative 125 per cent of 
base pay. By dividing the actual nu.:iber of units of work 




the number of hours which a normal operative would have 
taken to do the work is found; let this result be referred 
to as "x ". The factor "x" can thus be multiplied by the 
base pay per hour for the job in aìer to arrive at the 
operative's earnings for the day; if the result is less 
than the base pay, the base -rate operates as a minimum. 
As an incentive, and also as a means of measuring the 
efficiency of the operative, the department and the 
factory, the factor "x" is- expressed as a percentage of 
the hours actually employed. This percentage is knowras 
the "working speed" and is posted in each department daily, 
shewing the results for each operator. The firm is a priv- 
ate limited company, with the traditions of a family 
business, and excellent relations exist between management 
and staff. Before the poifts system of wage payment was 
introduced the project was laid before the workers through - 
the channels of joint consultation, and their approval and 
co- operation sought and secured. Every care is taken to 
ensure that the time- stùdies are conducted in fairness to 
the operators,' the employee gets the benefit of all the 
time she saves, and as a consequence the scheme works 
smoothly and without hostility. 
In another very large engineering plant, engaged in 
the manufacture of tractors and earthnoving equipment, an 
adaptation of Bedaux operates successfully. Base rates 
are fixed by job evaluation methods, agreed with the trade 
Road Motor 
Repairs. 
union, and above this level a points incentive system comes 
into operation. Standard units of work have been evolved, 
and time study is used to establish the unit- rating of each 
job. All the units produced by the worker over the standard 
are known as "pay units ", and the employee receives 
c )mpensation for such pay -units equal to 1 /60th of his basic 
hourly rate. Thus again there is no sharing of the premium 
so that this bone of contention is removed. Direct and 
indirect workers and supervisors are all treated quite 
separately for incentive purposes. In the payment of 
indirect workers, the productivity of the direct workers is 
used as one of the factors which determine the aount of bonus 
paid. Bonus payments are made to foremen for bavings 
resulting from operating efficiency in their departments, 
based on the total output of the department concerned. 
Bonus becomes payable to the direct worker before he 
reaches the standard efficiency. If he produces 40 units in 
an hour, he is given 20 additional units as allowance..; 
this is the break -even point between bonus and no -bonus 
earnings. If he produces 50 units in an hour, he is given 
15 units as allowance; if he produces 60, an additional 10 
are given; and so on until he produces 80 units in an hour, 
at which point no addition is made. At that point he earns 
thirty -three per cent, bonus on his basic hourly rate. 
Just prior to nationalisation, one of the main -line 
railway companies adopted a "points" system of bonus payment 
for the routine maintenance ins)ections of motor 
vehicles 
and trailers, A bonus of 33 -1 /3rd. per cent was paid on 
ourLnary. 
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base rates for a specified output, with provision for an 
increase in the bonus proportionate to an increase in output 
above this specified figure. The work is measured in terms 
of man -hours per output unit (known as a "point ") and, in 
effect, as the man-hours per point decrease the bonus 
increases. A standard time per output point is fixed., 
and this provides for all repairs necessary between the 
periodical inspections, e.g. running defects, repairs to 
bodywork, repair of accidental damage, etc. where such 
repairs do not necessitate large -scale operations. In view 
of the widely differing amount of work involved in dealing 
with the various types of vehicles and the various categories 
of inspections, the "A "(light) inspection of a trailer is 
used as the basis of value of an output point, and all other 
vehicles and inspections are valued in multiples of that 
unit, in accordance with a prepared schedule. In order to 
level out fluctuations from week to week, a for-weeks' ' 
running average is used fog' output points and. roan- hours. 
These three examples shew how points systems can be 
adapted to light, repetitive, mass- production operations, 
to heavy engineering, and to day -to -day repair work, and 
this adaptability is one of the method's greatest 
recommendations. It may be anticipated t Vját more and more 
firms will adapt the points method to their own particular 
needs by establishing a unit of work suited. to their 
requirements, and adding their own individual refinements. 
The Bedaux System, as such, has had its day; the nape is 
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anathema in labour circles, and any firm which set out to 
introduce the system by nano would almost certainly 
encounter hostility from the start. It must be admitted 
that the doguatic claims of Bedaux to be able to calculate 
with scientific accuracy the effort involved in and the 
relaxation.required for any job whatsoever, and to be able 
to reduce these variables to a common unit, cannot be 
substantiated. The calculation is nothing more than an 
estimate, an educated guess. 
Apart from this fundamental criticism, Bedaux has 
given ïnuch that is of value to the knowledge of wage systems 
The conceptions of process allowance and l st -time allowance 
are undoubtedly useful. The value of expressing piece -work 
Prices (for this is what the B- ratings really amount to) 
interms of points or units other than money is very great, 
particularly from the point of view of production control, 
costing, and adjustments following changes in base- rates. 
It would seem to be inadvisable to insist upon the sharing 
of the premium betwen management and labour; there is :ouch 
to be said for the view that the operator is entitled to 
the full benefit of the time which he saves, so long as the 
time- studies foxrate- fixing purposes have been accuratly 
made. If these amendments are accepted, it will be seen 
that the system becomes virtually a piece -work system with 
guaranteed_ minimum, and the prices expressed in terns of 
"points" rather than cash, and fixed by means of accurate 
time -studies, with proper allowances for relaxation. 
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The "standard times" system(1) which is being widely 
adopted today operates alone, these lines, the points 
being "standard hours ", and. it :ould seem to be the most 
satisfactory individual system so far evolved. 




Páyment -by- results implies remuneration based on 
output, but not necessarily the output of an individual; 
it may be the output of a group - a tear, a department, or 
even a whole plant. This is no new development; indeed 
our modern piece -work systems grew out of the former 
practice of fanning work out to a sub- contractor or piece- 
master who received payment for the work he produced; 
out of this lump sum, he in turn paid the men who worked 
for him, that is to say, the payment made by the manufact- 
urer was in respect of the output, not of an individual, 
but of a group. 
From this practice there developed the various indivi- 
dual systems of payment -by- results; but today the pendulum 
seems to be avinging back again, and group incentives are 
being widely adopted, for 4fiumber of reasons. In the 
first place, although the trade unions have very largely 
abandoned their opposition to the various piece -work 
systems, they still emphasise the principles of collective 
solidarity and no differentiation between individuals doing 
the sane job. The unions have often argued that piece -work 
tended to set man against man, and to stimulate an undesir- 
able, competitive spirit within the workshop. For this 
reason, they favour in many cases the collective piece -work 
systems, which give due weight to the trade union principle 
of collective solidarity. In the Scottish engineering 
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industry, for exaaple, a number of cases carie to light in 
which this collective spirit was so strong that employees 
working on an individual piece -work system poolec:'., their 
piece -work bonuses as soon as they received their pay - 
Packets, and redivided them among the ,;ie nbers of the 
voluntary pool in some agreed proportion. This is some- 
times known as a "fellowship pool" and is usually confined 
to the workers in a particular. shop. 
A further reason for the extension of the use of 
group incentives is that nowadays in many manufacturing 
processes the unit of production is the group rather than 
the individual, and it may be impossible to calculate the 
output of any one member of the group, though pufectly 
feasible to measure the output of the group as a Whole. 
In a modern mass production plant, for example, each 
operator is largely dependent upon the other operators on 
his -particular production line, and a steady wore -flow with 
properly balanced output is much more important than 
maximum output from any one individual operative. "In 
group work, individual starring would even be detrimental 
but as a matter of fact it cannot occur, exceLt momentarily, 
because an ambitious individualist would run himself out 
of parts to work upon. "(1) 
A third reason is psychological - the desire to 
introduce a collective incentive rather than an individual 
(1) Lytle: "Wagg Incentive ;Methods" p. 62. 
2 is 2 
incentive in order to engender a better team- spirit and 
give to all the workers within the organisation the sense 
of working together towards the attainment of a common 
goal. This attitude towards payment -by- results is largely 
a modern development, associated with the rise of 
industrial psychology, although even before the advent of 
the present century Schloss wrote: "A detailed scrutiny 
of the various forms of collective re:auneration discloses 
the presence in different kinds of group -work of a 
characteristic element of weighty importance. This is 
the mutual supervision exercised by the members of a group,' 
each acting, in effect, as a superintendent in relation 
to the work of his neighbour, because all have a direct 
interest in the performance by every man of a full share 
in the co«unon task. "(1) This view is borne out by the 
experience of a large electrical firm in the North of 
England, employing several thousand female operatives' 
engaged mainly on repetitive precision and assembly work. 
These girls were formerly_paid on an individual piece - 
work basis, but it was found that as several girls worked 
in close proximity to each other on the sane bench, the 
differences in their earnings led to constant bickering, 
jealousy and discontent. It was decided to'experiment 
with a group bonus scheme, not because the output of the 
individual operatives could not be measured, but in 
order if possible to infuse à spirit of unity into the 
(l) Schloss: ''iviethods of Industrial Remuneration % %. 
T 
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working group. All the girls on a bench were regarded as 
a unit, and the output of that group was made the basis of 
piece -work payment. The total output of the group deter- 
mined the total piece -work bonus payable, and this was 
divided among the individual workers. It has been found 
that this has led to a much better team spirit, and the 
members of the group tend to supervise themselves. Any 
girls who are inclined to slack are encouraged by the others 
to increase their efforts in the common interest of the 
group. 
Classification These various reasons for the development of group 
6f Group 
Incentives incentives may be used as the basis of their classification. 
A broad distinction may be drawn between (i) group piece- 
work and (ii) production bonuses, the former arising from 
the impracticability of determining what is the output of 
any individual member of the group; and the latter from 
the desire to introduce a spirit of unity and collective 
purpose into the shop, department or works. 
In many jobs, not only -in Aass- production, but also in 
batch- and job -production plants, a team of operatives work - 
together to produce a certain output, but this output cannot 
be assessed on an individual basis. For example, in the 
(i) Group 
Piece -work 
Scottish ship -building industry, rivetting is almost 
universally paid on a piece -work basis. There is usually 
a standard. price list per 100 rivets, and the payment is 
made on a group or "squad" basis. In hand rivetting the 
squad consists of two riveters, a holder -up and a rivet 
Example of 
Squad P. W. 
heater; 
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in aachine rivetting the squad includes one 
riveter with his holder -up and rivet heater. The total 
piece -work earnings of the squad are computed on the basis 
of the price -list, and this anount is paid to the squad 
leader who makes the distribution ainonL the members of 
ganL. In addition to the standard piece -work earnings, 
34/- per week per man is paid into the squad pool by the 
employer. 
Consider the case of a machine rivetting gang whose 
basic time rates are: rivetter 104/ -; holder -up 85/ -; 
and rivet -heater 85/ -. Suppose the piece -work value 
(according to the price -list) of the work which they 
complete during their standard week of 44 hours mounts to 
240 / -, then their percentage piece -work balance will be :- 
(342 - 274) x 100 = 25 per cent 
274 
(Note: (a) 342/- = 240/- plus 3 @ 34/-: (b) 274/- = sum 
of three men's basic time- rates. ) 
Their total weekly earnings will, therefore, anount to :- 
Rivetter: 104/- plus 25% = £6. 9.10d. 
Holder-up: 85/- plus 25% = £5. 6. ld. 
Rivet- heater: 85/- plus 25 % = £5. 6. id.. 
If,however, the rivet -heater was absent owing to 
sickness and only worked 36 hours during the week, his 
time -wage would be:- 36 x 85 = 69/6. 
44 
Then the total time wages of the gang will be: 104/ - plus 
Contract 
Piece -work. 
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85/- plus 69/6d. = 258/6d., so that if the total piece -work, 
value of their work remains at 342/- their percentage bonus 
will be :- 
342 - 258 6d. x 100 = 32 per cent. 
258 6d. 
Then their total earnings will be :- 
Rivetter 104/- plus 32% = 137/7d. £6.17. 7d. 
Holder -up: 85/- plus 32% = 112/5d. 5.12. 5d. 
Rivet -heater :69/6 plus 32% = 92/- 4.12. Od. 
A somewhat similar arrangement to the above is that 
known as "contract piece- work ",(1 - and this, too, is found 
extensively inLthe shipbuilding industry. Platers have 
traditionally been paid on a niece -work basis, and as they 
.work in large squads of sixteen to eighteen platers and 
folders -up their earnings are assessed as a group. A 
contract price is agreed between the squad and theen2loyer 
for all the plating work on a ship or part of a ship, the 
calculation being made according to the price -list of the 
particular shipyard. This contract price is paid to the 
men irrespective of the time which they take to complete 
the job, and the distribution among the individual members 
of the squad is made by the squad- leader. 
The electrical trade is normally a time -rate trade, 
but during the recent War the Electrical Trades Union 
relaxed its prohibition- against piece -work so far as ship- 
building and ship -repairing was concerned. and so long as 
the piece -work bonus was calculated on a group contract 
basis and not an individual one. 
(1) For sample contract document, vide Appendix "E "(1). 
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The following case, from the experience of a Scottish 
electrical contractor, is cited as an example of how the 
contract method of piece -work works out in practice. 
Before the Electrical Trades Union agreed to payment- by -re- 
sults the contractor found that his labour costs were very 
high owing to the necessity of employing inexperienced hands 
and men who had been compulsorily directed to shipyard work. 
There was a general atmosphere of disgruntlement and 
dissatisfaction, and a good deal of slacking, and as soon 
as possible the contractor, convinced that payment-by- 
results was the only solution, introduced a contract system 
of piece -work. The squad consisted of about 160 individuals 
including journey -men, apprentices, male and female trainees, 
and a few unskilled labourers. The work was the electrical 
installations on Tank Landing Craft, each contract compris- 
ing about fifty vessels, giving a run of repetitive work 
lasting for at least six months. The work on each vessel 
lasted about one month and employed a squad of twelve to 
sixteen workers. 
A price was fixed for each vessel, covering all types 
of work involved. in the contract, and this price was paid to 
the squad irrespective of how long they took on the job. It 
was, therefore, in their ówn interest to get the job done as 
quickly as possible, and it was found that labour costs 
fell 
by as much as 45 per cent, which meant that the men earned 
82 per cent. bonus on their time wages. During the period 
of the contract usually four weeks - the standard weekly 
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wages were paid, and at the end of the period the 
difference between the wages paid and the contract price 
was distributed to the men in proportion to their time -wag. 
Problems of The system of contract piecework is not without its 
Contract 
Piece -work. difficulties. Apart from the inevitable prohimms of rate - 
fixing, the squad method has its own peculiar limitations. 
Ih the above- mentioned contractor's own words: "In each 
squad there were always the black sheep who would not work, 
all out for the bonus, and who depended upon the others to 
work. There were the slow workers and the bad workers who 
se 
work had tó be done all over again, and I found that the 
only way was to separate the good men from the had, which 
meant that some squads, composed. entirely of good. men, 
earned very high wages, and that others barely earned 
anything extra. In the main, however, it eras the trouble- 
makers who spoiled the squad - men who had been directed 
away from home, or habitual trouble makers. The only 
cure, therefore, was. to get rid of them, and this was not 
always easy under the Essential Works Order." This 
illustrates one of the major problems of group incentives; 
many employers contend that they have the tendency to 
reduce the good man to the average level. The man who is 
skilled and conscientious, seeing his workmate failing to 
contribute as much as he might to the joint output, tends 
to the view that his extra effort is not worth while, and 
he slows down accordingly. Others employers 
take the 
opposite view, also held by Schloss,(1) that since the 




interests of the individual members of a group piece -work 
scheme are inter -related, each will see that the other 
doe s7ii s proper share of the work. 
It seems that, where group piece -work is in operation, 
the groups should be kept as small as possible consistent 
with the type of work, and, if possible, the individuals 
comprising each group should be always kept together. 
This gives the fullest opportunity for the development of 
group discipline and minimises the difficulties outlined 
above. Whenever a change has to be made in the 
constitution of the gaup - a transfer made, or the group 
added to or subtracted from - the men should be consulted 
and their approval obtained. In this way charges of 
damaging workers' bonus by taking away good workers or 
bringing in poor ones, may be avoided, and the confidence 
of the men secured. 
Where contract piece -work 'operates, the length of 
time of the contract dhould be as short as possible. The 
above- mentioned contractor found that his period of a 
month was rather too long. Most men are primarily 
concerned with their week's wages, and they would rather 
have a bonus payment each week than a correspondingly 
larger lump sum at the and of the month. If the period 
of the contract is too long, the men tend to lose interest, 
and the power of the financial incentive declines. 
These difficulties associated with the vo rking of 
the 
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contract system of piece -work were commented upon by a 
trade up}ion official reporting upon his experience of 
payment -by- results in the war -tune shipbuilding industry. 
He said.: "The introduction of the system of payment -of- 
results, based on the contract method, was designed to 
eliminate individual competition and to prevent setting 
man against man. In practice it very often works in the 
reverse. The teaming of Yuen calls for individual respect, 
and under conditions where the men are known to each other 
this condition can be fulfilled and men will work together 
in a spirit of co- operation. The system also demands 
the placing of a certain amount of confidence in the 
employer, and on the employer's part a. willingness to give 
a square deal and an honest price for the job. Without 
confidence there is a tendency to withhold. effort and if a 
square deal is not forthcoming effort will not be .iaintaine 
For successful results, there must be a restriction of 
squads to the minimum to do the jobs efficiently, and the 
jobs to be carried out should be broken down as far as 
possible." 
Where ',.,his mutual confidence does exist, contract 
piece -work can be highly succe sful. Of one large 
idlerseyside firm it was reported: "payment -by- results has 
(1) 
operated very successfully since it s inception. Thi s 
(1) Report by the haectrical Trades Union off Payent -by- 
Results in the. Shipbuilding Industry, 194; section 
containing reports of Area Officials on the Contract 
Method of Piecè- work. 
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is largely due to the high level of eo-operation, existing 
between the management of the finn and the workers' 
representatives. There has not, as yet, been a dispute 
regarding price or the application of payment -by- results 
between the management and the union. It has been agreed 
both by the management and the union that ships have been 
completed quicker and with less electrical labour than would 
have been the case if payment -by- results had not been 
operated. "(1) 
Contract The contract method of piece -work has also been 
Piece -work in 
the Oil markedly successful, and is widely used, in the maintenance 
Industry. 
of refining plant in the Scottish oil industry. Although 
the actual oil refining processes are paid on a daywork 
basis, the work of dismantling, cleaning and repairing the 
plant is carefully time- studied and executed. by squads of 
men on a contract piece-work basis. These men normally 
have other duties to perform, blot' they group together for 
the cleaning and over- hauling oiler tions. Frequently the 
squads are self-selected, and the price oer operation is 
settled by discussion between the management and the squad 
leaders, usually yielding- time and a half or more to the 
employees. The contract system is, on the whole, 
consEered 
to be satisfactory, and is the recognised method 
throughout 
the industry. One mine manager reported: "We 
find today 
that progress by this method outstrips that made 
by time- 
rate payment to our men, or by the employment 
of outside 






To sum up the position with regard to group piece- 
work; it is no different in principle from individual 
piece -work - its purposes are the sane, and the only 
difference is that the output of a group rather than an 
individual is the determining factor, owing to the 
impracticability in certain cases of determining.what the 
output of the individual really is. The incentive power 
is, hpwever, less than that of individual piece -work, 
because the relation between effort expended and earnings 
received is less, direct; it does not necesarily follow 
that a man's wage increases in proportion to the extra 
contribution he makes to the group output - much depends 
on what his colleagues are doing. Thus, if there is going 
to be real co- operative effort there must be a real team - 
spirit within the squad, and this necessitates a small 
group, homogeneous as far as possible, and, to a degree, 
self -selected. If the incentive power is to be kept at 
a iaximun the interest of the man dust not flag, so that 
the -period of the contract should. be as short as possible. 
Most important of all, as with all methods of na ment -by- 
results, mutual confidence between ..ianageï;.ient and men is 
an essential to success, and no effort should be spared to 
se cure it. 
(ii) Production The second broad. type of group incentive is 
that 
)_onus :c ".. 
which is usually known as a "production bonus "; its 




assessing individual output, as the desire to introduce 
spirit of unity and collective purpose into the shop, 
d.eoartinent, or works. 
A simple .schene inaugurated. by Messrs. Priestnan 
Brothers of Hull in 1917 has come to be regarded al:rost as 
the claaic exaaple of production bonuses. The plans of 
the nana_geinent were thoroughly c' iscussed wit'- the fore.aen 
elected any_ representatives of the workers before any 
steps were taken, and in order further to gain the 
confidence of the mien, the company promised than a 10 
per cent bonus whether output rose or not, if a fair trial 
was given to the plan. In consultation with the Works 
Committee, the management fixed a standard output, and a 
bonus was payable on all einoloyees' wages, proportionate 
to any increase which might be achieved over this datum. 
line. If output exceeded the standard by five per cent, 
then every employee received ar additional five per cent 
bonus on his basic time -wage, plus the 10 per cent 
promised concession. The standard was reviewed, and the 
bonus paid, each four weeks. The Works Coimciittee and the 
management agreed upon any adjustments which might be 
necessary in the standard, due to substantial increases or 
decreases in the labour force, or similar factors. The 
scheme worked well and had the full co- operation of the 
men and their unions, and it illustrates how a siarole group 
plan of this type can sometimes be successful where 
individual piece-work would be impracticable, or where it is 
2ri3 
-articularly desired that a spirit of co- operation between 
all sections of the staff should be fostered. 
Calculation In the Priestaan Plan, wages are enhanced by the same 
of Bonus. 
percentage by which the target output is exceeded, but 
this is by no means universal, although its simplicity is 
an advantage. In arranging the bonus system, two factors 
must be borne in mind. In the first price, the bonus must 
be sufficient to give a financial incentive which will 
increase output; extra effort or skill must be adequately 
and proportionately rewarded. On the other hand, the 
bonus must not be so liberal that it puts up unit cost of 
production. Thus, the first step in establishing a 
production bonus is to fix on the composition of the 
group - works, department, shop or squad - and measure 
its output in a normal period. Comparing this figure 
with the current wage rates will enable labour cost per 
unit of output to be ascertained. Then the bonus must 
be worked out so that successive increases in output will 
not result in uneconomic increases in unit cost of 
production, and this may require a somewhat more complic- 
ated arrangement than that embodied in the Priestman Plan. 
For exaaple, a small firm in the engineering industry had 
a production bonus scheme(1) operating durin,_ the War 
when it was engaged upon repetitive manufacture 
for the 
Miristry of Supply. A basis figure of monthly 
output 




was agreed upon, and any increase over this datum line was 
regarded as the amount upon which bonus was payable. The 
actual amount of cash paid out in bonus was five per cent 
of this Eunount, and this was paid out to the workers in 
proportion to their monthly gross earnings. The percentage 
payable was worked out on the following formula: - 
Total monthly bolus 
x 100 Percentage 
of each worker's 
Total monthly wages monthly gross earnings to be 
paid as bonus 
In the two cases cited, no bonus is paid until the 
standard output has been reached, and then only on the out- 
put in excess of this standard. Alternatively once the 
standard output has been reached, a bonus .nay be paid over 
the whole output; or again, no bonus may be paid until 
the standard is reached, and then a bonus paid on the 
standard output, and a higher bonus on output in excess 
of standard. Some firms have reduced the bónus after a 
certain point has been reached, but this detracts from the 
incentive power of the bonus system. Each increment to 
output calls for a greater amount of effort than the 1st, 
so that the bonus should increase rather than decrease as 
output goes up. With a greatly increased output, the 
consequent reduction in overhead costs should enable 
the 
management to pray this higher rate of bonus. 
This method has been successfully adopted by 
a South 
Wales iron and steel company, engaged in 
the re- rolling of 
steel in a modern, continuous mill, one of the -post 
efficient 
2a5 
in the country. Thus the cost of the plant was high 
coineared with the labour cost, and maximum production from 
the plant was a necessity. A standard output per eight - 
hour shift was fixed for each different size of bars produced, 
and every employee's basic rate of wages is increased, by a 
percentage bonus, in proportion to the excess of actual 
output over the standard. In addition, a "super- bonus" is 
paid at the rate of one per cent for every eight points of 
the percentage bonus up to 40 per cent, . and at the rate of 
one per cent for every five points thereafter. 
In this way a higher reward is given for the greater effort 
required as output improves, and as the bonus is paid on 
the output of the shift rather than the individual workers, 
the maximum encouragement is given to team -work. The 
following is an example of how the bonus is worked out in 
practice, in the case of a single shift on a job for which 
the standard output is 140 tons of steel:- 
Actual output 140 210 280 350 
Percentage increase - 50 100 150 
Job -rate (per shift) 10/- 10% 10/- 10% 
Percentage bonus - 5/- 10/- 15/- 
Super-bonus - 3d. 1/8 2/9 
10/- 15/8 21/8 27/9 
Sliding -scale and 
cost -of- living bonus 8/9 8/9 8/9 8/9 
Total pay (per shift) 18/9 24/5 30/5 36/6 
7210.1.01.11710111. 




the scheme receive a cash bonus on their earnings for the 
past six months at the same rate as the dividend paid on the 
equity capital. In this way the interest of the individual 
workman is extended to the efficiency of the whole organisati 
and not merely his own )articular work. The bonus has, in 
recent years, averaged. 110 per cent., indicating an output of 
approximately 100 per cent above the standard. But since 
this standard is fixed at such a low level that it is quite 
normal and easy to achieve a 50 per cent increase, it cannot 
be used to represent "normal output ". Assuming normal output 
to be 50 per cent above standard, the average of the past -few 
years has been one -third above normal, At this point, it is 
calculated that costs fall by,nine per cent., wages rise by 
25 per cent., and profits rise by 10 per cent per ton, and 47 
per cent per week of ten shifts. In addition tothese 
indications of success, the average length of service with 
the firm is ten years, and but for the influence of the War, 
would probably have been as high as fifteen years. The 
scheme has clearly achieved its purpose. 
An indefinite number of variations on the general- theme 
of production bonuses is possible. One of the largest firms 
in the sheet metal trade, which normally pays only on a day - 
work basis, instituted a production bonus during the War to 
counteract the general falling -off in productive 
effort 
experienced largely because of the employment of 
directed 
labour and untrained new entrants. Teams of individuals were 




performances, and once this target was achieved benefits 
accrued to the workers. The inen received the usual type of 
cash bonus, but the women were allowed to finish work the 
moment they completed their output quota for the week. This 
original variant wr, s found to be very effective; the women 
seemed to value ti:ue off more than extra money - many were 
married women with domestic duties, and extra money was 
subject to heavy taxation - and they much appreciated getting 
a full week's wages and yet having eight or ten working hours 
in hand at the end of the week, which they could use for any 
purpose they desired. The men, on the other hand, seeded to 
be more interested in money than time off, no doubt mainly 
because they had family responsibilties, all the more 
difficult to meet because of heavy taxation and high prices. 
A system based on the "points" method of assessment is 
in operation in the factory of a well -known firm in the 
Greater London area, manufacturing' toilet preparations. 
The plan was introduced with the deliberate intent of pro - 
moting -a sense of responsibility among the employees both to 
the :danagement and to each other, and with a view to .Match- 
ing greater effort with greater reward. As the explanatory 
leaflet(1) says: "The Pool is a co- operative incentive and 
confers on those sharing in it a definite responsibility 
to act in every possible way in 'the general interest. The 
conduct of every single person participating in the 
Pool 
affects the amount to be shared by all. Every member of 
the 
ompany should understand this vital point, and accept the 




duty and responsibility implied." 
Each product is given, by the. management, a "points" 
value based on its selling price. There are two "pools ", a 
sales pool for the administrative and distributive staffs, and 
a production pool for the manufacturing staffs. The size of 
the sales pool is determined by the points represented by the 
total net sales for the month, and at the end of each month 
the value of these sales points is distributed among the 
employees in proportion to each individual's salary. The 
production pool is made up of the points represented by the 
articles which reach the Finished. Stores and which are ready 
for sale. Payments from this pool are made weekly instead of 
monthly, and a visible indicator shews day by day the pool 
points as they accumulate, and the total reached and the 
percentage paid during the previous week. All members of 
the permanent staff are thus embraced in one or ether of 
these pools, so that co- operation of the whole organisation 
is emphasised and encouraged. The scheme is flexible in that 
an employee is not penalised by being transferred from one 
job to another, and every employee is encouraged to point 
out any undesirable' factors which may be danaging the 
interests of the whole organisation. 
By employing the device of points a wide variety of 
products can be reduced to a lowest common denominator, as 
it were, and a proper basis of comparison and measurement 
established. This is one of the difficulties of administer- 
ing a production bonus; a very common basis for measuring 
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out-out is weight, but this is satisfactory only where 
products are comparatively uniform, it is not a satis- 
factory method if during a certain period light articles 
are made which take just as much time and effort as the 
same number of heavy articles made during another period. 
The sane disability applies to a numerial assessment of 
output. Consequently, the most common basis of measure- 
ment is value, but even this is not completely satisfact- 
ory, as many factors enter into the determination of 
selling price which are not within the control of the 
workers, e.g. supply and demand in the market, price 
fluctuations, trade boom or depression, foreign competit- 
ion, and so on. 
Seasonal This problem of measuring output was one of those 
Fluctuations. 
which faced a West of England chemical fertiliser 
factory in which it was proposed to introduce a 
production bonus scheme. The de viand for fertiliser is 
excessively seasonal; for months sales-are low and 
manufacture is for stock; for the remainder of the year 
de.aand is heavy and stocks are withdrawn. In this 
particular case the finn was comparatively small, and 
only a few key men had fixed duties all the time, the 
remainder, either in small teams or as individuals, had 
frequently to change their role in the total production 
scene. 
At first. the firm introduced what was called a 
"responsibility" bonus, aimed at quality of work, 
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willingness to co- operate with different individuals and 
to suffer changes in occupation, team- spirit, and sense of 
responsibility. The bonus amounted to five shillings 
per week, and,was awarded, at the discretion of the fore- 
man, to mien who could be relied upon (a) to work 
conscientiously without supervision (b) to change over 
willingly to some new task if required and (c). to maintain 
a good standard of timékeeping. 
This was not so much an output bonus; it was 
concerned. with quality rather than quahtity, and the 
problem of finding a satisfactorÿ measure of production 
was not easy of solution. Not only was demand highly 
seasonal, but furthermore the arrival of raw materials 
was very erratic. Some raw materials were hygroscopic, 
i.e. in wet weather the humidity of the atmosphere slowed 
up some mechanical processes such as screening, so that 
speed of production varied with the weather. Against 
this difficult background, any bonus scheme would have 
to allow for constant changes in the constitution of the 
gangs of men who performed the .multitudinous and constantly: 
fluctuating duties involved in the manufacturing processes. 
Under such circumstances, the datum line for output 
had to be fixed in relation to a period long enough for 
these fluctuations to cancel out, so the management 
budgeted for a full twelve months ahead, setting miniiiuzn 
monthly targets for all the firm's products. These 
monthly targets varied according to the known variations 
in seasonal demand; for t're slack month of June the 
target was only 200 tons, whereas 600 tons was the 
standard for t' ,.e peak months of the spring. The 
arrange.nent was that if these monthly targets were 
reached, an output bonus was paid each week during the 
following month - for men receiving the "responsibility 
bonus" it was 10/- per week, for others 7/6d. Thus, the 
wade bonus was paid. for 200 tons in a slack month as for 
ßi00 in a busy month, but it was exalined to the meni that 
their ability to reach the despatch target in the busy 
months depended largely upon the building up of stocks 
in the :aonths of low demand. 
The scheme proved to be successful from the start, 
and in four years monthly targets were only missed twice, 
despite difficulties like shortages of raw materials, 
plant breakdowns through war -time wear, and so on. 
Perhaps the greatest gain of the scheme was the steady 
reduction in overtime which it brought about by 
stipulating output during normal working hours. 
There was, however, a natural tendency for output 
to settle down at the monthly targe figures, and in 
order to keep the incentive alive an "extra output bonus" 
was instituted. For the busier months, 600 tons was 
the monthly target, that is 150 tons per week. If this 
weekly target was exceeded, a sliding scale of bonus 
Summary. 
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payments came into operation, e.g. 
151 -160 tons 
161 -170 " 
171 -180 " 
and so on. 
ls. Od. per day. 




A lower scale applied to men not qualified for 
"responsibility bonus "; this started at 8d. per day 
extra and went up in ld. stages for each ten tons extra 
output. 
This supplementary scheme, too, has proved. quite 
successful in three years' working, and the average bonus 
is quite substantial. Over the five years during which 
the incentive schemes have been built up, output has 
increased by 125 per cent, and, depite wage increases and 
shorter hours, labour costs per ton have either fallen or 
kept steady year by year. The firm has found it easier 
to secure suitable employees owing to the existence of the 
incentives, and, furthermore, labour turnover has been 
substantially reduced. 
Experience gained in these and inanny other schemes 
enables a summing -up of the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of production bonuses to be made. First 
of all, as compared with daywork, group bonuses, like 
individual piece -work, give a definite financial incentive 
to increase output. Like individual piece -work again, 
however, there are disadvantages - there is the same 
2G 
emphasis on quantity rather than quality, and the same 
friction over rate- fixing. Perhaps problems of rate -fixing 
are less severe with group than individual piece -work for, 
although standards do have to be set, these need not be so 
exacting, for the figures of output will be averaged over a 
number of men, and "loose" and "tight" rates will tend to 
cancel out. Some protagonists of collective systems go 
further, however, and contend that they obviate the necessity 
for cutting piece -rates, but the validity of this contention 
is doubtful. Under piece -work, rate- cutting usually arises 
for one of the following reasons: (a) avarice of employer. 
(b-} changeof method or material, (c) mistake in calculation, 
or (a) rate too high for competitive working. As for the 
first, if this attitude of mind exists it will work out its 
purposes whatever the system may be. As for the remaining 
three reasons, they all result in the sane thing, namely a 
cost structure which is considered.' to be too high for 
competitive working. The position is fundamentally the same 
whether individual piece -work or production bonus is in 
operation - sortie way out of the impasse must be found, either 
by cutting rates, or in the case of production bonus by 
raising the basic - output or cutting the percentage 
bonus. 
The answer to the problem lies not in a choice 
between 
individual or collective systems, but in the accurate 
fixation of piece -rates or operation times. 
If rates are 
fixed accurately (e.g. by time and motion study) the 
third and 
fourth reasons for rate - cutting will not arise, and if 
2fie 
methods are changed so that operation firms are reduced, a 
direct comparison can be made with t e previous assessment, 
and rates can be adjusted without incurring a charge of 
arbitrary rate - cutting. 
The great advantage claimed for collective systems is 
that they promote team -work; it has been said of individual 
piece -work; "If an individual gets on better and snakes a 
better showing by setting another chap back a bit, that is 
in the game too - or at least it is in the nature of the 
incentive that he shall as readily do that as advance his 
own case in any other way. We cannot look under - individual 
incentives for the development of any wide spirit of co- 
operation. It is definitely an instrument of developing an 
attitude of each for himself. "(1) It has been clearly 
shewn in the examples quoted that production bonuses 
emphasise the "one -ness" of the whole organisation, and the 
paramount need for co- operation in achieving a com.ion 
purpose. The bonus is paid not only to direct workers, but 
also to executives, supervisors, inspectors, tool -men, 
maintenance staffs and so on, in recognition of the fact 
that all have contributed to the increase in output. Where- 
as under individual piece -work for direct workers, there is 
the ever -present proble.a of how to compensate indirect 
workers for their extra effort which, ho ever, cannot be 
measured, (2) under collective systems this problem does 
(1) H.S. Dennison: "Incentives for Executives ". 
(American Management Association) 
(2) Vide Appendix "H ". 
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does not arise. Again, individual incentives may make 
the slower workers feel rese nful towards their more 
efficient fellow workers who earn higher wages and. who 
may cause the employer to c>>t the rate. With a group 
incentive, however, all the members of the group have a 
common objective, and.'team -work is given a definite 
financial encouragaent. Mention has already been made 
of the experience of the Merseyside firm which found 
that individual piece -work led to constant ill -feeling 
between the girl operatives working on the same bench, 
but earning widely different piece -work bonuses; when 
group schale was introduce( this, 'fficult:- disappeared 
and óvtrut was substantially increased. 
On the other hand, many employers contend that 
group incentives tend to reduce the good men to the 
average level. There is really no moral. or economic 
reason why "A" who is a skilled, keen and conscientious 
worker should have to "caï iy a passenger" in the person 
of p,,, who is a slacker, as is liable to happen under 
a collective system where every employee gets the same 
percentage bonus whether or not he works hard as 
compared with his fellows. The device of the 
responsibility bonus" already mentioned iay, however, 
help to meet this difficulty. A large Scottish firm of 
electrical and mechanical engineers uses group piece- 
work for certain types of work which lend themselves more 
readily to collective than individual system. It has 
2B5 
been found, however, that the best worker is penalised by 
the smaller output of the less efficient worker, and whereas 
the better workera prefer individual piece -work, the less 
efficient prefer the collective method. 
A further objection to collective systems is that their 
appeal is far less direct and powerful than that of individ- 
ual piece -work. It is well -known that the main reason for 
the small polls in Government and mi.niciapl Elections is 
frequently that the individual feels that his small 
contribution cannot make much difference either way to the 
result of the election; he forgets that the whole is made 
up of the awn of the parts. Similarly, in a factory 
employing the collective system of payment -by- results; 
the individual worker is inclined to feel that his 
contribution cannot appreciably affect the output of the 
firm as a whole, and the incentive value is consequently 
much less than that of the individual system under which a 
worker's pay packet depends entirely upon his own individual 
of orts. The collective an thod seems to suffer in many 
ways from the same defect as the tine-rate system, for a 
flat rate of bonus is paid to all, irrespective of 
individual differences in output. 
Thus the choice depends largely upon the nature of the 
work; if the :iaximu:n incentive is required and individual 
output can be measured, individual piece -work is to be 
preferred. Where, however, jobs are interdependent and 
teem -work needs to be encouraged, grou-2 incentives may 
more fully meet the need. There is this to be said for 
group incentives; much of our modern industrial work is 
highly monotonous, owing to the ever- increasing use of 
mach -very and the specialisation of labour down to the 
smallest details. It is possible that group incentives 
may act as an antidote to this monotony by providing a 
new interest for all the members of the group, giving them 
a "sense of purpose" and uniting than in the fulfilment 
thereof. Group incentives may be the answer to one of 
the most difficult problems of the machine -age, developing 
an "esprit de corps" in industry, satisfying the naturally 
gregarious nature of man, and giving to highly specialised, 
repetitive workers a sense of "belonging" to some purpose 
bigger than themselves. All these may restore to the 
worker some of the satisfactions of the old craftsmanship 




Merit rating is an attempt to assess the real value 
of an employee to his firm and the resultant merit rates 
are payments made in excess of the recognised base rates 
as a reward for the }personal merit of the particular 
workers to whom they apply. They are something more 
than the ''ability" rates common in the engineering industry 
although the basic principle is the same. Frequently in 
this industry workers of particular ability or-reliability 
are paid an extra rate of so many pence per hour, the 
recommendation usually corning from the foreman to the 
.works manager. 
The sane practice is common in shipbuilding, where 
workers are scattered all over the ship and will freáuenV 
be working alone in places where the exercise of strict 
supervision is difficult if not impossible. In such 
circumstances reliability and a conscientious attitude to 
work are obviously of great importance, and workers who 
chew these traits are paid ability rates. 
Such payments were adopted in other trades during 
the Second World War,. but it was commonly held that once 
a worker had qualified for an ability rate, he had 
proved his skill, and the rate should not subsequently 
be with drawn. This is alien to the true principles 
of 
merit rating, in which it is the current merit of the 
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individual which matters, and the rate may be varied either 
upwards or d)wnwards, according to certain well- defined 
standards. 
Robert Owen It appears that Robert Owen, the social reformer and 
(1771 -1858) 
cotton mill.owner of New Lanark, should be credited with 
being the first industrialist tgitevelop a scheme of merit 
rating, on the basis of a set of "character books ". In 
this book were recorded daily reports upon the employee and 
his work, and the results were displayed in visual form 
through the medium of "character blocks ". These were 
wooden blocks, the six sides of which were coloured differ- 
ently, each colour representing an evaluation of the employee 
ranging from bade to excellent. These blocks were displayed 
each day on the worker's bench so that he - and anyone else 
in the workshop - could see by the colour lying uppermost 
into which merit category he had been placed on the basis 
of the previous day's work. 
ClothinE This simple type of merit rating has been adapted to 
Manufacture. 
their own particular needs by a large English finn of 
overall :Manufacturers. Piece -work having been tried, this 
method was discarded owing to the very large number of op- 
erations which went into a made up garment like a boiler 
suit; rate -fixing for these required much detailed 
calculation and, even v th mechanical calculators, it was 
found that a large wages staff was necessary. Point 
premium plans were also discarded in favour of a weekly 
base rate, plus a bonus on output, plus merit pay. 
When a girl machinist attains a certain standard of . merit 
she receives a badge, which carries an addition to her 
wage- packet. There are various grades of badge, e. g. 
"Improving ", "Efficient ", "High Grade ", "Excellent," 
"Super", and so on, each carrying a higher merit rate than 
the one preceding it. A girl may be demoted as well as 
promoter, and the scheme has been fouhd to work well, 
having been extended to other workerqin addition to the 
women machinists, viz. male cutters, stockroom staff, 
male packers and male machinists. Although there has 
been no perceptible increase in the quantity of output, 
there has undoubtedly been an improvement in quality, and 
a greater sense of satisfaction among both .management and 
employees. 
Although the origins of merit rating go back as far 
as the middle of the nineteenth century, there was little 
further development until after the First World War, and 
then it was mainly confined to the United States, In 
Civil Service,this country, the civil service has long used a form of 
merit rating for the purpose of selecting candidates 
for promotion. There is an "Annual Report Form" upon 
which an assessment is made of the candidate's (1) 
knowledge, (2) personality and force of character, (3) 
judgment, (4) power of taking responsibility, (5) 
initiative, (6) accuracy, (7) address an tact, (8) power 
of supervising staff, (9) zeal, and (10) official condud.t 
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The values attached to the various qualities are weighted 
according to the post for whiòh promotion is being 
considered. Judgment is made as to whther the officer is 
(a) eminently suited for special and early promotion, 
(b) fitted for promotion but not for exceptional promotion, 
or (c) not fitted for promotion at present. 
This, however, is merit rating merely for promotion. 
:purposes, and formal merit rating for the granting of 
special enhanced rates of pay is still in its early stages 
so far as this country is concerned. In the United 
States of America development has been much more rapid, 
and in some states merit rating is compulsory for 
government servants, and highly complicated rating scales 
and schedules are employed. A recent American survey(1) 
reported that 52 per cent of the companies covered were 
employing some kind of merit rating plan. 
No comparable figures aré available for this country, 
but so far as this present survey is concerned only 6 
per cent of finis reported that they were using merit - 
rating, and this disparity is an indication of the 
tardiness of British employers to adopt this technique. 
Some employers argued that rating was not worth while, and 
could not be done satisfactorily, but some kind of rating 
is essential and is undertaken by every employer at some 
time or another. Iie rates "his employees, to all 
intents and purposes, every time he promotes one man 
instead of another, gives one man a pay increase instead 
(1) Scott, Clothier, Mathewson and Spriegel: "Personnel 
Management" (U.S.A.) 1940. 
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of another, or in any way changes the relative status of 
various individuals. He expresses by those actions his 
over -all judgment of the relative standing of the various 
individuals who have received different treatment. The 
only question which needs to be answered is whether 
employers shall rate employees on a haphazard basis 
or whether they shall rate employees systematically, 
regularly, objectively, and as accurately as possible.''(1) 
Gaining It is inevitable, however, that if the merit rating 
Co-operation. 
plan is to take into account all the relevant factors 
which make up employee- value, some highly subjective and 
intangible factors will have to be assessed, despite the 
fact that there can be no precisely accurate methods of 
doing so. Although this is one of the difficulties, it 
is also one of the justifications for merit rating, for 
the chief advantage of the method is that it formalises the 
opinions of supervisors regarding their staffs, and 
provides some tangible basis for measuring those subjective 
but highly important qualities contributing to employee - 
value. 
Because of this difficulty - if for not other reason 
- the full co- operation of all, management, supervision 
and workers alike, in the administration of the 
merit 
rating plan is of fundamental importance. It is 
obvious 
(1) H. C. Taylor: "Problems of Ste cting 
and Evaluating 
Employees" in the "Engineering Bulletin ", Extension 
Series 43, vol. 23, number 3 (U.S.A.) 1938. 
Trade Union 
Attitude. 
that the rating scheme :oust be fair, both in design and in 
operation. Not only so, but it must also be recognised 
by the workers as being fair, and for this reason it must 
be simple to understand. There is a great danger that 
the framers of the scheme may be tempted to introduce 
refinements and complications to such an extent that the 
scheme becomes incomprehensible to the ordinary workînan, 
perhaps even to the supervisors who have to make the ratint,. 
It most be remembered that the shop supervisor cannot be 
expected to be au fait with the latest developments in 
rating techniques, and yet he must be able to make an 
assessment which will not cause dissatisfaction, or be open 
to criticism. There is always the danger that the rating 
may become arbitrary, and as far as possible assessments 
should be based. on measurable factors; the unsatisfactory 
rating of intangibles leads to great difficulties and 
dangers, and may set up irritations which will result in 
loss of production or goodwill. 
The general principle of trade union policy is that of 
"the rate for the job ", that is that there should be no 
difference in rate of pay between different workers perform- 
ing the sane task. In point Of fact this principle cannot 
be pursued to its logical conclusion; wherever systems of 
payment -by- results exist, differentiation occurs. In any 
case the principle is an unsatisfactory one, for there can 
be no doubt that the value of employees to their employer 
does vary; one man is more highly skilled, more 
lixarnnle. 
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conscientious, a faster worker, than another, and 
consciously or unconsciously both employers and workers 
themselves are constantly making this kind of comparison. 
As we have already seen, this is a foin of merit -rating 
in which every employer who makes promotions has to 
indulge, so that there is really nothing novel in the idea. 
A for,nai merit rating scheme, however, has the advantage 
that instead of the rating being done piece -meal and 
without any standards of judgluent, it is done systematic- 
ally upon agreed standards, and therefore is fairer to all 
concerned. 
If this is demonstrated to the workers, and they know 
that they stand to gain financially by its introduction, 
merit rating schemes have a better chance of ready 
acceptance. It should be emphasised that no employee 
will receive less than the recognised rate for the job, 
whether this be a.statutotrr rate or a negotiated one, and 
that everyone will have tre chance of earning.a higher 
wage based on the merit rating plan. It is of the 
utmost importance that the full confidence of the staff 
should be secured by giving them full details of the 
scheme beforè it is introduced, and allowing difficulties 
to be thoroughly thrashed out if and when they arise. 
For example, in the case of a large firm of tyre 
manufacturers in the South of England, an explanatory 
leaflet is handed to all employees pointing out that the 
well -being of the Yorkers and the comapny are really inter- 
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dependent. The leaflet goes on to explain how, under 
the merit rating plan known as the "Co- operative Award 
Scheme," every employee will be individually rewarded 
according to his or her own personal efforts. Before 
the scheine was ever introduced it was fully discussed 
at-meetings held between the management and represent- 
atives of the employees. These representatives were 
elected departmentally, in the proportion of one 
representative for every ten emDloyees. At the 
meetings these employee representatives were asked to 
pass on the infor_nation to their "constituencies ", and 
in this way every de'artment and every working shift 
received a detailed explknation of the scheme. The 
workers were encouraged to criticise the plan and 
offer their suggestions,and the management expressed 
their willingness to answer any questions which night 
be raised by employees. Finally, each representative 
was asked to state whether or not his "constituents" 
were prepared to support the scheme, and it was found 
that there was a hundred per cent acceptance of the 
plan in its final form. 
It is necessary to ensure the co- operation of not 
only the workers themselves, but also of the management 
and the supervisors, who wilJ,tiave the ultimate 
responsibility of doing; the actual rating. There may 
be a certain amount of sce_7ticisrri on the part of the 
sùpervisors regarding the practicability of rating, 
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and meetings must be held with representatives of the top 
management at which the working of the scheme can be out- 
lined to those who will have to do the practical work. 
FinoA_ly, full co- operation from the supervision cannot be 
expected. unless the scheme is simple enough for them to under- 
stand. 
Working out The n urpose of _lerit rating has already been defined 
the Scheme 
(i) Factors as the rewarding of each employee according tcyñ_is or her 
to be 'rated.. 
employee -value during .he period under review. In order 
l4unber 
that this: may be done, the component factors of employee - 
value must be deeded upon, together with tilir relative 
Lriportance for each different type of employment, so that 
due weight may be given to those most essential. 
In the .:Merit rating scheme in operation in a large 
box -making concern, the following factors are taken into 
consideration: (1) quantity of output, (2) quality of out- 
put, (3) versatility, that is, willingness and d)ility to 
switch over from one job to another, (4) diligence, that is, 
conscientiously starting the job at the appointed time and 
working up to the recognised finishing time without wasting 
time and (5) time -keeping. 
The number of qualities to be rated should be kept as 
small as possible, otherwise the scheme becomes unwieldy in 
its construction and costly in its administration. There 
can be no categorical definition of the number which 
should 
be incorporated; this will vary with the type of employment, 
ale:ction. 
but the number of qualities considered will usually be 
greater in the case of a supervisor than in the case of an 
ordinary worker, and the rating of an executive will be 
more comprehensive than that of a supervisor. In 
attenping to keep down the number of factors to be rated, 
however, care must be taken not to amalgamate several 
distinct and important qualities. For example, in one 
existing scheme, one of the factors rated is entitled 
"Work ", a term vh ich includes at least two distinct and 
vitally important factors, namely quantity on the one hand 
and quality on the other. The opposite mistake is sane.- 
times made, and overlapping qualities are enumerated. On 
one merit rating form, for example, appear these two 
factors (1) co- operativeness, and (2) attitude to work; 
the rater might well ask where the one ends and the other 
begins. 
Not only will the number of qualities rated vary from 
job to job, but also the slé ction of qualities for rating, 
and where the whole staff comes within the merit rating 
scheme, several schedules will be required. In the rating 
of supervisors, for example, consideration will have to be 
given to such factors as powers of leadership, initiative, 
organising ability, whereas for the ordinary workmen, skil], 
diligence, care of tools and materials, and so on:,_ will be 
the relevant factors. The desirable qualities will be 
different again for executives, research workers, sales 
representatives and others whose work brings them into 
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close contact with the actual or potential customers of the 
finn, In every case, only those qualities which are 
relevant to, and important in, the particular job to be 
rated should be included in the scale. 
(ii) Weighting Although only relevant and important factors should be 
the Factors. 
considered in each case, there will inevitably be differ- 
ences in the relative importance of the various factors in 
different jobs. The usual procedure is to weight the 
factors according to their estimated significance for each 
type of work, be it executive, supervisory or manual. For 
example, a firm of electrical Zaiufacturers has a merit 
rating scheme in which the various factors considred are 
weighted thus : - 
Quality of work 25 ?Der cent 
Speed of work 20 " 
Attendance and 
punctua3ity 20 
Reliability 10 " 
Initiative 10 
Care of tools and 
materials 5 
Social attitude 5 " 
Safety 5 " 
Total 100 per cent 
Supervisors are rated on a different scale, in which 1000 
points cover: - 
Leadership qualities 250 
Job knowledge 200 
Versatility 100 
Co- operation 100 
Self - improvement 150 
Willingness to accent 
responsibility. 





Promotions and salary increaser are based on the results of 
this rating scheme. 
These two scales within the one firm illustrate how 
different types of job require different qualities, and how 
the relative importance of these qualities varies from one 
type of work to another. In this particular fina, the 
selection and weighting of the factors was jointly agreed 
upon by equal numbers of employee and management represent- 
atives, meeting in the Joint Works Council. 
(iii) GraduatinF, Once the qualities to be rated have been chosen, some 
the Scales. 
kind. of scale must be provides' upon which the rater can 
indicate the degree to which the employee possesses and 
displays each quality in his work. There is an endless 
variety of types of scale; in some the rater inserts against 
each factor a percentage figure representing his eEtimate of 
the degree of that factor possessed by the employee being 
rated. This does not give the rater very much guidance, 
and leaves room for wide differences of judgment as between 
one rater and another. Then again, the number of graduatiop 
(100 possible steps) is large and these very fine discrim- 
inations are really quite impossible for the rater to make 
In the majority of schemes, therefore, the graduations 
are comparatively few, and are described. in words rather 
than indicated. by percentages, as in the case of t')e two 
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scales reproduced. herewith, (1) t',e one for shop operatives or 
routine clerks, the other for a shop supervisor: - 
Example: (a) Shop Operative or Routine Clerk. 
Unsatisfactory Quality Excellent Good Average Poor 
Quality of Work 125 100 75 50 25 
Quantity of Work 100 80 60 40 20 
Job Knowledge 100 80 60 40 20 
Adaptability 75 50 45 30 15 
Dependability 50 40 30 20 10 
Attitude 50 40 30 20 10 
Total 500 400 300 200 100 
Example: (b) Shoo Supervisor. 
Quality Excellent Good Average Poor Unsatisfactory 
Accuracy 150 120 90 60 30 
Job Knowledge 125 100 75 50 25 
Speed 100 80 60 40 20 
Reliability 50 40 30 20 10 
Tact 50 40 30 20 10 
Attitude 25 20 15 10 5 
Total 500 400 300 200 100 
Words such as "excellent ", "good'', "average ", "poor" 
and "unsatisfactory ", whilst they are universally understood, 
and give the rater much dore guidance than mere percentages, 
may yet have quite different constructions put upon them by 
different ratet. The same problem of language interpret- 
ation is present in connection with the titles given to the 
various qualities; two raters might have totally different 
conceptions of what is ,leant by "at'itude to work ", or 
"co- o17)erativeness ". For these reasons, some merit rating 
schedules have full descriptions appended to each grade of 
(1) Vide also Appendix "F" (1) 
 `1- 
quality;l) and sometimes even descriptions of the quality 
ittq f. This is an admirable refinement in that it is more 
likely to result in consistent interpretations by the raters: 
than if merely single words are employed. When the 
descriptions are being evolved there is afforded an 
excellent opportunity for formalising the interpretations 
among the raters by taking them into conference on this 
important issue. Lescriptions which are jointly agreed 
upon by the people who are actually to do the rating are 
likely to be better understood by them, and they in turn 
are likely therefore to give more consistent interpretations 
of those descriptions. 
(iv) Calculating The amount of bonus payable depends upon the total 
the Boni s. 
number of points awarded to the individual. It must be 
emphasised that this total "score" must not be regarded as 
a mathematical calculation of the employee's value to the 
firm; the score secured on each quality has been based 
merely on a raters, personal judgment, subject to all the 
fallibility of human nature, so that the total score cannot 
be any more accurate than the sum of these individual 
assessments. Consequently, the same caveat must be entered 
here as in the case of factor graduations - over -fine 
discriminations are impracticable, and the employees should 
be placed into a comparatively few groups in which all are 
regarded as roughly equal. These groups correspond to 
steps in the bonus scale, the lowest step esualling the 
iu iniruun consolidated rate for the job. 
(1) Vide Appendix "; "'(2) and (3) 
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For example, in the case of the two rating scales given 
above (Examples (a) and (b)) the scores of an unsatisfactory, 
poor, average, good and excellent employee would be 
respectively 10 i, 200, 300, 400 and 500. The following is 
the bonus scale applicable in this case: - 
Points Groin 
Bonus: % on 
base rate 
100 to 150 




15 per cent 
251 to 350 3 30 " 
351 to 450 4 45 " 
451 and over 5 60 
It will be seen that an average worker, scoring 300 points, 
would recc ive a bonus of 30 Der cent over his time wage, an 
increase comparable to that usually given to an average L 
worker on the piece -rate system. The datum line at which 
bonus first becomes payable is at 151 points, and this may be 
criticised on the grounds that bonus should not be paid to a 
worker whose assessment is somewhere between "unsatisfactory" 
and "poor ". On the other hand, the datum line should not be 
fixed at the half -m añ level, otherwise only those workers 
who are above the average would earn bonus, and this would 
be neither fair nor acceptable.' It is better to err on the 
side of generosity, and if men get low scores, move them to 
more suitable jobs. In thisway there is a strong incentive 
to reach above the average level of proficiency, 
On the rating schedule are spaces for certain details(1) (v) Sumning- 
regarding the employee concerned - his name, number, 
(1) Vide Appendix "F'ß(3) and (4) 
occupation and department - and concerning the rater, his 
name, signature, how long he has known the employee, and 
the date of the rating. In addition, some schedules 
contain such questionsl) for the rater as: "Is this 
person suitable for promotion ? "; "Is he improving, 
stationary, deteriorating ? "; Is he suited to the type of 
work he is doing: If not, for what other type ?" This 
method forces the rater to canalise the impressions he has 
gathered. of the employee, and for.iulate these into 
conclusions which will be a valuable guide when promotion 
problems come up for solution, or when a man seems to be 
unsatisfactory in a certain type of work. 
Aaministerina Some of the problems involved in evolving a 
the Scheme. 
satisfactory merit rating scheme have been discussed above; 
there remain to the considered sundry problems of 
administration. 
Frequency of First of all it must be decided how frequently the 
Pating. 
rating is to take place; as it is the current value of the 
employee which is to be considered, clearly the rating 
Process must be a continuing: one. Very frequent- ratings, 
however, involve a considerable and unnecessary addition 
to administrative costs, so the majority of finis rate at 
either six -monthly or twelve -monthly intervals. 
Some companies rate all their employees at one time 
in the year, whilst others bring each employee up for 
ratin 
(1) Vide Appendix "F "(4). 
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on the anniversary of his appointment on the staff, thus 
snreading the task of rating over the whole year. The 
latter method makes it easier for the Caters and. enables 
then to give more time to each man, than if they had to do 
hundreds of ratings at the one time; in such circumstances 
there is always a danger that under the pressure of monotony . 
and boredom the raters will rush their work and produce 
unsatisfactory results. On the other hand, if all the 
employees are rated at the sane time, there is a greater 
likelihood of all the ratings being made on the same standard, 
since comparisons between employees can more readily be made 
when all are being examined together. This tendency is 
strengthened by the fact that raters can rate one quality at 
a time for all the employees. As the instructions of one 
fine to its raters read: "When you have rated the first 
employee for this first quality, tur'over to the report for 
the next employee and rate him for the same quality. 
Work through the reports, rating the first quality for all 
your employees; then rate than all fòr the second quality a 
so on until you have rated all your employees for all the 
listed qualities. "(1) This method has two major advantages, 
namely (a) that proper comparisons can be made between 
employees regarding the same quality, and (b) that there 
is 
less likelihood of personal likes and dislikes affecting 
the overall rating of any one employee. 
(1) Vide Appendix "F "(4) 
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91 anisation Bef >re the sche:ie is launched the officers who are to 
of Ratirn ;. 
do the rating dust be wade fully conversant with it; they 
must be familiar with the form, method of scoring, standards 
to be observed, and action to be taken following the assess- 
ment. Instructions may well be brought continually before 
the raters by their being printed on the back of the rating 
forma, as in the example reproduced in Appendix "F"(3) and 
(4). Care should be taken to see that 'personal feelings of 
raters do not distort their findings, but that the set 
standards are iii fact strictly adhered to. In this 
connection it is important that all the raters put the sane 
interpretation upon these standards, and for this reason 
f requent conferences of those concerned in the administration 
of the scheme are eminently desirable. Practice ratings 
might be .made at such conferences, and comparisons wade 
between the findings of the different raters. 
A much debated question is as to who shall do the actual 
rating. Obviously it must be someone who has known the 
employee and his work intimately over a sufficiently long 
period of time to be dle to make a fair and accurate 
assessment of his abilities and worth, and this person 
is 
normally the employee's immediate supervisor. It is, 
then, 
usual for this officer to do the initial rating, but 
wherever possible it is desirable for a check rating 
to be 
Cone by some other individual also failiar with 
the employee 
in order that bias :nay be eliminated, standards regularised, 
. and results rendered more homogeneous. 
One firm in the electrical trade, for exanple, has a 
scheme in which three independent ratings of each employee 
are carried out by the foreanan,- a senior executive, and a 
director respectively. The three raters then discuss their 
findings and decide upon an agreed figure for each quality 
and for the total assessment. In another firm in the motor 
trade, the rating of the worker's immediate supervisor is 
scrutinised by a panel consisting of the works manager, 
the depart;tental supervisor, the foreman or chargehand 
concerned, and the personnel officer, the final assessment 
being made by this body. A great advantage of the coïmnittee 
method is that the interplay of several minds considering the 
same problem tends to iron out differences and give more 
reliable results. Again, the rater is less likely to allow 
his own likes and dislikes to enter into his rating, for he 
will have to justify his assessment before a critical 
committee. Ultimately, 'owever, the only person who can 
perform the major part of the rating is the employee's 
immediate supervisor, and his conclusions should carry most 
weight in the final assessment. 
. noloyee- In many cases, if the employee wishes, he is allaed to 
discussion. 
see his merit rating schedule and to have the opportunity of 
discussing it with some official such as the personnel 
manager. This has the merit of providing the opportunity 
for frank discussion on either side, and the employee is 
Conclusions. 
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enabled to see where he has come short of the desired 
standard if such should be the case. This practice is 
much less common in the United States than it is in this 
country, but it seems to be eminently desirable, for if 
the employee is denied the opportunity of knowing the 
details of his assessment he will naturally conclude that 
the management has something to hide; in such circumstances 
ill -feeling and suspicion are almost bound to arise. The 
only good reason for not allowing such investigation is 
that the management is not confident of the soundness of 
the scheie or the dp ility of its raters, and if this be 
true the remedy lies in the improvement of the scheme or 
its administration rather than in the maintenance of an 
"iron curtain" of secrecy. There is no doubt that in all 
departments of management and industrial relations the 
less secrecy and the more frankness there are, the better 
are relations likely to be, 
One of the major disadvantages of payment -by- results 
is its emphasis on quantity rather than quality, and it 
is the peculiar virtue of merit rating that it redresses 
this balance by taking into consideration not only 
quantity of output but all those other factors which go 
to increase "employee - value ". A Scottish chocolate 
manufacturing finn, for exaaple, employs a straight piece- 
work system for those repetitive, routine tasks in which 
quality control is simple, but has a system of merit 
rating for the skilled process workers who are engaged 
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in the actual composition of the confectionery where quality 
is more important than quantity. A tyre manufacturing 
company has adopted merit rating because it is the skill and 
conscientious work of the individual employee which is the 
vital factor in tyre production; although the materials can 
be tested and the processes scientifically controlled, yet 
it is the work of the tyre builder which makes or mars the 
final product. Again, it is not possible to test a tyre after 
manufacture; selected ones from each batch can be tested in 
the laboratory or on test cars, but it is not possible to 
test the actual tyre which goes to the customer. It is all - 
important that the finished product shotíh- be perfect because a 
slight fault in the tyre may result in a burst on the road 
causing a fatal accident. For these reasons merit rating 
has been introduced, not merely to step up production, but 
also to increase quality of workmanship and all -rou44 efficiency'; 
Another payment -by- results difficulty which merit rating 
can overcome is that of reAunerating indirect workers and 
others whose output cannot be easily measured,. merit rating 
has the advantage of flexibility, in that it can be adapted to 
any type of work, direct and indirect, manual and sedentary, 
supervisory and clerical, executive and adainistrative. The 
fact that everybody in the undertaking is embraced within the 
merit rating system is an important psychological factor in 
fostering the team spirit in industry. There is always a 
danger of friction where direct workers are paid on piece- 
work, indirect workers on time-rate, and executives perhaps 
on a profit - sharing basis. If everyone within the 
organisation is -paid according to merit and on agreed 
standards grievances of this nature are less likely to 
arise. 
Perhaps it is the greatest virtue of ;Merit rating that 
if it is properly conceived and acilinistered it can do much 
to improve morale and willingness to work conscientiously, 
since each employee knows that his work is being regularly 
assessed on agreed standards, and remunerated accordingly. 
Under ordinary conditions it is fatally easy for a supervisor 
whose de'Dartment is running reasonably smoothly to take. the 
line of least resistance and let things stagnate. 
Consequently, young and energetic workers, anxious for 
recognition and promotion, find themselves frustrated, and 
their initiative is craiped and ultimately killed. i.íerit 
rating forces supervisors to assess their subordinates 
regularly and scientifically, leading to a more consistent 
treatment of staff, and the bringing to light of latent 
talent whose ardour might otherwise have soon been dapped. 
Since the assessment is done according to well defined 
standards and precautions are taken against nepotism, merit 
rating reduces the advantage which the highly vocal, "push- 
ing" type of individual often secures over his quieter, more 
docile, but perhaps more efficient workmate. 
So long as the employee is allowed to know the details 
of his assessment, merit rating can be a valuable guide to 
workers as to where they have not come up to expectations 
and, therefore, the directions in which improve nentmay be 
sought. It can be a useful pointer also to the management 
in bringing to light vocational misfits, enablin workers to 
be placed in those occupations to which they are best suited. 
Like any other system, however, merit rating is not 
without its disadvantages and difficulties. The most obvious 
difficulty is to ensure that the rating is done accurately 
and without favouritism or personal bias. The assessment 
of subjective factors can never be scientifically accurate, 
and personal judgments can never be completely standardised. 
For these reasons the rating of the immediate supervisor 
should not be accepted without question; there must be more 
than one rating performed by people who know the employee an 
his work intimately, and a check- rating by some higher 
official, Training of supervisors in the technique of 
rating is also essential, so that they know what the 
standards are and how they should be algied. 
For a scheme of merit rating to be successful, the 
staff must have full confidence in the arrangements, and 
the value of joint consultation can hardly be over emphasise 
Mention has already been made of the desirability of having 
staff conferences before the scheme is launched, and there 
is no doubt that facilities should also be afforded to the 
workers who do not get a good rating to have their assess- 
ments explained tó hem, and if they are still aggrieved,' 
to lodge an appeal with the appropriate higher official. 
Sumeen ary. 
Otherwise they will labour under a sense of grievance, good 
relations wil],íbe destroyed, and production retarded. 
Finally, it must be admitted that _merit rating can 
never have the same strong financial incentive as a direct 
system of payment -by- results such as niece -work. The 
connection between output and remuneration is inevitably 
less direct, and this must lessen the incentive power. 
On the other hand, merit rating takes into account factors 
which go to make up employee- vaitie, and yet are ignored in 
the ordinary piece -work system. A worker may produce a 
very large output, and yet be a constant source of irrita- 
tion to his supervisors and fellow workers, so that his 
value to the firm is much less than that which is indicated 
by the .Mere :Measurement of his physical output. Whereas 
under piece -work this difference would be ignored, merit 
rating would take it into account, and the man would 
therefore have a definite financial encouragement to 
improve his behaviour in the workshop. 
To sum up, therefore, it tray be said that, although 
merit rating has not the incentive power of piece -work, 
it has the virtue of being applicable to processes in which 
measurement of output is difficult or impossible; it 
encourages the development of all the factors involved 
in employee -value and not merely quantity of output; it 
has the advantage of group incentives in that it encour- 
ages a spirit of co- operation within the plant; and it 
provides avenues for the development of the latent 
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abilities of personnel who might otherwise suffer from a 
sense of frustration and grievance. 
CHAPTER XVI. 
PROFIT- SHARING AND CO- PARTNERSHIP. 
2.3 
One of the :post unfortunate cJnsequences of the 
economic changes which followed. the Industrial Revolution 
was the tendency to regard workers Aerely as "hands ", 
appendages to machines, and their labour as a "commodity" 
to be treated like any inanimate product on the market. 
There were many who fought against this tendency at various 
times, and afonE-_ them were the "thristian Socialists" of the 
middle- nineteenth century, men like Ludlow and Vansittart 
Neal, the founders of the Society for Promoting Working- Men's 
Associations. Although the co- operative productive societies 
established by these pioneers failed to achieve real success, 
out of them was born a movement known as profit- sharing and 
co- partnership which still survives at the present time. 
The method had its on :ins, therefore, in the co- operative, 
iovement, but in the succeeding century it was adopted also 
by private enterprise, and it is with this aspect that this 
chapter is pri,:iarily concerned; developments in the co- 
operative field_ have been broadly similar to those in the 
field of private enterprise. In its evolution, the method 
has also lost its political associations with the co -oper- 
ative movement, and since the Second World. War all three 
political parties(1) have given their support to orofit- 
sharing and co- partnershop in one form or another. 
(1) Vide: "Co- partnership Today" (Conservative Party) 
Resolution passed at Liberal Party Assembly on 
22nd. April, 1948. 
"Industrial Democracy" (Labour Party) 
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Definitions. Profit - sharing; and co- partnerhsip are not synonymous, 
but the latter is a more advanced development from the 
former, and there are many varieties within each. 
Government reports(1) usually adopt the definition of 
profit - sharing which was agreed at an International 
Congress held in Paris in 1889, namely "cases in which an 
employer agrees with his employees that they shall receive 
in partial remuneration of their labour and., in addition to 
their wages, a share, fixed beforehand, in the profits 
realised. by the undertaking." The words "fixed beforehand "' 
must be emphasised; the mere giving of bonuses or 
gratuities at the discretion of .aanagement or shareholders 
without any agreed basis does not comprise a true profit - 
sharing scheme. Again, a scheme does not really merit 
the title "profit- sharing",-:unless it embraces a substatial 
proportion of the workers, and is not confined to management 
and executive staffs. 
Official sanction has been given to the definition of 
labóur co- partnership adopted by the Industrial Co- partner- 
ship Association; it reads: - 
"Co- partnenhip claims for all the workers that they 
shall share to some extent in the profits, capital, and 
control of the business in which they are employed. This 
may be stated more fully - 
(1) e.g. Board. of Trade Reports of 1894 and 1912, and 
Ministry of Labour Report of 1920; also Annual Statements 
in the "Ministry of Labour Gazette" published each year up 
to 1938. 
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(1) That the worker shall receive, in addition to the 
standard wages of the trade, some share in the final 
profits of the business or the economy of production. 
(2) That the worker shall accumulate his share of profit, 
or part thereof, in the capital of the business. 
(3) That the worker shall acnuire some share in the 
control of the business in one or both of the two 
following ways: - 
(a) By acquiring share capital, and thus gaining the 
ordinary rights and responsibikities of a shareholder; 
(b) By the formation of a co- partnership committee of 
workers, having a voice in the internal management." 
Development. The development of the profit - sharing and co- 
partnership movement has been slow and has had a somewhat 
chequered history.. Until 1929 the movement continued to 
expand, although not steadily; there were many ups and 
downs, and interest seems to have been greatest when trade 
was goon but industrial relations bad. "At such times 
there seems to be a recurring tendñecy on the part of the 
employers to resort to the expedient of profit- sharing as 
a possible remedy for the unrest. "(1) 
After 1929 interest flagged, and the number of schemes 




Although new scheues were started during this period, 
(1) Board of*`rrade Report, 1920. 
(2) Vide Appendix "G"(1) 
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their nu°ibers did not make up for those that were abandoned, 
and in 1938 (the latest year for which statistics are available 
there were known tibe 399 undertakings practising profit - 
sharing, the approximate number of workers entitled to 
participate in the schemes being 261,000. The number of 
schemes in that year was 404, larger than the number of firms 
because some companies operated more than one scheme. About 
430,000 workpeople were employed in the businesses having 
profit - sharing schemes, representing a little over two per 
cent of the employed. population. The differente between 
this figure and the number entitled to participate in the 
schemes (261,000) isgely accounted for by the fact that in 
many cases employees share in profits only if they deposit 
savings with the firm, or purchase shares in the undertaking. 
Then too, there are usually nualifications for participation, 
such as the attainment of a certain agem or employment for a 
minimum number of years. 
(1) 
',lndonments. The decline since 1929 in the number of schemes operating 
has been so severe that by 1938 there were only about three - 
quarters as many as there had been ten years previously. ThiS 
decline is not due to any lack of new scheges but rather to 
the number of existing schemes which have been abandoned. 
Leaving consideration of co- operative societies aide, by 1938, 
(1) Source of statistics: "Ministry of Labour Gazette" August 
(2) In addition, 19 schemes had ceases.: to count as 
1939. 
separate schemes owing to the amalgamation or transfer of 
undertakings which formerly had separate schemes. Thus the 
number of schemes still operating in private firms in 1938 
was 261. (Vide next »age. ) 
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691 schemes were known to have been started, and of these 
411 ha5. been discontinued.t2) 
This is a very high rate of abandonnent, although of 
course the figure is cumulative. The princiT11 reason for' 
abandonment has been lack of profits anC_ success in the 
business (26 per cent of total abandonments); other 
important reasons have been apathy of employees or 
dissatisfaction of employers with results (21 per cent); 
changes in or transfer of business (13 per cent); 
enterprise abandoned, death of employer, liquidation of 
business, etc. (12 per cent); substitution of increased 
wages, shorter hours, or other benefits (12 per cent); 
and dissatisfaction of employees (4 per cent}. 
lti7)loyees The dark picture is to some extent relieved by the 
Participating. 
fact that the steady decrease evident in the figures of 
the number of schemes is not found in those relating to 
the number of employees participating. Although there 
was a sharp decline from 267,000 to 223,000 during the 
depression- years, after 193 there was a steady increase 
until by 1937 the 1929 position had almost been regained 
(265,000). This was, however, the peak of the climb, 
for in the next year the number fell to 261,000, and one 
can only guess what would have happened had not the War 
intervened. 
Bonuses Paid. A similar trend is evident in the figures of bonuses 
Paid each year. The average percentage fell from 5.7 in 
(2) Vide previous page. 
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1930 to 5.2 in 1932, and then rose steadily to 6.1 in 1937. 
There was a drop in 1938 in this figure also - to 5.9 
per cent, the. average amount of bonus paid or credited in 
that year being £12.10.9d. per head. 
Oas Industry. The high -light oaf the co- partnership picture is in the 
gas industry. Although the number of finns operating; 
profit- sharing schemes is only a very small proportion of 
the total firms in all industries, a considerable proportion 
of undertakings in the gas industry have been consistently 
successful in the co- partnership field. Whereas in all 
industries taken together some 60 per cent of the schemes 
started have been abandoned, of 81 schemes started by gas 
undertakings up to 1938, only 12 had been discontinued, 
whilst 24 had been in operation for more than twenty -;five 
years. Half of the capital invested in gas undertakings 
is subject to profit- sharing. 
The South Metropolitan Gas Company was the first gas 
undertaking; to adopt% artnership; this was in 1894, but 
a profit - sharing scheme had been in operation during the 
previous five years. The eployees' bonus is derived from 
the "surplus profits" available after a dividend at the 
rate of £5 per cent. per annum has been paid on the 
ordinary stock. These surplus profits are shared thus: 
three quarters to consumers to the fonn of reduced prices, 
one -eighth to shareholders as additional dividend, and one- 
eighth to employees within. the )rofit- sharing scheme. 
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The bonus is distributed on a pro rata salary or wages 
basis; half is credited to the employee's deposit account 
and there earns interest; the other half is invested 
in the company's stock on behalf of the employee. The 
money in the deposit account can only be withdrawn in 
spaial circumstances, but it may be used for the purchase- of 
more stock. If there is no surplus stock available from 
employees who have left or died, the company buys it in 
the open inarket, but certain restrictions are placed upon 
the employees' right to dispose of their stock holdings. 
By the end of 1943 the bonuses paid to employees under this 
scheme had amounted to £1, b15, 287, and employees' stock 
holdings stood at £559,360. 
In this way employees not only share in profits, but 
also in ownership and control. There is a Committee of 
Management, under the chairmanship of the Compa'ny's Presidert 
with 35 members nominated by the Board of Directors and 36 
elected by the employees. There are service and stock- 
holding qualifications for nominators and nominees, and at 
its monthly meetings the committee acts in a consultative 
capacity on matters rahging from wages and welfare to 
general company policy. Three employees serve on the Board 
of Directors1 candidates for this office must have 14 
years service with the company and. hold £180 worth of stock. 
The success of this -pioneer scheme, led the way for a 
considerable expansion of co- partnership in the gas 
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industry, and the method has worked more satisfactorily here 
than in any other sphere. There are, no doubt, good. reasons 
for this success; gas undertakings are of the nature of 
public utilities, with a steady demand for their product, 
so that their stock is not liable to any great fluctuations 
in value, and the level of profits is fairly steady, 
circumstances which are particularly well- suited to profit - 
sharing. 
Methods. A study of profit- sharing and co- partnership schemes 
reveals at least one outstanding feature, namely their 
infinite variety, ranging from the very simple to the highly 
complex. Thi is inevitable having; regard to the widely 
differing circmistances obtaining in different firms; the 
proportions of capital and labour employed- vary considerably 
from one undertaing to another; so also does the extent to 
which labour can influence the firm's output and its cost 
of production. Add to this the great differences in size 
and type of undertaking, and it is hardly surprising that 
profit- sharing schemes vary so widely. 
These differences in :.iiethod can be summarised under 
four heads, viz. (a) How the anount of distributable profit 
is determined; (b) How this amount is divided between 
capital and labour; (c) The qualifications for participatior 
in the scheme; and (d) How the profit is distributed among 
the participators. 
(a) Distributable The first point to be decided. is how much profit 
Profit. 
is to be made available for distribution. In our 
3111 
definition of profit- sharing we have the phrase "share 
fixed beforehand ", so that the method of drawing up the 
final accounts and balance sheet must be in accordance 
with the profit - sharing agreement. The anount of 
distributable profit can be varied by changes in the 
anount Dut to reserve, co that, unless there are rules 
regarding reserves in the agreement, the directors have a 
consi(erable amount of discretionary power over the amount 
available for the profit - sharing scheme. 
There is great variety in the rules regarding reserves; 
in one large confectionery manufacturing firm, the scheine 
provides for three types of reserve: a Dividends 
Equalisation Reserve, an Advertising Reserve, and a 
Special Reserve, and ti rules regarding these are fairly 
rigid. For example with regard to the first, the scheme 
provides that "The mount to be set aside annually out of 
profits is £20,000, or 10 per cent of the profits remaining 
after rroviding for Capital's Wage for the year, whichever 
is the greater. This Reserve is not to exceed one year's 
Wage of Capital." 
A contrasting case is that of a textile manufacturing 
firi1 in the South of England whose profit - sharing scheme 
provides for "reserves made in the interest of the businesl. 
against specific, and as far as possible definite, 
liabilities." ?Mere, the discretionary power of the 
directors is obviously much greater. 
Whatever may be the basis of definition of 
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distributable profit, the general procedure is for the 
statement chewing the amount of profit available to be 
presented to the Profit - sharing Committee for their 
approval. In some cases the committee can, if it 
thinks fit, appoint an auditor to check the statement, 
and in the event of an insoluble difference of opinion 
the matter may be refamed to arbitration. It is 
essential that the method of preparing the accounts and 
balance sheet should. be standardises' so that there can be 
no grounds for allegations of "tinkering" with the amount 
of profit available for distribution. 
(b) Division of One of the thorniest problems in devising a 
Profit. 
satisfactory profit-sharing scheme is the basis of 
division between capital and labour. The general 
principle followed is that capital and labour are. entitled 
first of all to thir normal remuneration, namely 
dividends and wages respectively, and that neither should 
suffer from the existence of the profit- sharing scheme. 
In practice this means that after the necessary reserves 
have been made, the appropriate dividend on preference 
shares is paid, and thereafter a dividend up to a specified 
maximum percentage on the ordinary shares, after which 
the balance, or a certain part of the balance, is divided 
in some agreed proportion between the ordinar shareholders 
and the profit- sharing employees. 
Block Division. One method of division is known as the "block" 
method, whereby the total amount of distributable profit 
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is divided into two sections - frequently into halves - 
one for capital and the other for labour. There is no 
particular virtue in ai qual division, except that it does 
serve to inspire confidence in the scheine on the part of 
the workers, and thie is an important psychological 
advantage. The method of division depends largely upon 
the relative importance of labour and capital in the plant; 
for example if the plant is /lei 
r 
.ly mechanised, and 
comparatively few workers are e_nnloyed, an equal division 
would not be economically justified, although this might 
be over -ruled by the psychological advantage of an equal 
division. In a well -known English motor manufacturing 
concern, the plant is very highly mechanised, arid this is 
reflected in the profit - sharing scheme. After deducting 
six per cent on the nett capital employed in the business 
throughout the year, an amount equal to ten per cent of 
the profits is paid into the fund ;, thus there is a heavy 
bias in favour of capital, due to the highly capitalised 
nature of the undertaking. 
Rate Division. An alternative :Method of division is that in which 
the surplus profits are not divided in fixed fractions 
between capital and labour, but the rate of bonus due to 
the profit- sharing group bears some fixed relation to the 
rate of dividend paid on certain types of shares, 
usually the ordinary shares. For example, in one of the 
oldest sche_nes still in operation - a scheme which has 
in its fifty -six* years of life become almost a classic - 
P' () 4 
the basis of division is that after paying five per cent 
on capital, any furt::ler profit Available for dividend is 
declared at a uniform rate per cent on capital and on the 
year's total wages and salaries. In another firm of 
confectionery manufacturerhe rate of bonus for members of' 
the .profit - sharing group is the average of the rates paid 
on the preferred and the deferred shares. 
Block -rate A third method is adopted by some businesses, whose 
Division. 
schemes provide for a certain sum to be set aside as the 
profit-sharing bonus, for every rise of one per cent. in 
the dividend rate on ordinary shares, For example a 
North -East England firm of chocolate manufacturers has a 
scheme in which 742- per cent is first paid on capital, and 
then for each one bercent paid thereafter a sum of £1,000 
is put into the profit -sharing pool. 
°Notional" Sometimes firms irsue to workers what might be called 
Shares. 
''notional" shares, of no intrinsic value, but with a face 
value on which dividend is paid. One of the analler 
English publishing houses has a profit- sharing scheme of 
this type; three classes of certificate are issued to 
workers, all of them bearing the sane rate of interest as 
that paid on the ordinary shares. The certificates are 
(a) profit- sharing certificates, (b) bonus certificates, 
and (c) investment certificates. The first are issued 
to all employees on a scale varying with wage -rates; 
thus a worker earning up to £2 per week receives 
75 
certificates, and a further 25 for every additional 
20s. r 
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week in wages. Bonus certificates are issued at the rate 
of ten for each completed year's service. These 
certificates have no market value, but dividends are paid 
on them, anC an employee can, if he so wish, re- invest 
this dividend, together with any other cash, in investment 
certificates which are repayable at par at any time, 
together with any interest due. This method of payment 
has the advantage of smoothing out fluctuations in the 
a.rount of bonus cistributed; in sane other methods where 
surplus profits aboveacertain figure are paid out, the 
amount available tends to fluctuate widely from year to 
year. 
(c) Qualifications. There are almost invariably certain 
qualifications for participation in the profit- sharing 
scheme, the most conraon being concerned with age and 
length of service. For example, one of the principal 
groups in the cement industry has the following rule: 
"All employees of 21 years of age. are eligible to 
participate in a profit- sharing bonus provided that 
(a) they will by that date have completed one year of 
service to the datisfaction of the management; and 
(b) they do not (or are not Qualifying to) participate 
in the Staff Bonus, Foremen's Bonus, or other bonus 
scheme." 
Sometimes the profit- sharing scheme is limited iD. 
certain classes of workers only, e.g. managerial staff; 
this is to some extent an attempt to devise a "payment 
- 
by- results" methòd to those whose output cannot be 
Í 
measured, but who are in a position to influence very 
considerably the profitability of the undertdc ing. It is, 
however, very difficult to decide who should and who should 
not participate in such a scheme, for "management" is a term 
capable of various interpretations. 
In other cases, the scheme is only extended_ to those 
employees in receipt of wages or salaries over a certain 
pre -determined. level. In other cases again, in ceder to 
participate the employee has to join the co- partnership 
group, or perhaps be elected to it by its existing members. 
The general trend, however - and it would seem to be an 
admirable tendency - is for profit - sharing schemes to be 
made as all -embracing as possible, so that all the workers in 
the undertding from top to bottom are made to feel that they 
are partners in the enterprise. 
"Share- issue" In the case of what are known as "share- issue" schemes, 
Schemes. 
the employee is offered shares in the company on terns more 
favourable than those open to the ordinary investor, and it 
is a condition of becoming a member of the profit - sharing 
group that a certain number of these shares be purchased. 
In effect, the employee then becomes an ordinary share- 
holder of the company, but his right to dispose of his 
holding is restricted in view of the fact that he received 
preferential terms when purchaser. his stock; he usually 
is only able to sell his shares back to the company at the 
price which he paid for them. Sometimes, instead of 
buying the shares, at a discount, the employee -shareholder 
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revives a higher rate of dividend than that allotted to the 
outside investor. This method has the merit of encouraging 
the thrifty members of the :staff, but it means that their 
savings are invested in a commercial undertaking, liable to 
financial fluctuations, rather than in a savings bank, 
national savings, or gilt -edged securiths. There is, 
therefore, a greater risk of the employee losing his 
savings if his firm should came upon evil days, just at the 
time when his employment also is least secure. However, 
the method has worked successfully in a number of cases;l) 
and it is employed by one of the large chemical combines 
whose workers can purchase shares at one -eighth per cent 
less than market price; they also receive a gift varying 
from one in four to one in eight shares bought, depending 
on their wage or salary level. 
"Deposit" The "d.eposit" type of scheme is of similar nature. 
Schemes. 
Instead of employees bring the firm's shares on preferential 
terms, they are invited to deposit money with the firm, and 
in return are guaranteed a minimum rate of interest together 
with a further dividend varying with profits. 
(d) Method of After deciding how the suplus profits are to be 
Payment. 
divided between capital and labour, and who is to participat 
in the latter's share, the further question arises, "How is 
the bonus tqe distributed among the participators in the 
profit- sharing scheme?" The most usual method is to give 
(1) Vide Appendix "G "(2) 
._.. 
Pa ment in 
Shares. 
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a cash payment; which may be allocated. in a number of 
different ways. In the first place, the amount available 
for distribution may be allocated in direct proportion to 
the wages or salaries of the employees; this is the most 
popular method, and has been adopted by so many fires as 
to have become almost a standard. Secondly, the fund may 
be divided equally among the participants, as is done in 
a number of cases in the gas industry. Thirdly, mention 
has already been made of those schemes in which special 
certificates are issued, the share of profit, depending 
on the type and number of certificates held. Foruthly, 
a "points" system of allocation may be adopted, whereby 
posts are graded on a points scale, with weights for 
differing periods of service with the company. Whatever 
method is adopted, it is usual to take length of service 
into account when allocating the profit shares to 
employees. One of the oldest schemes still in existence 
gives a double bonus to all employees over 21 years of 
age who have been wit'. the company for at least five years. 
In another scheme the bonus is calculated on the nett wage 
or salary for employees with less than 10 years service, 
on 14 times the wage for those with 10 to 20 years service, 
and on 12 times the wage for those with more than 20 years 
service. 
Although the simplest method of payment 
is obviouslyta 
cash, this is by no means universal;(1) payment 
may be 
(1) Vide Appendix "G "(2). 
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made in the form of shares, or party' in cash and partly 
in shares; then again, in some cases payment is made into 
a provident, welfare or superannuation fund for the benefit 
of the employees. For the method of paymient in the form 
of shares it is claimed that a cash bonus is almost 
invariably spent soon after it is received, whereas the 
acquisition of shares encourages thrift on the part of the 
employees. In the South Metronolitcan Gas Company's 
scheme already mentioned there are two accounts in the 
employee's pass -book, viz. "cash" and "stock ". At the 
end. of the year, bonus is credited to these accounts in 
equal proportion, and when sufficient money has accumulated 
on the stock account for the purchase of £10 of stock or 
more, stock is allotted to the employee in accordance with 
the rules. Cash can be transferred from the "cash" to the 
"stock " account for the purpose of acquiring more stock, 
and workers are encouraged to increase their holdings in 
this way. 
-This method- of paying bonus in the form of shares 
means that profit - sharing is extended to become co- 
partnership, for the employees secure a share in the 
ownership and in some cases the control of th e business. 
Frequently the shares allotted to employees do not carry 
the voting rights of normal shares for they ar e offered. 
on preferential tenus and the directors may fear that 
in course of time worker co- partnership will develop into 
full worker control to the prejudice of the existing 
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shareholders. It is desirable, however, that the sense 
of co- partnership should be made real to the employees, 
and experiments in joint consultation, the appointment 
of employee- directors, the formation of co- partnership 
committees, and the giving of information to employees 
about the working of the business, are all to be commended. 
A disadvantage of the method of paying bonus in the 
form of shares is that it has not the same interest to 
the employee that a cash payment has,ï for the worker only 
receives in cash a small proportion, say 5 per cent or 
one twentieth of the value of his profit - share. On the 
other hand, if the firm has heavy commitments to meet, 
payment in stock may be easier than incash, although it 
may involve increasing the capital issue if there are no 
employee- shares available from decreased or resigned 
workers. The frequently adopted method of paying bonus 
partly ir}'cash and partly in shares is an attempt to 
reconcile these two conflicting points of view. 
The method of paying profit- shares into a provident 
or superannuat.tion fund offers very little incentive to 
the workers and has little to cammend it. The reward 
is very re.note, and to the younger workers especially the 
i 
prospect of a pension on retirement compares very 
unfavourably with a sum in hand at the end of the year. 
Although it s incentive value is small, however, it may 
tend to decrease labour turnover, as some workers will 
prefer to stay- with the firm until retirement rather than 
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forfeit their accumulated rights in the superannuation 
funds. 
Trade Union The traditional attitude of organised labour towards 
Attitude. 
profit -snaring and co- partnership has been one of hostility 
or at least suspicion. This attitude is partly based on 
the view that -profit- sharing is part of, and tends to 
perpetuate, the capitalist system to which the trade unionist 
is usually politically opposed. There has been a feeling 
also that employers have introduced profit- sharing schemes 
merely as "sugar on the pill" with a view to undermining 
trade union solidarity and keeping down wage -levels. 
Outright hostility has, however, in the 7a st two decades 
gradually given place to qualified acceptance, 
trend has been observed with regard. to payment -by- results. 
Few firms today would attempt to introduce profit- sharing as 
a means of payinr: less than the trade -union rate of wages; 
the plan would. be- doomed to failure from the very beginning. 
The trade unions now realise that they have an important 
function to fulfil in securing proper conditions for the 
working of a profit - sharing scheme. They will be concerned 
to ensure that the agreed method of dividing profits between 
capital and labour is sound andin practice honestly followed.á 
that there is no manipulation of reserves to reduce the 
distributable surplus; that employees have the opportunity 
of appointing their own auditor to check the accounts, and 
so on. In this way the trade unions can continue to fulfil 
their justifiable function of protecting the worker 
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against exploitation by unscrupulous employers. 
Criticisms of It has been said that profit - sharing is economically 
profit-sharing: 
unsound because the worker is not entitled to anything more 
than a fair wage. Classical economic theory has certainly 
regarded wages as the reward of labour, and profits as the 
(1) reward of risk- bearing, the function of the entrepreneur 
and the connection between the efficiency of the workers and 
the profit ix earned is not direct. Profits may be better 
in one year than in another even though worker -efficiency 
has remained constant, because of successful buying in the 
raw material Market. Conversely profits may decline, not 
because the workers have failed to come up to standard, but 
because of a general trade r ecession. This argument is 
sound, but, if the view of the mor%nlightened employers, 
that the workers are partners with them in industry, is 
accepted, it does not destroy the case for profit - sharing 
and co- partnership. 
Allied to this objection is the claim that if workers 
share in profits, they shoulc7 also share in losses. Howeve 
if profits fail, the workers do not receive aay share, and 
are not therefore in any better position than the share- 
holders. Again, if the position is even worse and the firm 
has to embark lion a policy of retrenchment, workers will 
either have to work short-time or lose thir jobs; they are, 
therefore, sharing in the loss. Indeed their loss may be 
(1) Vide, e.g. Knight "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit" for 
an able exposition of the theory of profits. 
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even more fundament) than that of the shareholders, for 
the worker who loses his job nor. ially loses his whole 
source of income, whereas the investor usually has his 
risks spread over a large number of undertakings. In any 
case, ordinarily, workers share only in surplus profits, 
that is those profits which remain after the necessary 
reserves have been made and the normal rate of interest 
has been paid to shareholders. 
Incentive - There are those who criticise profit - sharing and co- 
Value. 
partnership on the ground that it is ineffective as a 
direct incentive to increased output, but to argue thus is 
to misunderstand the real function of profit- sharing . 
Profit - sharing is not a method of fament -by- results - it 
has been argued in earlier chapters that if a p orient -by- 
results scheme is to be successful a orker's earnings 
should have some direct relation to output, preferably his 
own output, but if not, then the output of the working 
group of which he is a member, and the smaller this group 
is, the better. Then again, the working of the scheme 
should be simple, so that the ordinary workman can 
calculate what his pay will be; the more elaborate 
American systems have been criticised because they fail 
in this respect. By these standards, profit - sharing is a 
most unsatisfactory method of pÿament -by- results; the 
worker's share of profit bears no direct relation to his 
output; usually he does not receive it until the end of 
the year, and i is highly improbable that he will be able 
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to calculate in advance what his bonus is likely to be. 
The average bonus paid under a profit - sharing scheme is 
comparatively small; in 1936 ( a good year) it was only 
5. 9 per cent. , or £12. 10. 9d. per head. This is less than 
five shillings per week, and such a small sum as this can 
hardly be expected to act as a strong financial incentive 
to increased effort. Not only is the bonus small, but it 
is also very remote from the individual worker's effort and 
output; even if the bonus is paid in advance by quarterly 
or even ¡monthly payments, the good worker gets the sane 
relative bonus as the bad worker - there is no direct 
connection between individual effort and individual reward. 
True Function; It must be admitted, therefore, that profit- searing 
of Profit - 
sharing. does not offer a strong incentive to increased output, but 
in any case this is not its true function. "We have been 
mistaken in regarding it simply from the standpoint of 
financial inducement; it should. be regarded rattier from 
the psychological point of view. In other words, its 
results have depended not primarily on how much employees 
have actually received, but rather on their knowledge that 
whatever profits resulted from the joint efforts of all 
concerned - would. be divided amongst them on some basis 
previously agreed upon as equitable. "(1) So wrote one 
who 
has had a very long experience of business management, 
profit- sharing, and industrial relations, and 
the argument is 
soundd. The principal virtue of co- partnership lies, 
not 
(1) Rowntree: "Tile uiaan Factor in Business" p.191. 
not in the value of the bonus as a financial incentive, but 
rather in its power to promote happier relations between 
employer and employee. A properly designed profit -sharing. 
scheme autoiaatically ensures that the worker is informed 
of the financial position of the firm, and so enhances the 
sense of partnership. This divulging of informatibn 
traditionally regarded by the business -man as sacrosanct 
necessitates something of a revolution in business practice, 
but the improve rient in employee -relations should more thall 
eomansate for any sacrifice of privacy involved. 
The very title "co- partnership" gives to the worker 
a new status; he is not longer merely a "hand" and his 
labour a "corrnodity "; he is a co- partner, sharing owner- 
ship and control with the leaders of the business. A 
pro 7)erly worked -out profit- sharing scheme can be made an 
excellent opportunity for the whole working of the under- 
taking to be explained. to the employees, so that they can 
see where they fit into the organisation, and can under- 
stand the purpose of the tasks - _probably minute and 
repetitive - in which they themselves are engaged. If the 
co- partnership plan is worked honestly and. sincerely it can 
help to break down barriers of suspicion and promote good- 
will, and thus, indirectly, serve to increase the efficiency 
of the whole undertaking. 
In this connection the conclusions of a recent 
Conclusions. 
,American survey W are interesting. Several hundred 
companies which practised profit- sharing were questioned 
with regard to the vihie of their schemes in improving 
employee- relations. It -was found that whereas 23.4 per 
cent of firr;is with no profit - sharing plans reported strikee 
in their plants, only 9.9 per cent of those with profit - 
sharing plans in which all employees participated had 
siiiilar stoppages. This improvement in relations may 
not have been entirely due to co- partnership; other 
conditions in the plants may have been particularly good, 
but the results clearly indicate that co- partnership 
does serve to promote industrial peace. 
The sane survey revealed that, to be successful, 
profit- sharing must embrace the whole personnel, and not 
be confined merely to manage.aent, a practice which has 
had some protagonists in this country as well as in 
America. It was found that those fir :is which had 
profit- sharing schemes of the latter type experienced 
even more strikes than those which had no pro fit - sharing 
schemes at all (30.6 per cent as compared with 2'7.3 per 
cent). 
The conclusio4 is, therefore, that profit- sharing 
is not a satisfactory method of payment -by- results, but 
that it can be an excellent supplement to the more 
direct financial incentives, its principal value being 
(1) "Survey of "experiences in Profit- sharing" United 
States Senate Report No. 610. Washing. on. 1939. 
31 7 
its power to engender a team-spirit and a sense of loyalty 
to the working group. This is even iioe true when profit - 
sharing becomes co- partnership, for then the status of the 
worker is raised from that of a hand to that of a co- oartner 
with the management and owners of the business. For this 
reason, these schemes in which the employee acéiuires shares 
in the company (especially if those shares carry voting 
rights) are to be preferred to those in which merely cash 
bonuses are paid, for then the employee has a tangible and 
per :anent stake in the fortunes of the firm in which he 
works. 
There are, however, certain conditions in which co- 
partnership is most likely to be successful. Many schemes 
have been abandoned because in some years 4perhaps many 
years) there have been insufficient profits to allow of a 
distribution among the workers; this has been tc -principal 
reason for failure in British experience of profit-sharing. 
However, many schemes have succeeded in weathering trade 
depressions, and an occasional year without profits need 
not necessarily be fatal; indeed it may be a salutary 
reminder that the bonus is not a part of wages, and does 
not cane automatically as of right.evertheless, profit - 
sharing is least likely to fail where business conditions 
are reasonably steady, and whereviolent fluctuations are 
rare, as in the case in the gas industry where co- 
partner- 





SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION'S. 
.&.t this country needs - indeed must have - greater 
productivity per man -hour will hardly be disputed anywhere 
today, and it has been the purpose of this investigation to 
discover the part which methods of wage payment can play in 
the drive for increased output. 
The conclusion arrived. at in the earlier chapters was 
that although non -financial incentives such as good working 
conditions, and happy industrial relations were of 
fundamental importance, yet the financial incentive, with 
all its limitations, was still the most powerful and direct 
to increased output available to the employer today. 
flntion has already been made of a number of factors which 
tend to blunt the edge of the financial incentive - high 
direct taxation, the development of more and more State 
services, the shortage of consumer goods, and so on - and 
it was suggested that it :Might be advisable to make certain 
changes in national economic policy in order to give the 
"carrot" a little more "flavour ". 
If this conclusion be valid, then it follows that some 
sort of payment -by- results is to be preferred to simple 
day -work. That is not tosay that payment -by- results is a 
universal panacea for all industrial ills; it is no 
substitute for efficient management, proper production 
control, improved machinery and other primary fundaaentals. 
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Indeed, if payment -by- results is used in an attempt to 
correct a low- output situation caused by lack of one or more 
of these fundamentals, it will merely serve to perpetuate 
a high -cost structure. 
Essentials: Examination of the major systems of payment -by- results 
(i) Fairness. 
in the foregoing chapters has revealed certain essentials 
of a good financial incentive plan. The first and most 
obvious of these is that the system :oust be fair to all 
concerned, and contribute to the benefit of both employer 
and employee. This is of vital importance to an employer 
contemplating the introduction of any new incentive scheme, 
especially one which savours in any way of American methods, 
for the average British worker has a natural antipathy towar ds 
anything which he does not understand, especially if it 
cones from the other side of the Atlantic, the supposed 
home of the heartily despised and detested "efficiency 
experts ". ` his is an important factor in favour of the 
straight piece -work system for alnost every other type of 
incentive is of American origin, and has to be very care- 
fully adapted before it can be applied to British conditions 
The average British worker "resents arbitrary action; he 
denounces any syste.:i which he imagines willcall for 
speeding -up'; he will fight against bullying or 
riving 
from overlookers; he cordially detests outsiders 
brought 
in as experts, and upon them lavishes his scorn and 
irony; 
above all, he fears, and therefore resits, what is new. 




take long views and to demand guarantees against arbitrary 
action. On the other hand, he can be won to accept that which 
appeals to his sense of fairness; he goes some distance to 
meet the person who acknowledges his intelligence and his 
experience by consulting him on matters which affect his 
interests. "(1) Full co- operation between management and men 
is, therefore, essential, and unless the scheme has the 
c.nfidence of the labour force it is bound to fail. The 
channels of joint consultation should be fully employed both 
before the introduction of the scheme and during its working, 
and there should be a properly constituted agreement'regarding 
its administration. 
(ii) No rate- If there is one thing more likely than any other to under 
cutting. 
mine the confidence of the labour force, it is rate - cutting. 
Where methods are changed so that the time required to 
perform an operation is substantially reduced, some adjustment 
in the rate will clearly be both necessary and justified, but 
arbitrary rate - cutting is to be heartily condemned. This 
deans that rate -fixing methods must be sound enough to enable 
the management to give a guarantee against rate - cutting. In 
order to achieve this accuracy in rate -fixing, it will be 
desirable in many cases to employ time- study, and here again 
care .aust be taken to avoid hostility to this American 
technique. Details of the possible precautions 
have been 
discussed in an earlier chapter; suffice 
it to say here that 
a representative of the workers 
should, if possible, be 
(i) Dr. C.H. Northcott, writing in "unity" gay, 1932. 
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allowed. to be present at the time study and to have access 
to all the relevant information, in order that he may 
check its accuracy. The technique of effort- rating is a 
frequent source of grievance, and it is considered that 
the sane end, namely to obtain a representative timing, 
could be attained more satisfactorily by studying a number 
of average workers. 
(iii) Generous In order to provide a strong incentive the system 
should be high in task and also in reward; that is to 
say, the piece -rate or bonus time should not be "loose" 
but accurate, and the employee should receive a generous 
reward for attaining the required_ standard. There should 
be fair, guaranteed hourly rates, and the incentive scheme 
superimposed upon them should enable the average worker 
to earn an agreed percentage over these base -rates. If 
the reward for extra out -put, effort, or merit is 
niggardly, it will have comparatively little incentive 
power and will not achieve its purpose. For this reason, 
the premium bonus and other sharing plans, in which the 
piece -rate declines with increasing output, are not really 
satisfactory. given if the bonus times are liberal, so 
that the average worker earns the same percentages over 
time-rate as he would on piece -work, he is still apt to 
feel that he is being gheated'of part of the time saved, 
and the psychological disadvantage remains. 
(iv) Simple. It is essential that the wage system be reasonably 
simple, so that the ordinary worker can understand it 
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and estimate the amount of bonus he is earning. This is a 
serious defect of the highly complicated American plans, fore 
anything which a worker does not understand he naturally 
tends to lAistrust, and mistrust and suspicion are fatal to 
efficiency and good relations. 
(v) Balanced. It is important, too, that the wage incentive system 
should not upset the natural balance of wage rates within 
the plant. For example, if direct workers are put on 
payment.by- results their wages may rise so that the 
differential between their rate and that of their super- 
visors is considerably reduced. The balance has'been 
upset, and supervision will become dissatisfied. It is 
not recoa:nended. that supervisors should be paid bonuses 
dependent upon the output of the de- oartments which they 
control; this tends to make supervisors into drivers 
rather than leaders, a tendency which seriously mitigates 
against good employee relations., In order to maintain the 
balance of wages, where the installation of a bonus scheme 
for direct workers involves the indirect workers (such as 
maintenance staff, la'- ourers, etc.) in extra effort, they 
too show share in some way in the scheme. 
(vi) Complaints Pinally, there should be adequate channels 
through 
which the workers can .hake enquiries regarding their 
wages, 
and, if necessary, lodge complaints or appeals. 
Unredressed grievances and mis- understandings are so 
damaging to efficiency, output, and morale that proper 
arrangements for dealing with them should be made. 
Production 
Conditions. 
When considering the relative merits of the different 
incentive systems, it is essential that the conditions of 
production should be borne in:iind. It is quite impossible 
to say that this method or that is the best; it depends 
entirely upon the conditions and circumstances of production. 
First of all one must consider the quantity of the product 
to be made; is it sufficiently large to give a good run of 
repetitive jobs so that the expense of rate - fixing and 
putting the job on bonus will be justified? Then there is 
the further question of the type of product or operation; 
what is the degree of uniformity; can the job be standard- 
ised or it is essentially individualistic? Quality control 
is an important consideration; is the inspection of large 
quantities of the product by some independent agency 
comparatively simple, or is quality so all- important that 
increased speed of working is undesirable? In some trades 
the speed of working is outside the control of the operative,, 
as in "process work" such as heat treatment, plating, etc. 
What is the unit of production, an individual or a group; 
and is it possible to measure the output of an individual 
worker, or only that of the squad to which he belongs? 
These are some of the more important conditions of 
production, of which at least five broad types may be 
distinguished, viz. (a) mass production, (b) batch production. 
(e) job production, (d) process work and (e) indirect 
labour. 




output is produced, under standardised conditions, and 
covering a narrow range of very similar products. Where 
the work is done in batches large enough to form a 
considerable proportion of the shop capacity, this is known 
as batch production. Job production consists of the 
manufacture of numerous very aaall batches or individual 
orders which do not recur frequently. The term process 
work is used to cover those operations in which the worker 
has little or no control over his speed of working, this 
being determined_ by circumstances outside the range of 
his responsibilities. Indirect labour covers the work of 
maintenance staffs, transport workers, cleaners, labourers, 
and similar is to the directly 
productive trades. 
No one system of wage payment is appropriate to all 
these different types of production conditions. There is 
little doubt that mass production conditions are most 
suitable for payment -by- results, although in certain cases 
the time -rate system may be equally effective. Where the 
plant is so highly mechanised that the individual worker 
has little or no control over his speed of working - if 
he is working on a conveyor belt, for example - there is 
little point in _gutting. in a wage system designed to give 
an incentive to increased output. In this case, the most 
appropriate arfange;aent is to have a system of day- work 
plus merit rating. In this way there is an incentive to 
good, conscientious work of high quality, for all the 
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factors determining the value of an eiìployee to his firm are 
taken into consideration. 
What of those many cases in which the worker in a mass 
production plant can directly influence the volw?ie of his 
)utput? There is no doubt that individual response is best 
evoked by individual incentive. Whilst group incentives have 
a definite part to play, and offer distinct advantages, it is 
nevertheless true that where quantity of output is of vital 
importance, and where proper control over quality can be 
maintained, the individual incentives are most effective. 
It has been said that individual incentives, by reason of the 
differences in earnings which they afford to different 
workers, cause envy¡ jealous rand. strife. If this is so, it 
is usually the result of bad rate -fixing; either the base 
rates d'o not properly reflect the value, degree of difficulty, 
dirtiness, arduous nature, etc. of the various jobs, or else 
been so badly done that rates are either 
that some employees have an easy time 
work hard to earn bonus. There is no 
the time-studies have 
"loose" or "tight" so 
whilst others have to 
doubt whatsoever that rate-fixinL. must be accurate if an 
individual incentive system is to work satisfactorily. 
Of the individual incentives, piece -work is-without 
question the most satisfactory. The British premium bonus 
s_- stems, and the more complicated American sharin4; -plans all 
suffer from the fundamental defect of a piece -rate which 
falls as output increases. Indeed. there is much to be said 
fir a piece -rate which rises with increasing output, 
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along the lines of the Merrick system discussed in the 
latter _Dart of chapter twelve. If the guaranteed minimum 
time -rate is added to this multiple piece -rate plan, it 
approaches very closely to the ideal individual incentive. 
The initial standard should be such that the learner on 
the job is encouraged from the very beginning. Above 
this there should. be a series of progressive standards, 
well within the capacity of the average worker operating 
at a reasonable intensity of effort. The constantly 
rising piece -rate gives to the keen ambitious worker a 
sense of continual progress, which stimulates the will to 
work and maintains the incentive, so that there is less 
danger of his settling down at a rate of output less than 
tìie optimum. The multiple piece -rate plan gives the 
strongest possible incentive to increase output even at 
high productions, and it combats the natural tendency for 
interest to flag as output goes up and each successive 
increment requires the expenditure of more and more energy. 
The Lathod does, of course, involve the employer in rising 
labour costs per unit, but this may be well worth while 
where the plant is highly mechanised and the chief cost 
of production lies in the running of the machines rather 
than the payment of the labour force. 
Experience over the past few decades with the various 
point premiuíi plans such as Bedaux and: Haynes has some- 
-thing to offer also. In the first place, they place an 
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emphasis upon the value of time -study for rate -fixing 
purposes, and there is little doubt that, so long as it is 
operated fairly and with proper safeguards, this method can 
give more accurate results than any other system of rate - 
fixing. Since a high -task, high- reward multiple piece -rate 
system demands accurate rate- fixing, time -study clearly has 
an important part to .play in the ideal incentive plan for 
standardised, mass production conditions. This contention 
is by no means an endorsement of the Bedaux claim to be able 
to calculate with sdientific accuracy the effort involved in, 
and the relaxation required for, any operation. Indeed, 
considerable doubt has been expresser. regarding the technique 
of effort- rating, and it is suggested..that a more satisfactory 
result is arrived at by taking several time- studies on each 
of a nu:iber of average workers, and selecting the natural 
timing for that particular job. Base- rates, properly fixed 
on the basis of job -analysis, can then reflect the different 
values of and degrees of effort required by, the various jobs.1 
Again, the value of expressing piece -work prices in 
terms of some point or unit other than money is considerable, 
from the point of view of production control, costing, and 
adjustment of base -rates. It is suggested that the simplest 
and most satisfactory unit is time, and that piece -work prices 
should be expresser in "standard hours ", a unit which can be 
used as a common denominator for all kinds of labour for 
purposes of production control and costing, and a unit which 
is not affected. .by changes in base- rates. 
? ° 
The conclusions regarding mass production conditions 
are therefore, twofold, viz. (i) Where the worker has 
little or no control over his speed of working, the 
appropriate method of wage payment is daywork plus merit 
Dating. (ii) Where the worker an control his output, 
the best system is probably a hybrid, a multiple piece- 
rate plan, the prices being expressed. in terms of 
"standard hours" and established by means of time -study; 
base -rates should be fixed by means of job analysis. 
(b) Batch and Although the individual incentive is undoubtedly 
Job Production 
the most powerful, group incentives are applicable to 
certain sets of circumstances. Where the unit of 
production is the team or squad rather than the individual, 
and all share in the production of a product which is 
easily measurable, then group niece -work is the appropriate 
method of payment. Both the purpose and_ -the results of 
group piece -work are the saaeYas those of individual piece- 
work; the only difference is that the incentive power of 
the former is inevitably somewhat less than that of the 
latter. Since a man's bonus depends partly on what his 
colleagues are doing as well as on his own efforts, the 
group should be as small and as homogeneous as possible. 
This is difficult of attainment in these days of high 
labour turnover and absenteeism. 
In batch and job production plants, the cost of 
administering a piece -work system may be disproportionately 
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high. Where output is constantly changing from oie 
product to anoter, frequent time studies become necessary 
for rate- fixing purposes, and this may be so expensive as 
to be unjustifiable. Again, the costs of keeping piece- 
work records - of workers' output of the various 
products, and_ of time spent in changing over, re- setting 
machines and so on - will be unduly inflated. A batch 
production plant must be flexible, but piece -work tends 
towards rigidity.for workers dislike changing over from 
one job to another, since, by breaking their rhythm of 
work, their bonus may suffer. 
For these reasons, a production bonus system may be 
more suitable for many batch and job production plants 
than either individual or group piece -work. By this 
method, all the different products manufactured in the 
plant may be reduced to the lowestt common denominator 
of "value ", and when the valúe of the output rises above 
a certain datum line an appropriate percentage bonus will 
be maid mn the salaries or wages of all members of the 
staff. In this way, a greater degree of team -spirit 
and co- operation may be infused, into the undertaking, and 
an incentive to greater output incorporated into the 
time -rate system. 
(c) Process Furthermore, the production bonus method solves the 
Work and Indirect 
Lsb our. problem of remunerating indirect labour and those 
employed on what has been ternec process work. All 
2 3 0 
the employees, irrespective of their duties, and whether or 
not their output can be measured or controlled, receive the 
same percentage rate of bonus on their time- rates. In this 
way the unity of the whole organism is emphasised and a 
premium placed upon co- operation, although it must be 
admitted that group schemes can never have the same 
incentive power as individual schemes. The choice largely 
depends upon the type of work; where the emphasis is upon 
volume of output, and the latter can be measured, 
individual incentives are to be preferred. Where, however, 
individual output is not easily measurable; or the 
e.:iohasis is upon team-work, group incentives may be more 
suitable. 
Merit- rating. Although in our present desperate econo:iic straits 
quantity of output rightly assumes a position of great 
ii artance, it is nOt all- important. Indeed, it is 
largely the quality of British goods rather than their 
cheapness which has enabled this country to compete in 
the world markets against the floor? of Aaerican mass- produc 
ed 
articles. It is one of the disadvantages of payment -by- 
results that its emphasis is upon quantity rather than 
quality, but merit rating is not subject to the same 
criticism. It takes into account not only quantity of 
output, but also all those other factors which contribute 
to employee- value, and, properly conceived and adninistere 
it can help considerably in the development of good team 
spirit and will -to -work within the organisation. 
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For those processes in which quality of workmanship is just 
as important as quantity of output, and especially where 
the measure dent of output is difficult, merit rating has 
undoubtedly much to be said in its favour. Wherever 
conditions or type of work preclude the adoption of 
payment -by- results, so that the time -rate systeri has to be 
applied, the latter should be supplemented by a good merit 
rating system, which will serve to introduce some measure 
of financial incentive and-to maintain keenness and 
initiative by assuring workers that they will be remunerated. 
according to the ability which thy spew. 
Profit - sharing Profit- sharing and co- partnership have had a very 
and Co- Partnership. 
cP?equered. history in this country, and a good deal of 
criticism - much of it justified - has been levelled against 
them. Some of this criticism, however, has been misplaced, 
as, for example, when it has been said that profit- sharing 
has very little incentive value. That is perfectly true, 
but it is also a truism, for profit -sharing is not a system 
of payment -by- results in the acce Stec-. sense of the term, 
and its proper function is not that of offering a 
financial incentive. The true function of profit- sharing, 
and even more so of co- partnership, is the promotion of 
happier relations between employer and employee by giving 
to the worker that sense of "belonging" which he so 
sadly 
lacks in the majority of industrial plants. The 
worker 
is infor.ied of the financial position of the firm, he 
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shares in its profits and perhaps in its ownership and 
control; he is no longer :merely a hand but a co- partner 
in the business. Under favourable conditions, a well 
resigned and administered co- partnership scheme can be an 
admirable supplement to the more direct financial incen- 
tives. Perhaps this is at least part of the answer to 
the endless controversy between th0protagonists of 
individual and group incentives. It has often been 
claimed that individual incentives are anti- social and 
that they defeat their own ends by disrupting those 
group loyalties which are so essential to good industrial 
relations and ultimately to efficiency of production. 
On the other hand., two vitally important contentions can 
hardly be denied, viz. (a) the urgent need for increased 
output, and. (b) that individual response is best invoked 
by the individual incentive. Is it a possible function 
of co- partnership in the future to prevent the disruption 
of group loyalties by individual incentives, so that the 
two methods together may give both maximum output and 
also goof working relationships? What is quite certain 
is that a spirit of co- operation within the business is 
absolutely essential to success, and however good 
technically a system of wage payment may be, if it has 
not the confidence and goodwill of all concerned 
it is 
doomed to failure. 
The need for co- operation as well as technical 
excellence requires to be constantly re- emphasised. 
As Professor Elton Mayo puts it: "Technical progress and 
technical organisation have enabled the democracies - the 
'plutodemocraciesç of Mussolini and Hitler - to develop, 
for the most part, beyond an ignorant and peasant type of 
living, to improve at least to some extent the general 
material standards of society. But we have failed to 
develop at an equal step the strategy of co- operation; we 
have allowed. ourselves the easier !path, the strategy of 
hate, that leads inevitably to the City of Destruction.... 
Hitler - a tatterdemalion exponent of hatred - led{` a 
nation, perhaps the most technically competent in the 
world, into a morass of hate and misery. The democracies 
have attained a high level of technical competence and are 
justly proud of the achievements of 'Science'. Yet 
physics, chemistry, biology, are wholly unaware of the part 
they have played in the destruction of society. If our 
social skills had advanced step by step with our technical 
skills, there would not have been another European war. 
'Patriotism is not enough; we_Just have no. hatred or 
bitterness towards anyone.' "(1) 
(1) Elton Mayo: "Social Problems of an Industrial 
Civilisation" Harvard. 1945. 
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TEST PLUNGER LATCH 
This is a die -cast product, and the operation under 
control is the turning of the 0.3115 -0.310 diameter. 
Investigation into the high range and variations 
on the mean revealed that variation was due to slight 
differences in the shape and size of the component where 
it was held in the special collet. By sorting the 
components into their respective groups, i.e. No. 1, 2 
or 3 mould, a more consistent product was achieved, as 
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APPENDIX "A "(2) 
Photographic copy of an actual 
Q.uality Control Chart. 
Test Plunger Latch 
CONTRACT No. 
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DIMENSIONS 






















fi7TERZ H.. t 
.INSKCTORI No. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 O Mft + o ^ 4 A * t f h 41 d S 
P gs .+ g ? J, a f = - ' Y M r 'A `" '" o 
0 `r '" " " a M 0 0 p Ns Á 3 A t?` A 3 r r=+ r # A A ° o° 
_ . co- _ z_ r+ r^ 344 cr s rw *D2 Nlo+ M t 











No. IN SAMPLE 
L ; 1 
e 
APPEEDIX A(3) H 
This i8 an actual blank:- 
control chart shewing the 
ruling which, does not 
come out clearly on the 
ohOtograbhic copy. in-; 
Aopendix A(2). 
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A2PENDIX " B". 
PIECE-WORK - RATE-FIXING. 
APP:]EDIX i,13° (1) 
Extract from Industrial Court Award No. 728 
of 8.7.1922 applying to Wages of Railway Shopmen. 
12. PIECEWORK AND OTHER SYSTES OF PArr. _. ; BY RESULTS. 
(1) All prices, whether existing at the Cate of the 
coining into operation of this Decision, as provided in 
paragraph 40, or new .prices, shall be such as to yield 
to the nomal worker not less than 33 -1 /3rd. per on 
the worker's ti.:ie or day rate (exclue :..ing war wage or 
bonus); but where, under any written agreement between 
any Union ands. a Railway Copany, a larger percentage offer 
the time or day rate is provided for, such agreement 
shall not be interfered with by this Decision. 
(ii) Where, under this Decision, the time or day rate 
has been altered, the prices shall be adjusted so as to 
yield to the normal worker not less than 33 -1 /3rd. per 
cent on the worker's time or day rate (excluding war 
wage or bonus. 
(iii) No piece -work price which complies with the above 
)revisions shall be altered unless the material, means 
or ,;Method of Pror'uction is changed. 
(iv) The above provisions shall apply as nearly as 
practicable to the method of fixing price ̂ under any 
other system of psynent by results. 
(v) The provisions set out in the foregoing paragraphs 
shall apply as nearly as practicable to the method of 
3 2 
of fixing prices for gang or squad workers; that is to say, 
prices shall be so fixed as to enable each member of the 
gang or squad to earn not less than 33 -1 /3rd. per cent on 
his time or clay rate (excluding war wage or bonus). 
(vi) Where any alteration is hereafter made in the price 
payable to a gang or squad the price shall be so divided as 
to yield to each member of the gang or squad his appropriate 
proportion of the price as altered. 
(vii)Where any lateration is hereafter made in the time or 
day rate of any member of the gang or squad, the price 
payable to the gang or squad shall be so adjusted that the 
portion of the price payable to the member whose time or 
day rate has been altered will yield not less than 33 -1 /3rd. 
per cent on such altered time or day rate (excluding war 
wage or bonus. 
(viii) The intention of the above provisions is that where 
men work in gangs or squads each member shall be in a 
position to earn the requisite percentage over his time or 
day reite. 
13. PIECEWORK AND OV. RTI,IE, IÎIGHT WORK, SUNDAYS,_ HOLIDAYS, 
ETC. 
Overtime rate for pieceworkers shall be the extra rate 
paid to day or time workers under Clause (a) of paragraph 3 
of these Conditions if overtime falls within the day period, 
and under Clause (b) of the same paragraph if overtime falls 
within the night period; and in the case of piece -workers 
working on Sundays, Good Friday, Christmas Day, and Bank 
3 43 
and Public Holidays the rato in ad Cition to the piecework 
earnings shall be the extra tine or day rate paid to tilde 
or day workers on any of those respective days. 
14. LIEU WORK. 
Wherever possible lieu rates shall be abolished and a 
syste i of payment by results shall, where practicable, be 
substituted for the lieu rate system. 
APPEiDIX "B" (2) 
Extract from Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Engineering and Allied. Employers' National Federation and 
the Engineering Joint Trades i.iovernent - 23rd. June, 1931, 
whereby the Joint Reco.nendation of 19th. and 20th. June, 
1931, is adopted as follows: - 
The parties mutually recaa:iend to their respective 
constituent bodies acceptance of the undernoted working 
conditions as substituting, in só far as they apply, the 
respective working conditions at :?resent in operation. 
The parties further agree t': _at any Agree.:ients at 
present in operation governing working o)nditions shall be 
modified in so far as the undernoted provisions conflict 
with the provisions of such Agreements. 
SYSTEMS OF PAYi. _:2 BY RESULTS. 
(a) All systems of payment by results will be subject 
to the following conditions: - 
No piecework prices, bonus or basis times once established 
may be altered except for the following reasons: - 
(1) A mistake in the calculation on either side, or 
(2) The material, means or method of production or 
the quantities are changed, or 
(3) A mutual arrangement has been come to between 
the employer and the worker in the sane way as a new price 
is arranged. 
(b) Piecework prices and bonus or basis times shall 
be such as will enable a workman of average ability t© 
7 4 
earn at least 25 per cent* over tune rates, excluding War 
Bonus. 
(c) As regards existing prices or tunes: - 
(1) In those cases where the basis is 33 -1 /3rd. per 
cent it will be reduced to 25 Der cent; i. e. , a reduction 
of 64 per cent. 
(2) In those cases where the basis is by Agreements 
or recognition greater tan 33 -1 /3rd. per cent, the 
reduction will be in the ration of 33 -1 /3rd. to 25% *. 
*(Increased to 272% by National Arbitration Tribunal 
Decision of March 1943.) 
APPENDIX ":B" 13) 
RATE- CUTTING GUAYAN '. 
AT ROWNTREE WORKS. 
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Thé following was agreed to between management and 
labour, and is embodied in the List of Rules: - 
"Existing rates (standard of output) will not be 
altered unless it is agreed with the workers' 
representatives that a change affecting the rate of 
output attainable for the same effort has taken place 
in - 
1 Machine or other equipment. 
2 Material used. 
3 Process or method of manufacture, or 
4 Other conditions. 
Wherever it is agreed that a.mistake has been 
made in the setting of a rate, correction will be made 
without delay. 
Subject to what has been said above, the company 
guarantee that the standard output required to earn 
standard piece or bonus money will remain unaltered 
except as provided above, and that standard outputs on 
new jobs (including all existing jobs for which the 
final rate has not yet been set) will be similarly 
guaranteed when sufficient time and_ practice have been 
allowed for attaining normal skill on the job." 
Source: Eowntree : "The Human Factor in 
Business" pp. 51-52. 
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APPE1 DIX "B" (4) 
Extract from "Evershed" Report on 
the Cotton Sbinnino Industry 1945. 
"A system of time rate minima supplemented, where 
appropriate by piece rates is in our judgment best 
adapted to provide on the one hand a just measure of 
security for the operative and at the sane time an 
incentive towards the increased production which is so 
pressing a need 
Our principal difficulty has been to arrive at a 
conclusion (in cases to which piece rates are applicable) 
upon the proper relationship between the time basé *_ 
minimum and the piece rate on which the earnings of 
the operative of average skill and industry in a normal 
week would be calculated, We have considered 
particularly the engineering and other trades in which 
the piece rates are so tabulated that operatives of 
average skill will expect to earn wages equivalent to 
various percentages in excess of the time base minima. 
It is clear, on the one hand, that the time base 
minimum must be such as in itself to constitute an 
adequate and satisfactory wage, acceptable as such, when 
for reasons outside the operative's control the 
opportunity of earning the piece rate wage is denied to 
him or her. Moreover, we are anxious that the time 
base wage should. in effect provide a "guaranteed week" 
for the operative who is ready and willing to work and 




the week, for in such cases unless and until a clear 
week's notice has been given and taken effect, the 
operative, if ready and. willing to work, will be entitled 
to receive the minimum or basic wage. 
On the other hand the piece rate must be such as 
to fora a real incentive to effort and production. 
28. In balancing these considerations it is 
necessary to bear in mind the circumstances of the 
spinning industry - particularly the important 
circumstance that the amount of production of yarn is 
determined by the spinning machine which, save when 
stopped for doffing or. cleaning or other incidental 
stoppages, continues throughout the whole period of 
the working week at a uniform speed adapted to the count 
of yarn being spun. 'Increased production from the 
machine can therefore be attained by the operative only 
(substantially speaking) as a result of shortening the 
times taken for the operations which require the 
machines to stop. Similar considerations apply in 
the cases of other operatives for whom piece rates are 
appropriate. 
Generally speaking therefore the possible variations 
in production depending upon the effort or lack of 
effort on the operatives' part are limited by comparison 
with some other industries. With this factor in mind 
and attaching the importance we do. to the claim of 
security, we have reached the conclusion that the 
:11 
n 9 , 
proper relationship between the piece rate and the time 
base minimum will be expressed by calculating the piece 
rate earnings of an operative of average skill and 
industry in a normal week to yield a wage of not less 
than 20 per cent above the time base minimum. We have 
agreed that the time rate minimum shall in general be 
applicable in the case of all stoppages arising from 
causes beyond the control of the operative, save that 
such stoppages amounting to four hours or less in any 
week shall be paid for at production rates. 
BASIC TIME- 1201..wEs 
PICK UP PIECE LOCATE PIECE N DRILL JIG . 
FROM TRAY OR BOX 
BASIC TIME - 020 MINUTES s- RQiEVE 
SPINDLE 
GRASP DRILL HANDLE. 
SET SPINDLE TO WORK . 
RELIEVE SPNDLE FROM WORK. 
RELEASE DRILL HANDLE. 
81111 O. 
àZnat 
APPENDIX "G "(5) 
Pictorial diagram skewing 
division of operation into 
elements for time -study purposes. 
(a) Drilling Operation. 
FASTEN DRILL JIG. 
BASIC TIME- -01.5o.mutes 
DRILL ONE HOLE 
120bIAx 4; DEEP. 
3%0 
BASIC TUTE- 013ures 
APPLY LUBRICANT 
TO DRILL . 
RELEASE JIG FASTENING. 
BASIC TIME- 076 Mmurts 
REMOVE PECE FROM JIG. PLACE PECE ASIDE 
.N TRAY OR BO)(. 
BASIC TIME- 043v+ur s 
PICK LP AIRPISTOL. 
CLEAN %IMF FROM JIG 
WITH MRBLAST. 
PLACE A PI TOL AXE. 
APPENDIX "0"(6) 
Pictorial diagram.shewing 
division of operation into 
elements for time -study purposes. 
(b) Forming Operation. 
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APPENDIX II9"(7) 3 5 2 
Pictorial diagram chewing 
division of operation into 
elements for time -study purposes. 
(c) Capstan Operation. 
BASIC TIME 058M1Nu1ES 
PICK UP PIECE FROM TRAY 













SLIDE TO WORK 
TOOL) 
N :1 .M wow 
"")) 
BASIC TIME 

















BASIC TIME -131 MINUTES 
OPERATE TO FACE WORK (BACK FACE) 
8 FORM OUTSIDE DIAMETER 
ti 
BASIC 
ADVANCE 8 POSITION 
TIME 016MINures 
SWING TOOL (KNURL) 
BASIC TIME 049MINUTES 
OPERATE TO KNURL 
BASIC TIME 025MINuTEs 
OPEN CHUCK 
REMOVE PIECE FROM CHUCK 
& PLACE ASIDE TO TRAY OR BOX 












L. 61444 BPLE) 



















l 1 /8" Thick. 
TOOLS 
T.N. 71694 
DESCRIPTION OF OPERATION 
Drill 2 holes .120" Dia. 
Total Actual .... .... .... 




Total with all Allowances .... 





























Pick up piece and fasten in jig (1) 
Apply Lubricant 
Set and relieve drill spindle 
Drill 1 hole .120" Dia r 1 /6" Deep 
Reposition jig hale to hole 
Unload jig and place piece aside 


























TOTAL ACTUAL TIME IN MINUTES 
APPE:!DIX "B" (9) 3 5 4 
Extract from: SCHEDULE of Moulding Rates mutually agreed 
between the National Light Castings Ironfounders' Federation 
and the AZalgamated. Union of Foundry Workers and the 
National Union of Stove Grate and General Metal Workers 
to come into operation in respect of work done on and as 
from MONDAY, 24th. FEBRUARY, 1947. 
I. PIPES 
(A) Rain Water Pipes. 
(1) Round Rain Water Pipes (without Ears) - per 
6 ft. length ... each. 





3' -" 2 
4" 
1144. 
1 / -mod. 6" 711 1/9ßd 2/8"-d. 
22" 9d. 41" 1 /2 -d. 8" 3/18d. 
3" lOß d. 5" 1 /48d. 
EXTRAS ON ROUND RAIN WATER PIPES. 
Faucet Branches cast -on :- 







. . . . 
... 1/38d. ea. 
... 1/5-'d. " 
. . . 1/88 d. " 
tf 
Spigot Branches cast on:- 






. . . 
. 
. . . 




Plain Cuts: - 
All sizes ... . . . . . . . . 
Cuts on 7" and 8" sizes: - 
Pipe cast to exact length by stopping up 




APP''NDIX ''B" (10). :155 








Description. of Work qu 
per 100 





Bulb Angle, and Angle Beam 
Knees, Welded ends 
do. Plate Knees 
clo. do. 
Following Machine 
Beam Knees, Channel Section, 
Welded Ends 
do. Plate Knees 
c1.o. do. 
Following Machine 
Bulb Plate Beam Knees, 
Welded Ends 
do. Plate Knees 
do. do. 
Following Machine 
Beam Knees in Fore and Aft 
Peaks, when done alone or 
with the rest of the work i 
Peaks, all sizes. 
NOTE: If done with Deck 
Beam Knees, ordinary Beam 
Knee price to apply. 
Beam Knees, Forecastle and 
Poop, Riband to be kept clear 
of the Bean Knees. 
Beam Knees, Odd Bean Knees, 
all sizes 
NOTE: Number of Knees deeme 
odd, to be left an open 
cluestion between Foreman anc 
Men. 
11/9 13/6 15/3 
10/1 11/10 13/7 
11/9 13/5 i 15/3 
11/9 13/6 15/3 
10/1 11/10 13/7 
11/9 13/6 15/3 
11/9 13/6 15/3 
10/1 11/10 13/7 




Extract from: CLYDE RIVETERS' PIECE-WORK PRICE LIST 
NEW WORK 
(Hand Riveting -Iron Rivets) 
1926. 
No. Description of Wc;rk 5I 1" 1" 18" ,t Io. 
1. Ash Shoots: - 
(a) Lone on ground, 
(b) Built in Ship, 
sh Shoot Castings, Bunker 
or Casing Ring and Deck 
Castings, 
3. uxilia °y :;iachinery Seats, 
Foundation Bars - 
(a) Rivets through 
tank top, 
(ba Rivets through 
vertical flange, 
done with seats or 
done alone - 
Single bars, 
Double Bars, 
16/ 16/8 17/2 








16/8 18/9 2/10 -3/- 
21/3 3/4 25/6 27/6 
'SI';711,SS S.MIO`d I^IllII"IaTd 
',sti) XICfM7ddV 
APPEIvDIX ".21___CL3 N c 
Assume: (1) Times set so as to enable an average man to 
earn 25 Der cent over time -wage, i.e. the following 
additions are made to the estimated operation time: - 
Piece -work 25 per cent; Halsey (one -third bonus) 75 per 
cent; Rowan 33 -1 /3rd. per cent. 
(ii) Average man can make 100 articles in 40 hours. 
(iii) Time -wage is 2/- per hour. 
Then; (i) Piece price: 
100 articles take 40 hours; 
1 article takes 24 minutes; 
Time -wage for one article = 9.6d. 
Add 25 per cent 2.4 
Therefore, piece -price = One shilling. 
(ii) Halsey (one -third bonus) time: 
100 articles take 40 hours; 
Time allowed = 40 plus 30 (75%) = 70 hours. 
(iii) Rowan time: 
100 articles take 40 hours; 
Time allowed = 40 p1'l.s 13 -1 /3rd. 
(33 -1 /3rd. per cent) 
= 53 -1 /3rd. hours. 
Assume further that: 
Worker A (very quick) makes 100 articles in 30 hours; 
B (quick) " " " " 35 hours; 
C (average) 
it D (slow) 
E (very slow) 
It It It 
It " 
" 40 hours; 
" 45 hours; 
" 50 hours. 
Then, wades for 100 pieces: 
(i) Piece -work. 









wages = 100 shillings, 
Halsey (one- third bonus) 
to each worker. 
= 43 -1/3 hours g 2/- = 
86/8d. 
= 46 -2/3 1t u ti - 
93/4d. 
= 50 u 11 11 
100/-. 
= 53 -1/3 " 11 u - 
106/8d. 
= 56 -2/3 " 11 - 
113/4d. 
= 70 hours; 
receives 30 plus 13 -1/3 
11 35 " 11 -2/3 
u 40 " 10 
It 45 " 8 -1/3 
11 50 6 -2/3 
(iii) .rowan: 
Time allowed = 53 -1 /3rd. hours; 
Wage =(Time taken plus Time taken x Time saved) x 
( Time allowed ) 
Worker A receives 30 plus 30 x 23 -1/3 = 43¡ " 2/- 
53-1/3 
" B " 35 " 35 x 18 -1/3 = 47 -1/32 " 
53-1/3 










" =100 / -. 
45 " 45 x 8-1/3 = 52-1/32 " 
53-1/3 
50 " 50 x 3-1/3 = 53-1/8 
53-1/3 
= 104 /1d1 
" = 106/3d. 
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APPENDIX "C" (2) 
Variation of Wages per 40 -hour week, with Output: 
Hours Incr: 
ease 
Halsey -Weir (50%) 























10 10 0 0 0 0 1 10 80 0 o 
10 9 1 10 11.1 , 2 
f 92 , 84 5 0.9 
10 8 2 20 25 1 9 90 0 1.6 
10 7 3 30 42.9 12 82 97 1 2. 1 
10 6 4 40 66.7 2 8 106 8 2. 4 
10 5 5 50 100 22 72 120 o 2. 5 
10 4 6 60 150 3 7 140 0 2. 4 
10 3 7 70 233.3 32 62 173 4 2.1 
10 2 8 80 400 4 6 240 0 1.6 





Labou wk. of 40 
















6. 4 128 0 
5.1136 0 
3. 6 1All 0 
1.9152 0 
References: (1) Time saved x 100 
Time taken. 
(2) Time taken plus bonus hours. 
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APPENDIX "C "(3) continued. 
It will be noted that the Rowan bonus is more generous 
than the Halsey -Weir up to 50 per cent of the saving, and 
more generous than the Halsey up to 66 -2/3 per cent of the 
saving, after which it is less generous. This has some - 
times been called the "poor half" of the Rowan curve, and 
has been the object of criticism. For example, the bonus 
paid to a man who does the job in 8 hours is the same as 
that paid to a man who does the job in 2 hours, namely 
1.6 hours in each case, and this is considered by some to 
be unfair to the latter. However, this fast worker does 
four jobs in the time taken to do one by his slower work- 
mate, so that he really earns 4 x 1.6 = 6.4 hours bonus 
instead of 1.6 in the same working time. 
Sir Wm. Rowan Thompson, seeking to refute the criticism 
of the "poor' half of the Rowan curve, wrote: "There is a 
general reply to all the alleged defects and academic 
objections regarding the "poor" second half of the'Rowan 
system. If, as I have urged, there is a limit, even with 
the assistance of the management, to aiman saving more than 
50 per cent -of the standard time allowance, then what is 
the use of considering or discussing what roes, or does not 
take place in the second half of either the Rowan or Halsey 
scales? It is outside the range of general practice, and 
there the ,natter ends. "(1) 
(1) "The Premium Bonus System" p. 28. 
On the other hand, one of the claimed advantages3A5 
the Rowan system is that rate- fixing need not be particularly 
accurate because, after the point of 50 per cent saving, 
the Rowan bonus, unlike the Halsey -Weir, can never become 
excessive. Clearly this advantage is meaningless if the 
case pf pver 50 per cent saving is in fact "outside the 
range of general practice ". Janes Rowan himself apparently 
did not share Sir William's views, for in correspondence 
with F.A. Halsey he wrote; speaking of the cases of very 
large time saving:- "You will no doubt remark that these 
are extreme cases and seldom to be met with, but these are 
the cases we are aiming at and hope to arrive at some day, 
although it may be a long way off. When we do arrive at 
them we will not require to cut the man's rates, but you 
will and so will Messrs. Weir....There is no getting over 
the fact that if ever you have to cut rates it tells very 
much against the premium system. We have never yet cut a 
rate unless we have made a radical change in the method of 
doing the work. "(1) 
(1) Correspondence between Messrs. James Rowan and F.A. 
Halsey in the columns of the "American Machinist" of 





°1Ñ1 .. ApPË IX 
1111111111 
Grah s ewinR co . 














PEP . .......... . ... 
1ÌÌÌ1ÌHi 1111ÌÌ1B .........8;18 
C.'11:1:1111111111..11' 
11BINIÌIIIÌ ,._ ._ r.. m..c.r regoird 
MEN . .. ... 
E11 
i::r 





u . .P .. 
11111 : 





'11u11111.i1'.1: .11.; 1....... 
ÌÌ111Ì111iH111Ì1ÌÌ 
'111111"1111á:° 11111... 11.. 
818181111C11 ... .1..11.... mum ...1:1111111. 
Out 
11 111 
'11111' I11 1811811 








APPEidDIX "C" (4) Contd. 
It will be seen that the Rowan labour -cost at first 
rises above the Halsey -Weir and Halsey, but at half and two - 
thirds respectively it falls below. This shews how that, if 
rate -fixing is fairly accurate the employer will prefer one 
of the Halsey systems, since the labour -cost with only snail 
savings of time allowed. is less'than the Rowan labour -cost. 
If, however, rate -fixing cannot be, or is not, accurately 
done, the Rowan system is much safer for the employer for, 
with large savings of time allowed, labour -cost is less than 
with the Halsey systems. The graph also illustrates the 
further advantage of the Rowan system that the employer may 
be able to introduce new methods involving less time, and yet 
not renuire to cub the rate, unless the change is a radical 
one. 
APPL'NDIX "0" ( 51 
EMERSON 'EFFICI ENCY BONUS SCALE. 
Efficiency Bonus: % Efficiency Bonus: % 









69 .11 87 7.56 
70 .22 88 8.32 
71 .37 89 9.11 
72 .55 90 9.91 
73 .76. 91 10.74 
74 1.02 92 11.62 
75 1. 31 93 12. 56 
76 1.64 94 13.52 
77 1.99 95 14.53 
78 2. 38 96 15. 57 
79 2.80 97 16.62 
80 3. 27 98 17. 70 
81 3.78 99 18.81 
82 4.33 100 20.00 
83 4.92 For every 1% An increase 




APPENDIX "D't C1) 
Extracted from the .;iinistry of Labour Gazette, March 1932. 
BELAUX SYSTEM OF WOK EASUP,Er,IEs::T. 
Settlement of Dispute at Works of Messrs. Wolsey Ltd. 
The stoppage of work which commenced on 7th. Lecaaber 
last at the hosiery works of Messrs. Wolsey Ltd. , in 
Leicester and district., and as a protest against the 
introduction of the Bedaux system of work measurement, 
was brought to an end as the result of an agreement, 
signed on 11th. February. This agree,,ient followed a 
aeries of joint conferences presided. over by the Lord 
Mayor of Leicester, who was accompanied by an officer of 
the Ministry of Labour. The agreement was in the 
following terris: - 
(1) RESPONSIBILITY OF MANAGEMENT IN FIXING BASE 
RATES - The Union (The Leicester and Leicestershire 
Amalgamated Hosiery Union) contended that the sole 
responsbility for the fixing of the base rates rested 
with the Bedaux Company. Wolsey, Limited, gave a 
definite assurance that they would take full responsibility 
and that future, before fixing base rates, they would 
be pre -pared to consult with the Union. 
(2) TESTS hi L TIME STUDIES - Wolsey, Li.dited, gave a 
definite assurance that full studies of good, bad and 
indifferent work, and on quic k, average and slow 
operators, would be taken; thus giving a definite under- 
taking that a fair average study would, in fact, be taken. 
Wolsey, Limited, take full responsibility for "B. 
values" and are prepared to retest any "B. value" questioned 
by the majority of workers in aiy department. 
It is recognised by Wolsey, Limited, that speed 
performance on the part d.f the operator shall not be sole 
test of efficiency. 
(3) PREMIUM - Wolsey, Limited, agreed to give the 
direct worker 95% of the premium earned, in place of the 
75% at present in operation. It was stressed, however, 
that in the interests of the workers it was essential that 
there should be team spirit, and that the indirect worker 
should have an inducement to give the direct operator good 
and efficient service. It was, therefore, agreed that 
the direct worker would give 5% of the premium earned, to 
which Wolsey, Limited, were prepared to contribute a 
further 5% in order to maintain the team spirit. 
(4) COMPLEXITIES OP_TIE BEDAUX SYSTE . Wolsey, 
Limited, conceded that the complexities and rigidity of 
the Bedaux System were amongst the chief causes of com- 
plaint, and realised that a very serious effort must be 
made to simplify the whole system; and, in particular 
Wolsey, Limited, agreed. to group the various allowances 
in the form of an agreed value, it being understood that 
this value would be altered from time to time as 
conditions varied, by arrangement between management and 
the workers. 
(5) Wolsey, Limited, agreed. that, when it was proposed to 
put a new Department on Bedaux, in order that the workers in 
that department should have aiopportunity of satisfying 
themselves that they could earn satisfactory wages under the 
system, the Company guaranteed to nay them for a period of 
three months their previous average hourly piece rate earningq 
this figure to be agreed upon. 
(6) Wolsey, Limited, also agreed. to pay for work N.O.B. 
(work which has not been studied) at the average hourly 
earnings of the operator, including premium, instead of, as 
in the past, at the base rate, this average figure to be 
agreed upon. 
(7) It was agreed that in a complicated department, such as 
the fancy department, considerable fear might exist that the 
application of the Bedaux System would be too complicated. 
Wolsey, Limited, gave a definite assurance that a simplified 
method of application would be installed, which would enable 
the girls to understand the application without any difficulty 
(8) In order that Wolsey, Limited, may be able to deal 
immediately with any grievances or misunderstandings which 
might arise in the future, they gave a definite assurance 
that they are prepared to establish a works council in each 
factory at the earliest opportunity. 
(9) In order that the workers may thoroughly understand 
the 
working of the Bedaux System, Wolsey, Limited, suggest 
that 
one worker: from each factory, chosen by the 
workers them- 
selves, shall be trained in the detailed working of the 
application if they so desire. 
(10) The Union contended that there was considerable 
anxiety on the part of the work people that the Bedaux 
System would result in the harsh treatment of individuals. 
Wolsey, Limited, stated that this was directly contrary 
to their policy in the application of Bedaux, and they 
undertook to give sympathetic consideration to any case 
in which age or other disability is involved. 
Conclusion: The signatories to this agreement are convince 
that, if is provisions are carried out by all concerned in 
the spirit of Mutual co- operation and good -will, the 

























Chart shewing performance 
variation of one operator 
T10 timings), drilling .040" 
dia. hole through e thick 
cast iron. 













APPENDIX "D" (2) ( continued) 
Operator Time (mins.) Chart sheaving performance 
variation of ten operators 
1 .233 drilling .040" hole through 
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VARIATION IN PERFORMANCE OF 10 OPERATORS 
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APPENDIX "D"() 
STUDY BY MA' DEPT. 41. ELEMENT RECORD CARD 
DATE 22.9.42 No. OF OPERATORS STUDIED 10 
ELEMENT No. 25A ....... 
ELEMENT VALUE .043 
DESCRIPTION. 
.......................... 
CIZAN DRILL JIG WITH AIR PISTOL. 
Hold Jig in left han4, pink up. air ........ ................ .............. . ..... ..... 
plAto.1..mith_right...hand .ji.g.Ab.P.r.9.1Aghly...t.P.. ....... ...... ........ 
Place.. Air .pistol aside.. .. ... .... . ..... 
HISTORY 
MACHINE TYPE NUMBER I R.P.M. FEED TOOL No. TYPE 
REMARKS Apply..11$411 cases. Wars lubricant io usad On drill. 










































FOR DETAILS SEE OTHER SIDE 
.047 Kai oso 
.040. 1 040 438: 













issai 021. .021 
.031 .027 .042 
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ELEMENT VALUE .043 MINUTES 
APPENDIX "E''. 
GROUP INCENTIVES. 
APPENDIX "E" (1) 
CONTRACT PIECE-WORK. 
Sample Contract Document as used 
for Electrical Work in the Ship- 
building Industry. 
(copy) 
kAOS & SMITH LTD. 
Vessel Job Price No... ................. 
STATEMENT OF AGREEMENT FOR WORK TO BE CARRIED OUT ON 
JOB PRICE CONTRACT. 
The work detailed in the specification below will be 
undertaken on job price contract for the sum of £ 
This price is based on plain time rates. The hours 
actually worked on overtime are to be included in the time- 
on which the price is based, but all usual overtime 
allowances are to be additional. 
The contract price includes for all labour only 
(electricians, electricians' apprentices, dilutees,, 
labourers, or helpers) to complete the electrical contract. 
The residue of earnings after payment of the base 
time wages will be snare( out in the proportions of actual 
hours worked per man, the- payment being made to the neares 
penny. 
Should. the rates of pay be altered during the period 
of a contract corresponding alterations will be made in 
the above price. 
Where contract price cannot immediately be fixed, 
work must be proceeded with, and contract price arranged 
as soon as details of contract -or other queries are 
finally settled.. 
3 0 
The work to comrìience -Ind to complete 
All the work in this contract as regards Quality 
and workmanship is to be carried out to the entire 
satisfaction of the management, and. should the contract, 
in the opinion of the management, not be proceeding 
Quickly enough to complete in the agreed time, they mulcïi 
rectuest extra hours to be worked to complete in the time. 
If owing to the non -delivery of any fittings which 
prevents the completion of any part of the contract, 
representatives of the wor«ers and the management shall 
agree what proportion of the contract shall be deemed 
complete. 
SP+,CI.FICATION. 
1?epresentative of AMOS ez SMITH 
LTD. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . ) 
)Representatives of EMPLOYEES 
............F.Ç.....<<... 
Wit-.Le. . . . . . . . . . . a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Date. . . . . . . o . . . . . . . 
FOR AMOS & . ITH LTD 
Signed.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . O . . . . s . . . . . . . . 
APPENDIX "E" ( 2 ) 
9. p i 
PRODUCTION BONUS SCHEME. 
1;ï0NTH ENDINTG. . , . . . . . . . . . 
ACTUAL IJI:ONTHLY OUT '?UT FI GURE £ 
MONTHLY OUTPUT BASIS FIGURE £ 
AMOUNT ON MICH BONUS. IS PAID:s3 
ACTUAL TOTAL MONTHLY BONUS 
FIGURE = 5% OF ABOVE AM OUNT £ 
TOTAL MO THLY BONUS x 100% _ % OF EACH WORKER'S MONTHLY GROSS 
TOTAL MONT'HI,Y WAGES EARNINGS " BE PAID AS BONUS 
NAME 













£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d 
.__. ___:_ 
0 AV 
APPENDIX "E" (3) 
GROUP "POINTS" BONUS SYSTEM 
(Explanatory Leaflet) 
THE 'POOL' 
The Pool is a co- operative incentive and confers on those 
sharing in it a definite responsibility to act in every 
way possible in the general interest.. The conduct of 
every single person participating in the Pool affects the 
:amount to be shared by all. Every member of the Company 
should understand this vital point, and accept the duty and 
responsibility implied. 
One aspect is involved in paragraph 7. below: - 
(1) The pool will be operated in three sections : - 
Section A. - Cumberland Works. 
Section B. - Hendon Works. 
Section C. - Administration and Staff. 
The departments participating in the respective sectionE 
are shown in the attached schedule. 
(2) In making up the Pool each of the Company's products is 
given, by the Management, a "points" value based on its 
selling price. This includes repairs and service charged 
to customers. 
(3) The Pool will be built up as follows: - 
Sections A and B: From the "points" represented by the 
articles which reach the Finished Stores every day and 
which are ready for sale. These "Points" will be displaye 
on an indicator which will show : - 
(a) The Pool "points" accumulated day by day for 
the current week. 
2 3 
(b) The points attained over the previous week. 
(c) The percentage paid by the Pool for the previous 
week. 
Section C: Prom the "points" represented by the 
total net salas for the month. The percentage available 
in the Pool for any month will be declared as soon as 
possible after the end of the month. 
(4) The Pool will be maid out as follows: - 
Sections A and B: At the end of each week on the 
previous week's production. 
Section C: Towards the end of each month on the sales 
for the previous month. 
(5) Participation in the Pool will be available to all 
members of the Company's permanent staff after a 
probationary period of one month's service. It will not 
be available to temporary staff. 
(6) Pool payments are subject to Income Tax which will be 
deduced at time of payment. 
CO Any time lost, except on authorised holidays, will 
involve loss of Pool earnings. The Pool points will be 
spread over those who are present and working. The 
individual incurring such loss may be penalised. In view 
of the basis on which the Pool is built, and its objectives, 
the right is reserved to bar Pool participation for 
unpunctuality, slackness, or unsatisfactory conduct. 
(8) The cost of rectifying articles found defective after 
passing final inspection will have to be borne by Section 
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!;UALITY OF WORK 
SPEED OF WORK 
Excellent 
Above Averag 
















High Di r 
II`TI`l'IATIVE 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tiI l " '11xTI1V.G, REPORT. 
Name..........,.. Dept 
Clock No. Tob. 
APPENï:iIX rtI-0}t 
Y 
Length of Service 
Rated by 
Physical ¡Excellent Physique Good Physique 
Suitabil:'and sound stamina. and Ütamina. 
ity. Can always provide Work does not 


















Satisfactory Physiqud Below Physique Poor Phys- 
and stamina. Seldom needed for the type and 
fails to maintain job. Work over- unstiitable 
standard required. taxes his for the 
strength. work 
1 I } 






Unusually clean 'Maintains good 
in personal app -- standard of 
earance and *.work -- personal and 
ing habits. An working clean - 





+- Accu - f-+ Accu - 
rate ' .J ratej 
IWorks enth.usias- Can be relied 
tically. (:'an be ¡upon to carry 
trusted to do his lo_:t all reas- 
best at all times ionable instr- 
aind to try out luctions. Ira- 
new methods. 1proves team} 
1morale by his 
+ 
Mai - retains fair stan- 
dard of- personal c1- 
eanliness and work - 
ingbabits. Average 
in this respect. 
Below average 
in cleanliness 
and a messy 
worker. Will- 




and a dirty 
worker. Has 










ed in the work. May 
slack sometimes but 
can usually be tru- 
sted to do accept- 
able job. 
Does not work 
as well as the 
average. Does 
what he i s told 







Accu , - ¡ .p ¡Accu - + Accu 
rate I irate ¡ rate 
Always maintains 
a high standard 
of workmanship. 





Outstanding. Out- Very sat- 71- 
put required al- factory. (lit- 















a good standard of 
workmanship. Seldom 




Reliabil- Throoughly de- 
ity. pendable. Can 
always be trust- 






+ :,.ccu - 
rate 
1-.... 
'Above the a v- 
er=_ge. Can be 

























put required some- 
times exceeded. 













A steady reliable 
worker. Needs re- 






Cannot always be 
trusted tovairk 



















MERIT' RATING REPORT FORM (Reverse) 




Is this person in the job best suited to him? YES / NO If not, what other 
type of work would he do best? 
Is this person suitable for promotion? NOW / LATER / NEVER / DON'T KNOW. 
is this person (tick one) improving ( ): Stationary ( ): deteriorating 
Is this person worth a technical training? YES / NO / DON'T KNOW. 
Other comments 
Signature Date 
Time lost through lateness and absence (Personnel Office to complete):- 
Perfect ( ): Excellent ): Good ( ): Fair ( ): Poor ( ): 
DIRECTIONS FOR MAKING MERIT RATING REPORT. 
'Construction of the Merit Rating Report Remember: 
This Merit Rating Report is divided into 
t% personl qualities; each quality is 
divided into 5 levels of ability: each 
level: of ability is divided (on the scale 
beneath it) into 3 scoring spaces. 
(The s;keztlin quality, "Time lost through 
Lateness and Absence," has been filled 
in from the Personnel Office records - 
see above). 
Method of completing the Report. 
1. Start with the first personal quality 
on the report, i.e. Physical Suitability. 
Read the 5 groups of woes that describe 
the 5'levels of ability. Then select 
the group of words from the five that 
most nearly describes the employee you 
are rating. If the wording describes 
him exactly.(for this quality) then put 
a /mark in the space above the word 
"accurate ". If the employee is not quite 
as good as the description, put your I/ 
mark. in the space over the sign - (minus). 
If the man is slightly better than the '- 
description put your /mark in the space 
over the sign o+ (plus). 
2. One axiom of sound ;rating is to rate 
one quality at a time ,for all your 
employees. 
.:-When you have rated the first employee 
for this' first qualit, turn over to the 
report for the next employee and rate 
him forthe same quality: Work through 
the reports, rating', the first quality for 
all.ynur employees; then rate them all 
for the second. quality and so On until 
you have rated all your employees for all 
the ] istec]_ áuali ties,. ___ 
(a) Do not rate an employee on your 
personal like or dislike of him 
or his personal opinions. Your 
decisions must be based en the 
value of the employee's actions 
to. the Company. This is the only 
thing that counts. 
(b) Judge a man by his work during 
the whole time he has been under 
your control. DON'T judge him 
only on an isolated incident, 
whether it is good or bad. 
(c) Use the same fairness and care 
that you want displayed when you 
yourself are rated. 
(d) No one could ever score the 
maximum marks for all the highest 
or left -hand levels of ability. 
When the rating is done correctly, 
the majority of a "satisfactory 
average man's" scores fall in the 
third level of ability, with a few 
of the remaining scores (his 
strong points) falling in the first 
and second levels and a few scores 
(his creak points) falling in the 
fourth and fifth levels. The 
better a man is, cf course, the 
more his scores move towards the 
left of the page. 
(e) The rating of people is NOT a job 
that can be rushed through. No 
man, no matter what is his position 
likes to be judged hastily, 
particularly if an increase and 
possibly his future, rests on the 
result. 
(f) We want men to know their fgUrfir só 
that they can make efforts to improve. Men will be allowed, 
therefore, to read their completed reports should they wish to 
do so, and discuss them with the personnel Manager. 
el 9 U 
APPENDIX "G''. 
PROFIT - SHARING AND CO-PART NLRSiIIP. 
APPENDIX "G" ( 1) 












Boxuses paid under schemes 
for which details are available+ 
Number Average Average 
profit -sharing (end of year entitled to of amount percentage 
(end of year) participate Schemes per head addition to 
earnings 
£ s d Per cent. 
1929 517 526 267,000 420 9 9 11 4.8 
1930 508 517 247,000 428 10 2 11 5.7 
1931 492 501 240,000 415 10 6 7 5.4 
1932 471 479 227,000 391 9 10 5 5.2 
1933 453 461 223,000 383 10 18 7 5.6 
1934 435 442 224,000 369 10 12 3 5.7 
1935 428 434 235,000 356 10 14 5 5.8 
1936 422 428 261,000 368 11 6 1 6.1 
1937 413 419 265,000 369 11 8 0 6.1 
1938 399 404 261,000 355 11 6 7 5.9 
+ Including schemes under which no bonus was earned 
APPENDIX "G "(2) 
=In some of these schemes employees may receive part or the *hole of theie* 9 2 
subsequent bonuses in cash, etc. after a prescribed period, or after they 
have accumulated a prescribed. amount of capital. 
Types of Schemes. 
The following Table gives particulars for schemes of various 
types at the end of 1938:- 
Type of scheme+ 
"Share issue" schemes, i.e. 
schemes consisting in the 
issue to employees of share 
capital, either free, or on 
specially favourable terms. 45 





Total Approximate discontinued 




"Deposit" schemes, i.e. 
schemes under which 
interest, varying with the 
profits, is allowed on depo 
its made by employees 
Other schemes, analysed by 
methods of paying bonus: 
(a) Bonus paid in shares 
or invested in capital of 
the undertaking.= 
(b) Bonus retained in a 
provident, superai:.nuetion 
or other similar fund. 
(c) Bonus paid in cash, o 
credited to a savings or 
deposit account. 
(d) Bonus paid in other 
ways; combinations of 
above systems; or method 






















261 385,700 219,200 411 
.1 
+Where a scheme has been modified since its introduction, it has been classified 
according to its latest form. 
+For the majority of schemes in this group the bonus is a definite proportion 
of profits or a sum determined by the rate of dividend paid to shareholders. 
3Ì3 
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PAY E Y2- BY-RE S ULT S AND 
IN:LIRE CT LABOUR. 
394 
PAY,,ili1;iT-BY-RESULTS .' AlT1) I''t;iìliiJCT LABOUR. 
There are inevitably certain types of workers who cannot 
be remunerates on a payment -by- results basis because their 
results are not easily measurable. Such employees as 
maintenance staff, stores issuers, labourers, transport men, 
and so on cone within this category, and yet they contribute 
in varying degrees to the output of the whole plant. 
If some workers are 
dissatisfaction may 
workers should have 
workers wherever an 
paie by results and others are not, 
well result, ana, 
some share in the 
if possible, ancillary 
bonuses paid to direct 
increase in the output of the latter 
necessitates a proportionate increase in effort -out out by 
the indirect works; rs. If this latter condition is not 
fulfilled there is no justification for increasing the 
remuneration of the ancillary workers. 
Ancillary workers may be divided into two classes, viz. 
(a) those workers such as furnace -men and labourers, who work 
directly with a certain group of productive workers, and can 
influence the latter's output; and (b) those who have no 
such direct associ. Lion, but serve the plant as a whole. 
The first group shoulí1 receive a bonus based on the earnings 
of the direct workers whore they serve, ana the latter a bonus 
bases: either on the average piece -work earnings of the works 
as a whole, or on the total output of the plant. 
Where the indirect workers work in close association 
with, and can influence the output of, a certain group of 
productive workers, their total bonus may be calculated on 
the piece -earnings of the direct workers, divided by the 
nunber of hours worked by the indirect workers. This ;rust 
be multiplied by an arbitrary figure (P) which is calculated 
to yield a reasonable bonus to the ancillary workers, thus: - 
P x piece -earnings of Amount of bonus 
direct workers = payable per hour 
Total hours worked. by to ancillary 
indirect workers workers. 
It follows from such an arrange :lent that if the ancillary 
workers can do their job with either fewer men or in a 
shorter time, the amount of bonus received per hour wc5rked 
will rise. Hence there is an incentive to speedy working 
and. efficiency; on the Part of the indirect workers. Not 
only so, but the ancillary workers have an incentive to in- 
crease, so far as it lies within t eir power, the efficiency 
of the productive workers, for this will result in a higher 
bonus nay:lent for both classes of workers. 
On the other hand, the amount of bonus paid to the 
indirect workers is not in direct proportion to the mount 
of effort which they put forth, since the total bonus pool 
depends upon. the output of the direct workers. Further, 
the sche.ie suffers from the inevitable disadvantage of a 
collective incentive, nanely that there play be a tendency 
for certain workers to slack and yet still enjoy the sane 
bonus as their more energetic fellows. 
Bonuses for executives and supervisors are outside the 
scope of this thesis; this subject merits a detailed study 
of its own. It may be said 
here, however, that as a 
396 
general rule it would seem to be undesirable to pay 
supervisors bonuses based on the output of their subordinates; 
since this policy inevitably tends to mitigate against good 
relations between the fore.aan and his shop. There is a 
grave danger of the foreman becoming an ogre constantly 
driving his men to greater efforts, an attitude which is 
calculated to destroy all spirit of co- operation and good- 
will. The financial incentive of this type of arrangement 
is much too direct, and it would seen to be more satisfactory 
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"Incentives in Repetitive Work" I.H.R.B. Report 69, 1934. 
"Incentives - Some Experimental Studies" I.H.R.B. Report 
No.72, 1935. 
Industrial Court Award No. 728, 1922. 
"Industrial Relations Handbook ", Ministry of Labour, 1944. 
Interim Report of the Cotton Manufacturing Commission, 1948. 
Memorandum on Payment by Results, 1944. 
National Arbitration Tribunal Decisions - various. 
Report of the Cotton Working Party, 1946. 
Report of the Departmental Committee of the Board of 
Trade on the Engineering Trades after the War, 1917. 
Report on Collective Agreements between Employers and 
Workpeople, Ministry of Labour, 1934. 
Report on Profit -sharing and Labour Co- partnership in the 
United Kingdom, Ministry of Labour 1920, Cmd.544. 
Also Board of Trade Reports of 1894 and 1912. 
Report on the Operation of the Payment by Results Scheme 
applied under Essential Work (Building and Civil Engin- 
eering) Order 1941, during the period July 1941 to 
March, 1947, 1947. 
OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
1b) AMERICAN 
Bureau of Labour Statistics Surveys - various. 
National Industrial Conference Board Reports. 
"Survey of Experiences in Profit - sharing "United States 
Senate Report No. 610, Washington, 1939. 
UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
Allen: "British Industries and their Organisation" 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers: 
Transactions - various 
"A Piece -rate System" 
Balderston: "Group Incentives" 
"Wage Setting based on Job Evaluations' 
Balderston, Karabasz and Brecht: "Management of an 
Enterprise" 
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Barnes: , "Motion and Time Study" 
Bedaux: "Bedaux Measures Labour" 
Benge: "Job Evaluation and Merit Rating" 
Bethel, Atwater, Smith and Stackman: "Industrial 
Organisation and Management" 
Executives" 
Bloomfield: "Financial Incentives for Employees and 
Carroll: "Time Study for Cost Control" 
Chane: 'Motion and Time Study" 
Chapman: "The Lancashire Cotton Industry" 
Cole: "The Payment of Wages" 
Collective Agreements between Trade Unions and Employers' 
Federations - various. 
Conservative Party: "Co- partnership Today" 
"The Industrial Charter" 
Deimer: "Wage Payment Plans" 
Dennison: "Incentives for Executives" 
Dewey: "Human Nature and Conduct" 
UNOFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS (continued) 
Dobb: "Wages" 
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Electrical Trades Union: "Report on Payment by Results 
in the Shipbuilding Industry" 
Engineer Office: "The Premium System of Paying Wages" 
Fay: "Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day" 
General Federation of Trades Unions: "Report on the 
Bedaux and Kindred Systems" 
"Handbook of Business Administration" 
Hendry: "A Manual of Time and Motion Study" 
Jewkes and Gray: "Wages and Labour in Cotton Spinning" 
"Job Analysis - A Classified and Annotated Bibliography" 
Knight: "Risk, Uncertainty and Profit" 
Labour Party: "Industrial Democracy" 
Labour Research Department: "How Bedaux Works" 
"Wages during the War" 
Leicester Hosiery Union: "Report on the Bedaux System of 
Labour Measurement 
Lidbury: "A National Wages Policy" 
Lowry, Maynard and Stegemerten: "Time and Motion Study and 
Formulae for Wage Incentives" 
Lytle: "Wage Incentive Methods" 
"Management Handbook" 
Mayo: "Human Problems of and Industrial Civilisation" 
"Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation" 
Miles: "The Problem of Incentives in Industry" 
Northcott: "Personnel Management; its Scope and Practice" 
Powell: "Payment by Results" 
Prosser: "Piece -rate, Premium and Bonus" 
Roethlisberger: "Management and Morale" 
Roethlisberger and Dickson: "Management and the Worker" 
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Rowan- Thompson: "The Premium -Bonus System" 
Rowntree: "The Human Factor in Business" 
Schloss: "Yethods of Industrial Remuneration" 
Scott, Clothier, La_tthewson and Spriegel: "Personnel 
Management" 
Schumard: "A Primer of Time Study" 
Smyth and Murphy: "Job Evaluation and Employee Rating" 
Todd: "The Cotton World" 
Trades Union Congress: "Annual Statistical Statements" 
"The T.U.C. Examines the Bedaux 
System of Payment by Results" 
PERIODICALS 
American Machinist (U.S.A.) 





Engineering Bulletin (U.S.A) 
Engineer's Monthly Journal 
Factory Management and Maintenance (U.S.A.) 
Fortune (U.S.A.) 
Harvard Business Review (U.S.A.) 
Illustrated Carpenter and Builder 
Industry Illustrated 
International Labour Review 
Labour Management 
Manchester Guardian Commercial 
Mechanical World and Engineering Record 
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PERIODICALS (continued) 




Personnel Management and Nelfare 
Production and Engineering Bulletin of the Ministry of 
Labour 
Scotsman 
The Human Factor (U.S.A.Ì 
Times 
Unity 
